ROYAL DANISH DEFENCE COLLEGE

THE ROLE OF MADRASAS

Assessing Parental Choice, Financial Pipelines and Recent Developments in Religious Education in Pakistan & Afghanistan

Edited by David Vestenskov

DANISH DEFENCE

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2018

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The Role of Madrasas

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Foreword

For more than one and a half decade, Danish soldiers have been engaged in Afghanistan with a core focus on stabilization. From an initial approach to stability of Afghanistan the framework for stabilization has widened, which has resulted in a continuously increased attention toward the region surrounding Afghanistan and the root causes to regional instability. For the last three years, the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) has been working with different research projects with the aim of identifying causes and providing solutions in terms of recommendations for future policy development among the regional states as well as at an international level.

One of the causes identified in the region is the parallel education systems, the religious seminaries – *madrasas* – in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The frequent and constantly repeated framing of madrasas in this narrative caused the RDDC to address this by engaging with three independent research centers from Afghanistan and Pakistan with expertise within this area.

For many years and especially since 9/11 madrasas have been in the limelight. "Incubators of violent extremism". "Food chains of militancy". The controversies and myths are many. This book is most of all an attempt to provide a more nuanced view on the role of madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as to shed light on some of the questions that are at the core of efforts to unravel these myths: Why do parents decide to send their children to madrasas instead of public schools? From which sources do madrasas get their funding and how dependent are they on it? Which religious groups run madrasas?

To provide insights into these questions the RDDC engaged with researchers from the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) and the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), both based in Islamabad, as well as researchers from the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) based in Kabul. The result of this academic project is a book with ground research-based information drawn from the field in Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively and it is important for me to stress that it would not have been possible without the extensive on-the-ground knowledge and access to local communities that CRSS, PICSS, and CAPS brought to the project. I congratulate the research teams from CRSS, PICSS, and CAPS

for this impressive result, and I would like to thank them for their valuable contribution to the gathering and analysis of the data.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have both initiated reforms and made efforts in terms of registration and oversight of madrasas. However, challenges remain, for example how to include all madrasas in the registration without provoking a backlash from local communities. Another important issue at hand is to ensure that children educated in the madrasas become an integrated part of society. Though these challenges associated with madrasas are recognized at the political levels in Pakistan and Afghanistan, there is a lack of documentation that can be used when presenting recommendations to decision makers and policy developers in the two countries.

This book should be read as a modest contribution to closing this information gap by offering tentative recommendations on how to invent and improve implementation of the reforms. However, to ensure further progression with educational reforms further research is required and it is my personal hope - along with RDDC's - that the book can inspire future research and help promote awareness on the role of madrasas in stabilization and peace building efforts in the region.

Finally, the Peace and Stabilization Fund (PSF) located at the Danish Ministry of Defence and Defence Command Denmark provided the financial resources for the project and on behalf of RDDC I would like to pay a sound vote of thanks to PSF for this support along with their patience. A special thank is also extended to the Danish Embassies - and especially prior and present Defence Attachés in Islamabad and Kabul for organizational and logistical support in coordinating the project. Lastly, the author and editor as well as the data collectors must be sincerely recognized not only for their diligence but also for their courage.

Ole Kværnø, Dean RDDC

About the authors

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Mr. Gul Dad is a defense/security analyst and one of the pioneers of Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) and heads its Research Division. He holds a master degree in political science from University of Peshawar, an MBA from Virtual University of Pakistan and an M. Phil degree in Government & Public Policy from National Defence University, Islamabad. He combines over 18 years of teaching, educational planning and management, and research experience in public/ private sectors. Peace & conflict, security, public policy and counter-terrorism are his special areas of interests with focus on Pakistan, South and Central Asia.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

CAPS	Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies
CRSS	Center for Research and Security Studies
FATA	Federally Administrated Tribal Area
ISK	Islamic State in Khorasan
NAP	National Action Plan
NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
NDS	Afghan National Directorate of Security
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PICSS	Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies
RDDC	Royal Danish Defence College

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Summary and key recommendations

The book at hand is the result of a more than two-year-long joint enterprise across borders, regions, and continents, aimed at identifying the development and status of the religious seminaries, also known as madrasas, in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the West, these madrasas are often perceived as a massive production pipeline for international terrorism. This book attempts to look beyond – or beneath – this perception by examining the role of madrasas through three main research questions, each provided as a main question to each one of the three independent think tanks and research centers. The overall objective of this framework is to take a first step toward creating a correct image of the madrasas and the trajectory their role in society has taken. The three research questions directing the study are: 1) What motivates parents to send their children to madrasas instead of public schools in Pakistan? 2) How are the madrasas in Pakistan funded, and which influence do donors have over them? and 3) Which trends can be identified in different groups' influences on religious education in Afghanistan? These questions have served as the foundation for the extensive data-collection conducted in the respective countries.

