By Muhammad Haris Khan
When Pakistan came into existence in 1947, it entered a regional environment marked more by hostility than goodwill. From the very outset, India’s leadership believed that Pakistan would not survive and should be absorbed into the Indian mainstream; an assertion documented in the statements of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel. Pakistan, therefore, emerged with virtually no established state apparatus and had to build a coherent national strategy from scratch while managing a difficult relationship with India. The first major conflict over Jammu and Kashmir followed almost immediately.
Amid the other early struggles, Pakistan began searching for reliable international partners to ensure its security and stability. In order to quench the thrust of seeking of potential partners it turned towards US. After the Second World War, the United States was the only country capable of rendering meaningful assistance. Europe lay devastated, while Washington possessed both the resources and the political will to help. In the early decades, U.S. assistance contributed to Pakistan’s agricultural development and to strengthening its armed forces. However, the relationship was rarely linear. Following the 1965 war, the United States imposed sanctions on both Pakistan and India. This prompted Pakistan to reassess its strategic choices and steer towards China articulating a more independent strategic vision. About a decade later, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan again repositioned itself. After the Soviet withdrawal, the United States once more imposed restrictions on Pakistan, resulting in another period of distancing. The events of 11 September 2001 marked yet another pivot and Pakistan coming to the spotlight became an active partner in the international campaign against terrorism. These recurring shifts made the bilateral relationship a true roller-coaster, characterized by alternating periods of cooperation and estrangement. This pattern reinforced the perception within Pakistan that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship are an unreliable alliance.
Another salient feature of this relationship had been its transactional nature. While Pakistan sought a broad-based partnership, the United States often viewed Pakistan through narrow prisms i.e. Afghanistan, India, China or nuclear concerns. As a result, engagement remained issue-driven rather than holistic. Over time, Pakistanis came to accept this as a circular, transactional relationship; one that needed to be managed pragmatically, with the aim of deriving maximum possible benefit.
While government-to-government relations between the both countries fluctuated, people-to-people ties remained consistent. Pakistani students continued to pursue higher education in American universities; Pakistani physicians trained and worked in the United States; IT professionals maintained links with Silicon Valley, and agricultural scientists collaborated with institutions such as the University of California. Despite official pauses, the societal foundation of the relationship endured. Since early 2025, however, bilateral tensions become pronounced. During the parts of the Biden administration and earlier in the first Trump term, relations dipped to a low point.
Post-Second World War international order that had governed global relations for decades was now under strain. The rules and norms that once structured state behavior was no longer being observed consistently. The unipolar moment of American dominance had given way to the re-emergence of multiple centers of power, most notably China and Russia. Of concern was the trend of major powers disregarding established international law and norms in pursuit of their security interests. The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 exemplified this shift. In the regional context, India’s actions in 2016, 2019, and 2025 were perceived by Pakistan as aggressive.
World was passing through an era of strategic transition and unpredictability. Different U.S. administrations had articulated distinct global visions President Donald Trump, for example, had displayed skepticism toward globalization, arguing that it had disproportionately benefited countries like China while hollowing out certain American communities. His focus had been primarily domestic appealing to middle-class white voters who felt marginalized. Trump prioritized infrastructure renewal, job creation, and manufacturing revitalization over foreign interventions. These domestic priorities significantly shaped U.S. foreign policy debates.
Strategically, the United States had emphasized the “Indo-Pacific”, a term popularized by the Biden administration as a central theatre of focus. The concept linked the Indian and Pacific Oceans, aiming to secure sea lanes and counterbalance China’s maritime expansion. This vision had given rise to initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad”) comprising the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. However, Trump’s approach differed: he emphasized economic instruments i.e. tariffs, incentives, and market access as key tools of U.S. strategy, alongside traditional diplomacy.
The Middle East has also remained a focal point of U.S. policy. Under Trump, Israel had become central to Washington’s regional strategy, with Iran perceived as the only remaining challenge after the normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab states. The twelve-day conflict between Israel and Iran, coupled with the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, underscored these dynamics. U.S. support for Prime Minister Netanyahu had remained steadfast.
