Twenty-five years after 9/11, Al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent (القاعدہ برصغیر) (often named as Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent -AQIS) has neither disappeared nor returned to the centralized model associated with Al-Qaeda before 2001. Instead, it has adapted to South Asia’s changing militant environment by operating through dispersed cells, partner organizations, shared personnel, ideological influence and propaganda networks. This transformation is most evident in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where AQIS has maintained leadership and infrastructure while deepening its relationship with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and emerging militant coalitions. Its regional reach also extends into India, Kashmir and Bangladesh, where propaganda, recruitment and localized networks provide additional avenues for influence. The United Nations’ 38th Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report, circulated in August 2026, assessed that AQIS had evolved from a “fragmented organization” into “a regional terrorist entity,” developing logistics and financial networks and increasingly operating through small, scattered cells rather than large formations.
Leadership and Afghanistan: AQIS’s Strategic Rear Base
AQIS was formally announced by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in September 2014, with Asim Umar (Sana-ul-Haq) appointed as its first emir. Umar, an Indian-origin Al-Qaeda operative, led the group until he was killed on 23 September 2019 during a joint U.S.-Afghan operation in Musa Qala, Helmand Province. His death did not dismantle the organization. Usama Mahmood, who had served as an important spokesman and media figure, subsequently assumed leadership, while Atif Yahya Ghouri has served as his deputy. The continuity of AQIS leadership following the deaths of both Umar and, later, Zawahiri illustrates the organization’s ability to absorb decapitation without losing its broader network.
Afghanistan remains fundamental to that resilience. The latest UN assessment states that AQIS leadership, including Usama Mahmood and Atif Yahya Ghouri, remained in Kabul, where they had reportedly been issued tazkiras by the Taliban authorities. Afghanistan therefore provides AQIS with physical sanctuary as well as the organizational environment from which leadership, training, communications, propaganda and relationships with other militant organizations can be maintained. The latest UN report recorded a Member State assessment that Al-Qaeda trainers had trained Balochistan Liberation Army elements alongside TTP personnel. Afghanistan consequently functions as a common operating environment in which several militant networks maintain overlapping connections.
The AQ–TTP Nexus
Al-Qaeda’s relationship with the TTP is longstanding. It provided ideological guidance, training and operational support to Pakistani Taliban factions during the TTP’s formative years. The relationship has since become more organizationally interconnected, particularly following the TTP’s consolidation of numerous factions after 2020.
One important manifestation has been the movement of experienced AQIS personnel into the TTP. Chaudhry Muneeb ur Rehman Jatt, known as Commander Muneeb, is a prominent example. A former AQIS operative, Muneeb took charge of the TTP’s Umar Media apparatus in 2021. This proved to be an important factor behind the improvement in the TTP’s propaganda and recruitment capabilities. The UN further assessed that Al-Qaeda continued to provide ideological guidance, training and support to the TTP. This indicates a growing convergence in which the TTP retains its Pakistan-focused insurgent identity while benefiting from Al-Qaeda’s transnational ideological and organizational resources.
AQIS and the IMP Coalition
A second major development is the emergence of Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) in 2025. The coalition brought together Lashkar-e-Islam, Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwah-e-Hind (TTG) also known as Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group and Harakat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP). In the latest issue of AQIS Urdu publication Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind, an infographic featured IMP attacks in the months May June July alongside attacks by other regional affiliates of the group including Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Harkat Shabaab Al-Mujahideen. The UN’s latest assessment states that AQIS formed the “backbone” of IMP and attributed several attacks to the organization operating through this network. This is particularly concerning because IMP’s further nexus with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, notorious for its urban attacks, can translate into broader AQIS-IMP-JuA nexus which can be a concerning factor for Pakistan’s security landscape. In August 2026, JuA claimed three attacks in Karachi and three more in Punjab.
Bangladesh, India and Kashmir: Regional Reach
Bangladesh remains a secondary theatre but an important indicator of AQIS’s regional strategy. The
most significant recent Bangladesh-focused development was Usama Mahmood’s August 2024 statement, issued through As-Sahab after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Rather than calling immediately for participation in government, Mahmood advocated a longer-term approach centered on Da’wah (preaching), building the capacity for resistance and revolution, and developing social influence. The statement portrayed Bangladesh’s political upheaval as an opportunity for Islamic mobilization. The latest UN report subsequently expressed concern that AQIS was attempting to exploit Bangladesh to establish cells. This is an assessment of intent and activity, not evidence that AQIS has established a large operational network there.
Al-Qaeda’s Statement titled “India’s Aggression Against Pakistan”
India and Kashmir remain important primarily because they provide AQIS with a longstanding ideological and mobilizational focus. Its Ghazwa-e-Hind narrative and Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind publication have sought to connect Kashmir and Indian Muslim grievances with Al-Qaeda’s wider transnational agenda. Following Operation Sindoor in May 2025, AQIS issued its message portraying India’s strikes as an attack on Muslims and calling for jihad against India. The organization appeared to use the India-Pakistan confrontation to reassert itself after a period of relatively low visibility. The India dimension nevertheless acquired greater significance following the November 2025 Red Fort attack in Delhi. The UN’s 38th report states that the attack was officially attributed to AQIS. The finding is significant
because it places AQIS’s India strategy beyond the realm of propaganda, while the organization’s overall structure remains decentralized rather than comparable to the large territorial networks of earlier jihadist organizations.
Conclusion
AQIS’s current trajectory is best understood not as a return of the Al-Qaeda of 2001 but as an adaptation to South Asia’s fragmented militant landscape. Afghanistan provides the strategic rear base; the TTP provides the most important Pakistan-focused militant partner; and IMP offers another coalition through which AQIS can project influence. Its relationship with the TTP encompasses a history of ideological and training support, the movement of personnel into TTP structures, and increasingly explicit public support from Al-Qaeda.
AQIS’s importance consequently cannot be measured solely by attacks conducted under its own name. Its continued presence in Kabul, its decentralized cells and logistical networks, its role in IMP, its transfer of media expertise to the TTP, and its ability to connect conflicts in Pakistan, Kashmir, India and Bangladesh demonstrate a model based on networked resilience rather than centralized power. The challenge for regional counter-terrorism agencies is therefore not simply to eliminate AQIS as an independent organization, but to disrupt the relationships through which its ideology, personnel, training and media capabilities continue to circulate across the Af-Pak militant ecosystem.