The result of the study in terms of this book reflects the collaboration between the Royal Danish Defence College and the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) and the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), both from Pakistan, and the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) from Afghanistan.

In this summary, the findings from the field research provide a brief overview of the analytical results as seen through the editorial lens in Copenhagen. One key discovery was that, besides the anticipated general devotion to religion, households' economic concerns appeared to be a main motivation for Pakistani parents in sending their children to madrasas instead of public schools. Findings also show an almost remarkable equality in choice among a majority of the parents interviewed regarding the preferences for public school or madrasas. This implies that families with two children or more often have children in both types of school. Another result not initially anticipated related to the financial pipelines of the madrasas in Pakistan, which – contrary to popular belief – are not heavily funded from abroad but mainly funded by donations from local communities in Pakistan. The latter can arguably be viewed as local recognition of a failed public school

system in parallel with a continuously self-sustaining religious educational sphere that increases in strength due to the perception (recognition) of a failed public school system. The results in relation to Afghanistan show that various religious and non-governmental militant groups in the country attempt to exert their interpretation of Islam through their support to madrasas, which again serves the purpose of establishing a powerbase in the civilian populace. As the case is in Pakistan, madrasas in Afghanistan cannot be viewed merely as hotbeds for terrorism but also as an alternative (or rather the only option) for securing education for children in many areas. Likewise, there is a gap between the perceptions of the Afghan government and madrasa officials and the local communities in regards to whether madrasas are linked to militancy.

In the last part, a set of recommendations for policy development in Afghanistan and Pakistan is offered in view of promoting increased knowledge as well as debate on how reform of the madrasa education systems and investment in public education can mitigate some of the negative consequences of madrasas. A condensed excerpt of the recommendations concludes this summary:

- **Prioritize investment in public education** – The public education systems in both countries need a significant overhaul. Government buy-in is required for improvement of critical thinking, innovation, and entrepreneurship in institutions of learning. The problem of corruption and nepotism in Afghanistan's education sector needs to be addressed.

- **Build trust with madrasas through financial and technical support** – To achieve oversight and monitoring of madrasas, the trust deficit between the Afghan and Pakistani governments and the madrasas has to be reduced. It is vital that the government espouse accommodative policies towards madrasas by looking at the opportunity to provide financial support in order to achieve the right to stipulate regulations for madrasas. Furthermore, employment opportunities for the madrasa graduates in government and private sectors could also prove effective in terms trust building and influence on development.

- **Ensure madrasa registration** – All seminaries should be geo-tagged and registered – the government should streamline and facilitate the madrasa registration process by announcing registration requirements as well as nominating a single body with whom madrasas should be registered.

- **Encourage and facilitate transparency and accountability in madrasa financing** – Madrasas should be encouraged to and facilitated in opening bank accounts and conducting annual audits of their accounts in order to develop a transparent monitoring system.

- **Initiate teaching as well as curriculum reform** – All madrasa curricula should be government approved and must include scientific subjects.

- **Ensure effective communication with madrasas** – To avoid confusion and ensure effective communication, a single body in each country should be nominated to deal with madrasas. A board of religious scholars could be formed with a well-defined mandate to allocate budgets for madrasas at provincial levels.

- **Streamline donation flows to madrasas** – Encourage the local communities to submit their donations and Zakat to the governments for better utilization of resources. However, the government will then have to address flaws in the existing system and ensure that Zakat is indeed allocated to the most deserving institutions and areas with limited access to public education.

- **Provide security to madrasas** – In conflict zones, as well as in the areas where sectarian tensions are high, madrasas are bound to adopt additional security measures, thus placing extra pressure on their finances. Security should be provided to the madrasas if they meet the requirements of the reforms above.

Introduction

Project outline and study objective

When the Cold War heated up in the 1980s, Afghanistan became a symbolic and very real kinetic theater for proxy warfare between the then two superpowers, the USA and USSR. Whereas the USSR had thousands of troops in the country, the US fought through intelligence operations and covert as well as overt alliances with other regional states. The most well-known alliance materialized in a massive supply of weapons to the different insurgent groups in Afghanistan opposing the Afghan Communist regime and the Soviet intervention. Another known (but not well-known) alliance was made between Washington and Riyadh, which resulted in Saudi Arabia matching the US financial support for the anti-communist war in Afghanistan. Though a majority of the funds was allocated to weapons, a certain amount of the official government Saudi funds, along with a yearly increasing amount from private institutions and Saudi citizens, was distributed as educational development aid to the rural areas of Pakistan. The deal between Saudi Arabia and the US initiated an export of Islamic *Wahhabism* (a conservative interpretation of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia since its founding) into Pakistan in the same period as the then leader of the country, General Zia ul-Haq, launched an extensive Islamization of Pakistan.[1] Though other factors also played a role, the above-mentioned factors paved the way for the establishment of thousands of private religious schools/seminaries, hereby expanding the so-called madrasa system in Pakistan.