India had been Washington’s preferred partner for the past 25 years. However, after May 2025, the United States began reassessing whether India could effectively serve as a counterweight to China. This reassessment stemmed from concerns in Washington over India’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” and its continued engagement with both China and Russia even while aligning with the United States. Such duality had complicated the bilateral calculus. A key turning point came in May 2025 when violence erupted in Pahalgam. J.D Vance, then visiting India, declared that the U.S. had “nothing to do with what is happening between India and Pakistan.” However, as Pakistan’s response unfolded, Washington began to question India’s reliability as a partner. Trump reportedly concluded that if India could not manage Pakistan, it could hardly balance China. Additional frictions arose from trade negotiations-particularly U.S. demands for greater access to Indian agricultural markets and from India’s consistent denial to U.S. role in mediation in Pakistan-India conflict, May, 2025.
Against this backdrop, U.S. interest in Pakistan had been renewed. Several factors contributed: Pakistan’s strategic gains during the May 2025 events; a U.S. desire to signal displeasure with India’s proximity to Russia and China; Pakistan’s readiness to accept U.S. mediation in May, 2025 and its nomination of Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Washington also recognized the growing sophistication of Pakistan-China defense cooperation, and identified U.S. interests in Pakistan’s mineral wealth, counterterrorism cooperation and cryptocurrency.
In concrete terms, US-Pakistan engagement had continued after 2010 and intensified before the events of May 2025. Washington released pending F-16 funds, and in March 2025, Pakistan handed over to the U.S. the alleged mastermind of a major terrorist attack on American forces withdrawing from Afghanistan. These actions led to renewed cooperation and public acknowledgment from U.S. officials like General Kurilla, for instance, described Pakistan as an “excellent partner.” Recent high-level engagements including a formal luncheon invitation extended to Pakistan’s military leadership by the U.S. President reflected Washington’s intent to recalibrate strategic, intelligence, and military cooperation with Islamabad. The agenda of these engagements likely included strategic recalibration (enhanced intelligence sharing and defense collaboration), expanded economic and trade linkages (in energy, agriculture, technology, and rare-earth minerals) and cooperation on counterterrorism. On the energy front, U.S. officials had highlighted Pakistan’s significant hydrocarbon potential and indicated interest in investing in oil and gas development. Historically, American companies such as Hunt Oil had explored Pakistan’s basins in the 1950s. With improved relations, such investment might resume.
This gave rise to an important question as to whether the current improvement in US- Pakistan relations is transitional or enduring. The present relations are not merely security-driven but included an economic dimension, something new compared to the past. China remains Pakistan’s steadfast partner, supporting Pakistan at all forums and avoiding interference in its internal affairs, Pakistan should avoid sending mixed signals as it had done in recent years by pausing CPEC. China desires stability in Pakistan because only a stable Pakistan could balance India. Therefore, Pakistan needs to maintain strong relations with both China and the United States. “Proportionality” rather than “balance,” should be preferred as relations with China and the U.S. are inherently asymmetrical and must be guided by national interest.
India appears uneasy with Pakistan’s renewed engagement with the U.S. after years of successful “de-hyphenation.” Similarly, China remained wary of India’s reliability, particularly after India distanced itself from BRICS discussions on non-dollar transactions to accommodate U.S. preferences. At present, all three major powers i.e. the United States, China, and Russia saw value in engaging with Pakistan. The challenge, is whether Pakistan could capitalize on this moment. To do so, Pakistan needs to lower industrial input costs, attract investment in energy and infrastructure, and negotiate effectively by moving away from the tradition of solo negotiations. Pakistan should also give ownership to local communities, particularly in Balochistan, to get benefit of the province’s mineral wealth and explore opportunities in emerging fields such as cryptocurrency, modern agriculture, education, and public health, and engage its diaspora constructively beyond political divides.
Pakistan’s geopolitical context is in transition and the country should strive to maximize the economic and strategic opportunities available in this evolving environment. The decisions made in the manner of those taken during the Afghan war against the USSR can lead to serious repercussions. Therefore, every decision must be carefully evaluated before being taken. Geopolitics is heartless, and the situation in Gaza is a stark reminder of that reality. Nations ultimately act in pursuit of their own interests; therefore, we too must remain aligned with and serve our national interests. National interests are better served through collective decision and parliament is the place for such decisions.