Since then, evolvements in madrasas have transformed and developed in different directions, ranging from well-organized educational institutions providing religious, as well as scientific education, to one-dimensioned schools only focusing on memorization of the Quran, elaborated on later in this introduction. These developments pose as an inspirational foundation for the thoughts behind the study; and as field data was collected through the partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it became evident that it indeed was possible to present an informative overview based on a set of the key research questions. There are of course other questions and variables containing important information regarding the development in madrasas, and further studies along with large-scale research projects are required within

(1) Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).

this field. What this book presents is first and foremost an overview, and though a set of policy recommendations is provided, it is the RDDC's as well as the external partners' conclusion (i.e., recommendation) that further studies based on field data be prioritized and initiated both from within the region and at the international level from without. Thus, the objective of the book is to provide a platform of documentation that can be used by both researchers and decision-makers in the two countries to innovate and direct future efforts for stability and peace building in the region overall. While both Afghanistan and Pakistan have made attempts in terms of registration and oversight of the madrasas, it is difficult to see that these initiatives in themselves will reform the system as a whole. If this book can contribute as progressive inspiration for further research leading to such reforms, this project has served both its ambition and purpose from an RDDC point of view. If the project in itself contributes to policy development in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan, it will have achieved both a joint hope and vision for all four main stakeholders in this project: CRSS, PICCS, CAPS and RDDC.

As mentioned above, this book is the result of a project that took its initial steps more than two years ago with resources provided by the Danish Stabilisation Fund. Naturally a sound vote of thanks in this regard is directed to the Danish Ministry of Defence and Defence Command Denmark for giving priority to research within this area. As the coordinating and leading institution of implementation, RDDC would like to pay a special vote of thanks to the cooperative research partners CRSS, PICSS, and CAPS from the main authors to the field researchers. It is important to stress that the data collection and subsequent data analysis by scholars and research centers based in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been vital for the realization of the project. Finally, yet importantly, the main author would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this project, albeit without mentioning each and every person. However, a few people do deserve personal thanks. First mention goes to the former Danish Defence Attaché in Islamabad, Colonel Thor Aron Hilton, for facilitating the initial contact with the Pakistani partners and for supporting the idea behind the project from the very beginning. In the editorial process, research assistant Mr. Hüseyin Yücel's detailed structuring of data and organization of databases of the applied literature laid the groundwork for the process of merging three independent research reports into a comprehensive overview. Last – but not least – a sound vote of thanks goes to research assistant Ms. Dea Andersen for her

tireless effort in the last phase of the project in structuring and organizing the final book.

Before entering the research approaches by each partner and RDDCs selection of the partners a few remarks regarding the definition of madrasas as applied in the entire book are required. Another requirement is to describe the methodology behind the construction of this merged output, along with a few remarks regarding the selection of partners in the region.

Defining madrasas

The term 'madrasa' (transliterated variously as madrassah, madaris, etc.) has been used in many different ways. In general, madrasas refer to a traditional form of Islamic education consisting of a core curriculum of a variety of Islamic subjects – in short, a religious seminary. In Arabic, madrasa simply means 'school'. In Pakistan, religious schools are therefore typically referred to as 'deeni madaris', where 'deeni' translates as religious while madaris is plural of madrasa in Arabic. The 2015-2016 Pakistan Education Statistics, for example, define 'deeni madaris' as "educational institutions in which formal religious education is provided."[2] In this book, the transliteration 'madrasa' has been chosen since it seems to be the one most commonly used. Furthermore, when referring to madrasas it is implied that these institutions are private in nature and not part of the public school system in terms of financing, while oversight and registration from the public system may or may not take place. Finally, it is important to stress that the expression is used interchangeably with the term 'religious seminary'.

Research approach and selection of partners for data collection

In 2015, the first steps were taken toward a joint research project between the RDDC and three local research centers: Two from Pakistan and one from Afghanistan. The project was shaped through a series of meetings in Islamabad and Kabul. All three organizations were chosen as cooperative partners due to their well-based research network across all of Pakistan and in Afghanistan. From the beginning of the project, the partners were kept anonymous to one another with RDDC as a reference point in order to secure independency in the separate parts of the book. Each was tasked with one of the main fields of the data collection for the study.

(2) NEMIS-AEPAM, *Pakistan Education Statistics*, 2017 <http://library.aepam.edu.pk/Books/Pakistan Education Statistics 2015-16.pdf>.

The data was gathered in the second half of 2016 and is presented in parts one to three of the book. As stated above, the three parts of this book have approached the phenomenon of madrasas in quite different ways, but a common denominator was that all three organizations have extensive experience in field research in the designated areas. Below is a brief description of each partner organization.

The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) surveyed 558 families in 14 cities across Pakistan to identify their motivations for sending their children to madrasas instead of public schools. CRSS is a think tank located in Islamabad, committed to providing independent research and nonpartisan analyses of socio-political issues confronting Pakistan. With its well-based access to families across all of Pakistan and its use of enumerators indigenous to the provinces where they conducted the interviews, CRSS was a sound first pick for this specific research question.

The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) interviewed administrative staff at 77 madrasas, madrasa board officials, donors and relevant government departments to assess the financial pipelines of madrasas in Pakistan. PICSS is a policy and strategy research organization based in Islamabad working to provide credible and up-to-date information and analyses related to defense and security for policy development leading to peace and stability. Through its statistical division, the 'Conflict Monitoring Center,' PICSS also serves as a databank for information and statistics related to conflict and security. The extensive experience in statistical analysis made them a highly relevant and desirable partner for conducting exactly this part of the research.

Finally, the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) interviewed madrasa officials, former Taliban members, government officials and tribal elders to provide an overview of trends in religious education in Afghanistan. Headquartered in Kabul, CAPS is an independent research and advocacy center conducting action-oriented research aimed at influencing policymakers in key areas such as state building, governance, narcotics, women empowerment, conflict resolution and peace building. CAPS proved ideal in relation to obtaining an overview of the development of madrasas in Afghanistan due to its network among key persons within the educational sector and within influential advocates for expansion of madrasas/religious seminaries.

The Danish Defence provided the funds for the study through the Danish Stabilisation Fund and with RDDC in the organizational and editorial lead for the book. CRSS, PICSS, and CAPS are each responsible for their parts of the book and the way they have applied sources and references in their respective parts of this study, and the main author from each partner therefore appears in the respective parts.

Outline the book

The book comprises five sections with a background chapter on the evolution and structures of madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the academic debate on the connections between militancy, foreign funding, and madrasas as a contextual guide. The next chapter 'Part one' presents the research from the CRSS study on Pakistani parents' motivations for sending their children to madrasas and the correlations between family income, education levels and preference for madrasas. In 'Part two', the research by PICSS tracks the financial pipelines for madrasas in Pakistan and discusses madrasa dependency on donors. 'Part three' presents the CAPS research in the shape of an overview of the evolution of madrasas and their current trends in Afghanistan, including the different groups that run them. Finally, the book concludes with a chapter synthesizing the findings from the three studies and providing policy recommendations for how reform of the madrasa systems in both countries can contribute to stabilization in the region.

Contextualizing madrasas: Evolution, structures, and the militancy connection

This chapter provides a brief overview of the evolution of madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and attempts to track the available information on the numbers and structures of madrasas in the two countries. The chapter furthermore outlines the academic debate on the connection between madrasas and militancy as well as the madrasas' sources of funding. The research teams at CRSS, PICSS, and CAPS have all contributed to the chapter.

The historical evolution of madrasas

Madrasa as a concept and as an institution has changed over time, both in its contents and contours. The first known madrasa is said to have been established in 1005 AD by the Fatimid caliphs in Egypt. This madrasa taught the Shiite minority's version of Islam. However, an inventory catalogue of the madrasa has shown that the madrasa also had thousands of volumes on other subjects, including astronomy, architecture and philosophy.[3] When the Sunni Muslims conquered Egypt in the tenth century, they replaced the Shiite version of Islam in this madrasa with the Sunni version. [4] A huge number of books were then taken to Baghdad where Nizam-ul-Mulk Hassan Bin Al-Tusi, a Seljuk Vizier, established the first organized and formal madrasa education system in the Muslim world in 1067 AD.[5]

From the twelfth century, a madrasa system also emerged in India, which was consolidated under the Mughal Empire. The madrasas were largely informal in their method of teaching with the curriculum being rather flexible in a combination of rationalist (such as mathematics and logics) and religious subjects.[6] The establishment of British colonial rule in India dramatically changed the role of madrasa education in South Asia, making it irrelevant to the state and economy by introducing Western institutions and English as the official language. This led to a major shift in the curriculum in madrasas toward a strict focus on religious aspects.[7] In this

(3) Uzma Anzar, *Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).
(4) Ali Riaz, 'Madrassah Education in Pre-Colonial and Colonial South Asia', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 46.1 (2011); Anzar.
(5) Masooda Bano, 'Madrasas as Partners in Education Provisuon: The South Asian Experience', *Development in Practice*, 20.4–5 (2010), 554–66.
(6) Bano, 'Madrasas as Partners in Education Provisuon: The South Asian Experience'.
(7) Bano, 'Madrasas as Partners in Education Provisuon: The South Asian Experience'.

period, the first institutionalized madrasa was established in Deoband in 1867 running on donations from internal Muslim communities.[8] Thus, the foundation for madrasa funding based on public donations was laid and it continues until this day. The Deobandi movement introduced an institutionalized delivery of Islamic education characterized by paid staff, a full library, a set curriculum, formal examinations, and certification upon graduation.[9] The Islamic scholars of the Deoband madrasa emphasized a puritanical school of Islamic thought, which soon led to the emergence of sister madrasas and today this school of thought has the largest number of madrasas in South Asia.[10]

Under British colonial rule, a process of exclusion of the madrasas from the formal economy and society in Pakistan began and it continued in the independence period.[11] Reforms of the madrasa system in Pakistan were discussed soon after independence and under the political leadership of General Ayub Khan, who by a coup d'état gained power in 1958. He was very vocal in his criticism of the madrasa system and wanted the religious establishment to meet the demands of modernity.[12] In the 1980s, the national government in Pakistan attempted a reform program, but it was not until 2001 that a formal reform program was launched with assistance from the US under the banner of the 'war on terror.'[13] These reforms have met severe resistance from the religious elite in Pakistan, and to date the traditional religious establishment, the so-called *ulama*, still exercise full control over the interpretation of Islamic texts.[14]

As in Pakistan, the madrasas in Afghanistan have also been a central institution of learning for centuries. Various Afghan regimes have attempted to transform the influential religious landscape in line with their interpretations of Afghanistan. In the 1920s, the modernization program initiated by King Ghazi Amir Amanullah Khan sought to transform the country into a

(8) Barbara Metcalf, 'The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in Modern India', *Modern Asian Studies*, 12.1 (1978).
(9) Nafay Choudhury, 'The Localised Madrasas of Afghanistan: Their Political and Governance Entanglements', *Religion, State and Society*, 45.2 (2017), 120–40 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2017.1311512>.
(10) Bano, 'Madrasas as Partners in Education Provisuon: The South Asian Experience'.
(11) Masooda Bano, *The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan*, eBook (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).
(12) Bano, 'Madrasas as Partners in Education Provisuon: The South Asian Experience'.
(13) Bano, 'Madrasas as Partners in Education Provisuon: The South Asian Experience'.
(14) Bano, *The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan*.

modern nation state through wide-ranging reforms – among them major educational reforms. King Amanullah's reforms were mindful of the *ulama* commanding authority over education, and were cast as complementing rather than competing with the traditional madrasa system. [15] However, in September 1928, Amanullah proposed a number of reforms to the Afghan Loya Jirga (grand assembly) that targeted the religious establishment, and thereby the madrasa system. The *ulama* considered these reform proposals an act of aggression, leading to civil war and the overthrow of Amanullah in 1929. Taking into account what happened to King Amanullah, the subsequent regimes - King Nadir Shah's four-year reign (1929-1933) and his successor King Zahir Shah's reign (1933-1970s) – arguably attempted a more cautious approach in relation to introducing new educational reforms paving the way for general education to gradually take root in Afghanistan.[16] Many of the educational reforms instituted during this period did not trigger the same reaction as against Amanullah's reforms.[17] In 1936, Zahir Shah established the first regime-financed (official) madrasa in Afghanistan named Abu Hanifah to serve as a bridge between the government and the religious scholars in the country. During the 1930s and '40s official madrasas in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i Sharif, Takhar, Faryab, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Paktia were established by the government to formalize higher religious education and to train judges of Sharia.[18] The gradually introduced reforms and regulations of the madrasas were non-coercive and also implemented with cooperation from Islamic religious scholars.[19] The progress, however, was hindered with the advent of communism in the 1960s and '70s in Afghan society and the efforts of different communist leaders to transform the education system based entirely on communist principles. Furthermore, the still increasing number of Afghans employed in the central administration in Kabul were educated in the West and in the Soviet Union, and upon their return they pursued an aggressive reform agenda that decoupled the traditionally minded majority of the population. In the 1960s and '70s, both general and religious education became politicized and new and more radi-

(15) Choudhury.
(16) Paul Fishstein, 'Afghanistan's Arc of Modernization: 1880 to 1978', *The Globalist*, 1 September 2010.
(17) Choudhury.
(18) Kaja Borchgrevink, *Beyond Borders: Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education*, 2010 <http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/PRIO Paper_ Borchgrevink_ Beyond Borders Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education_September 2010.pdf>.
(19) Fishstein.

cal ideologies began to develop in the country. Afghan ruling and political elites viewed madrasas and religious scholars with suspicion. In contrast religious scholars, rejecting and discrediting liberal democratic and communist values, began to put themselves at the center of what they called a movement to defend Islam against un-Islamic forces.[20]

The above outlined a simplistic historical overview of the evolvement of madrasas in both countries, which serves as platform for understanding the present status – or landscape – of madrasas that is the focus of the following.

Understanding the madrasa landscape

The role of madrasas in the educational landscape in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a sensitive issue, and data on the numbers of madrasas are often absent, based on rough estimates, or conflicting. The following section outlines the available information on the numbers of madrasas and their organizational structures.

Pakistan

The precise number of madrasas in Pakistan is unknown. The Pakistan Education Statistics 2015-2016 estimated that there are more than 32,000 formal degree-providing madrasas in Pakistan, out of which 97 percent are in the private sector. It is estimated that the total enrolment for the period 2015-2016 was 2.26 million.[21] The estimated number of madrasas for the 2013-2014 period was about 13,000.[22] Prima facie, this looks like asignificant increase in number of madrasas but in reality this was due to increase in efficiency of relevant government departments to count the number of madrasas in addition to their geo-tagging. This was done by provincial governments under the National Action Plan that was devised in early 2015 as a comprehensive counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy.

There are mainly five religious schools of thought that run madrasas in Pakistan: Deobandi, Brailvi, Shia, Ahl-e-Hadith and Jamat-e-Islami. These five schools of thought have established their own separate madrasa boards, approved by the government and recognized by the Higher Education

(20) Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, a Modern History, Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy?, the Problems of Governance in the Muslim Tradition*, New ed. (London: IBTauris, 2005).
(21) NEMIS-AEPAM.
(22) NEMIS-AEPAM.

Commission. These boards are responsible for coordinating and running the affairs of the respective madrasas with regards to their examinations in such a way that these boards set syllabus, conduct exams, and regulate madrasas (to a varying extent) in their respective schools of thought. These five boards are:

1. Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia (Deobandi)
2. Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Ahl-e-Sunnat (Brailvi)
3. Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Salafia (Ahl-e-Hadith)
4. Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Shia (Shia)
5. Rabita-ul-Madaris Al Islamia (Jamat-e-Islami/Neutral)

In addition, the Higher Education Commission also recognizes some independent degree-awarding institutions that are not affiliated with any of the above-mentioned boards. These include:

1. Jamia Islamia Minhaj-ul-Quran, 366 Model Town, Lahore.
2. Jamia Taleemat-e-Islamia, Sargodha Road, Faisalabad.
3. Jamia Ashrafia, Feroz Pura Road, Lahore.
4. Darul Uloom Mohammadia Ghousia Bhera Distt, Sargodha.
5. Darual Uloom, Korangi Greek, Karachi. [23]

According to the Higher Education Commission, the approved mode of education for recognition of final degrees in religious education (Deeni Sanad) is a Middle School Certificate (eight years of education) as entrance requirement for:

- *Shahadatul Sanvia Aama:* two years of study (equivalent to secondary school certificate or 10th grade)
- *Shahadatul Sanvia Khasa:* two years of study (equivalent to intermediate, 12-year education)
- *Shahadatul Alia:* two years of study (equivalent to graduation, 14-year education)
- *Shahadatul Almiya*: two years of study (equivalent to MA Arabic/Islamic Studies, 16-year education)

(23) Higher Education Commission Pakistan, 'Mode of Education', 2016 <http://www.hec.gov.pk/english/services/students/Documents/Mode of Education.docx>.

There are four levels of madrasas working in Pakistan, which are:

1. *Nazira*: These madrasas impart preliminary knowledge and are restricted to teaching their students recitation of the Quran. Such madrasas could be found attached to almost all mosques and require the comparatively least amount of financial resources. Usually the Imam Masjid (prayer leader) teaches students early in the morning or in the evening how to read Arabic and properly recite the Quran. At this level, students remain in the madrasas for only about an hour a day.
2. *Hifz*: In addition to basic reading of the Quran, memorization or rote learning of the Quran is undertaken in the Hifz madrasas. These madrasas are also most common within mosques, either with or without accommodation facilities. There are two types of Hifz madrasas:
    a. Iqamti (boarding schools): Students stay in madrasas for as long as they memorize the Quran. The students get one day off per week to see their parents and one and a half months' vacation during Ramadan and Eid. Usually a student becomes Hafiz (the one who memorizes the complete Quran) in 2.5 to 3 years. Such madrasas require more financial resources, as dining and living expenses for students are provided by the madrasa, in addition to other miscellaneous expenses.
    b. Ghair Iqamti (day schools): Students spend eight to ten hours per day in these madrasas and then go back home. Hence, no stay in the madrasa is required, and therefore, comparatively fewer financial resources are required to establish and run such madrasas, especially when such madrasas are established within a mosque.
3. *Dars-e-Nizami*: Generally provide eight years of education in which the Quran, its translation, Tafseer (explanation of Quran), books of sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic jurisprudence, Arabic and Persian languages, and supporting subjects are taught.
4. *Takhassas*: This level offers specialization courses including *Mufti* (who can issue a Fatwa) and *Qazi* (a judge in Islamic Sharia Justice System).

Afghanistan

In general, there are three categories of madrasas in Afghanistan: Madrasas that are run by the government; madrasas that are registered with the government, but not controlled by it; and unregistered madrasas.

Official Afghan sources report that there are 5,000 madrasas and 'Quran learning centers' across the country registered with the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, and 1,200 public and 200 private madrasas registered with the Ministry of Education.[24] Madrasas that are affiliated with mosques can be registered with the Afghan Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs and madrasas that are not associated with mosques can be registered with the Ministry of Education.[25] The registration process requires a madrasa to demonstrate that it has suitable buildings, classrooms, and teachers. Registration does not entail government control over the madrasa. Registration is a certificate for government recognition and qualification of the madrasa's diplomas. Diplomas from registered madrasas allow students to pursue higher education at government universities. A condition for registration is that the madrasas follow the standardized curriculum standard approved by the Ministry of Education. This curriculum standard specifies that 60 percent of the subjects should be religious in nature, while the other 40 percent should consist of scientific subjects including mathematics, history, geography, and Dari literature. The madrasas that are registered with the government, but not run by the government, do not receive any financial support from the government.

Estimates of the ratio of registered vs. unregistered madrasas are very conflicting, depending on the sources, but it is fair to state that unregistered madrasas in Afghanistan are mostly located in rural parts of the country with some present in major cities, including areas that are under the control of the Taliban movement. These madrasas are naturally run without any oversight of the government. Afghan religious scholars have formed three informal bodies to create coordination among madrasas and their students and leadership: *Islahul madrasas* in the east, *Itehad ul madrasas* in the west and *Majma'ul madrasas* in the south of the country. These bodies have no legal authority to carry out oversight on how the madrasas are run and which curriculum is taught.

(24) US Department of State, *2016 Report on International Religious Freedom - Afghanistan*, 2017 <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269168.pdf>.
(25) US Department of State.

In general, madrasa education in Afghanistan can be divided into the following three levels:

1. *Darul Hifaz*: At this level of education, students only memorize the holy Quran by heart and they do not study other religious subjects.
2. Madrasas where students receive Islamic education of primary and secondary levels: Most of these madrasas exist in provinces at provincial and district levels.
3. *Darul Ulooms*: At this level, students receive Islamic education of higher-level equivalent to bachelor level of universities. When students graduate from Darul Ulooms, they become religious scholars known locally as Maulawi. To qualify for this religious title, the students have to study the following subjects: Arabic grammar in the first level; jurisprudence and Islamic Law along with the Quran and one book of hadith at the second level; and the six major books of Hadith at the third level. Darul Ulooms exist in provincial capitals in most provinces and at district level in some provinces. According to Maulawi Aziz-Ur-Rahman, the General Director of Abu Hanifah Madrasa in Kabul, who was interviewed by CAPS (see part three of this book), there are 55 government-run Darul Ulooms, but this number has to be added with both registered (but not run) as well as unregistered Darul Ulooms in Afghanistan.

Madrasa teachings are based on three distinct religious schools of thoughts in Afghanistan – Hanafi (also referred to as Deobandi), Salafi, and Ja'afri (Shiite). The Hanafi school of thought has traditionally been the mainstream religious authority representing Islam in Afghanistan. Since the 1980s, due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and with support and funding flowing in from the Middle East and Iran to counter the Soviets, a stricter religious ideology was exported to Afghanistan called Salafism or Wahhabism. It has grown in strength since then, and it not only challenged the traditional Hanafi school of thought in the country but also triggered Sunni-Shia sectarian schisms. Salafists and Shia Muslims each attempted to give credence to their respective beliefs over the other and continue to establish increasing numbers of madrasas in the country with support from local sympathizers and foreign actors.

Framing the research questions: The madrasa-militancy connection, the issue of foreign funding, and reform efforts

There has been much debate about the connection between the rise in militancy and madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since September 11, 2001, madrasas have received special attention with regard to their alleged linkages with extremism subsequently leading to terrorism and militancy.

The US Commission Report on the September 11 attacks against the US held that some madrasas in Pakistan have been used as "incubators of violent extremism."[26] In the West, the general perception about madrasas has been negative and associated with religious extremism and promotion of radicalization. In the wake of 9/11, the US pressured the then Pakistani leader General Musharraf to address the issues (stated link to extremism) with the religious seminaries in Pakistan.[27] Madrasa reform was among the many changes General Musharraf pledged in exchange for financial aid and debt relief from the US and other Western allies.

The madrasas in Pakistan drew renewed focus from foreign governments after the London bombings in 2005, which resulted in pressure on the Pakistani government to undertake new reforms of the religious schools.[28] The Pakistan Peoples Party's government (2008-2013) introduced additional initiatives to reform the madrasa system. Registration was made mandatory for educational boards of all five schools of thoughts and the Inter-Madrasa Boards now had to attest degrees of Wifaqs. One positive development was made with the formation of the common platform of *Ittehad Tanzeemat-e-Madaaris Pakistan*, through which it was hoped that the madrasas would work in coordination for reforms. The reforms mentioned that the English language would be introduced in the madrasas, which had previously only used Arabic literature. Fund raising and resource generation ways of madrasas were also taken into account. Another tool in the reforms was the Pakistani government launching crackdowns on Afghan madrasa teachers and mosque imams in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, removing

(26) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 2004 <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>.
(27) Robert M. Cassidy, *War, Will and Warlords - Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011*, *Marine Corps University Press*, 1st edn (Quantico, VA, 2012).
(28) Irfan Bukhari, 'Pemb Fails to Deliver', *The Nation*, 19 January 2009.

hundreds of madrasa teachers and mosque imams and thereby forcing them to return to Afghanistan.[29]

Since many of the Sunni religious scholars who run madrasas in Afghanistan have a religious background from Pakistan, Afghans could easily travel to Pakistan to study in madrasas in the 1980s and '90s. After the fall of the Taliban regime, many of the Islamic scholars that had studied and later taught in various madrasas in Pakistan returned to Afghanistan and established madrasas at district and provincial levels. This development, as well as outlining which groups that currently are engaged in madrasa education, is the primary scope for CAPS's analytical assessment in part three of this book.

Post 2001, however, the two countries gradually introduced stricter measures for madrasa enrollment, which made it hard for Afghans to continue religious studies in Pakistan. In January 2015, the Pakistani government presented its 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) aimed at tackling terrorism in the country. Point 10 of the National Action Plan resolved to register and regulate madrasas and discourage foreigners from studying or teaching in said madrasas.[30] There has been moderate progress in the implementation of the reforms, specifically regarding geo-tagging of madrasas, but there have been delays in the implementation, and Pakistan has not begun the process of including science subjects, English or other subjects in the standardized madrasa curriculum.[31]

There has been considerable academic debate on how militant Islamic fundamentalism and madrasa education intersect. The criticism against madrasas and their alleged links to militancy has received pushback from scholars of various disciplines. In 2006, Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, for example, examined the educational backgrounds of 79 of the terrorists behind some of the most significant terrorist attacks against Westerners and found that the majority of the terrorists were college educated and only nine

(29) Zabihullah Ihsas, 'Pakistan's Crackdown on Afghan Mullahs Doubted', *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 4 March 2015; IslamOnline.net, 'Pakistan Deports Provocative Afghan Imams', *IslamOnline.net*, 13 October 2009.
(30) Humaira Israr, 'Curbing Militancy: Regulating Pakistan's Madrassas' (Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2015).
(31) Zeeshan Salahuddin, *CRSS NAP TRACKER - The Second Year Audit of the National Action Plan*, 2017.

of them had attended madrasas.[32] In 2010, Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff published a study on the connection between education (both public, private, and religious) and rising militancy in Pakistan.[33] They asserted that although religious seminaries had been deteriorating the stability of the region, they were not the major cause of militancy in Pakistan. Winthrop and Graff argued that with an enrolment rate of less than 10 percent, madrasas were not the primary cause of instability in the region, although a handful of hardline madrasas had been linked with extremism. The poor governance of the public education system had in itself increased the risk of conflict. Winthrop and Graff found that madrasas have not risen to fill the gap in public education supply. They argue that curriculum reforms are required to modernize the school system in Pakistan to promote stability and mitigate extremism.

Furthermore, many scholars have rejected the notion that poor Pakistanis place their children in madrasas as schools of last resort.[34] Some scholars have demonstrated that many Pakistani parents decide to place one or more of their children in a madrasa because they value an Islamic education. In her article from 2015, "Does Pakistan Have a Madrasah Problem? Insights from New Data," Christine Fair, for example, argues that madrasa utilization is a child-specific decision: Parents choose madrasa education for some children because they value it or find it to be the most appropriate choice for a specific child.[35] Andrabi et al. also argue that neither economic compulsion nor household factors seem to determine madrasa enrolment and

(32) Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, 'The Madrassa Scapegoat', *The Washington Quarterly*, 29.2 (2006), 115–25.
(33) Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, *Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links between Education and Militancy in Pakistan*, 2010.
(34) C. Christine Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (Washington D.C., USA: United States Institute of Peace, 2008); Anne Cockcroft and others, 'Challenging the Myths about Madaris in Pakistan: A National Household Survey of Enrolment and Reasons for Choosing Religious Schools', *International Journal of Educational Development*, 29.4 (2009), 342–49; Tahir Andrabi and others, *Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data*, 2005 <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8914> [accessed 8 February 2017]; Bano, *The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan*.
(35) C Christine Fair, 'Does Pakistan Have a Madrasah Problem? Insights from New Data', 2015, p. 33 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468620> [accessed 7 February 2017].

that the reasons to place a child in a madrasa vary from person to person.[36] Saleem H. Ali also confirms that parents do not always send their children to madrasas due to financial constraints but that they often prefer religious education to a public one.[37] However, several scholars have stressed the need for reforms of the curricula taught in madrasas, and promotion of initiatives to bring awareness in parents about educating their children.[38] In part one of this book, CRSS explores in depth quantitative and qualitative factors for why parents choose to send their children to madrasas.

The issue of how the madrasas finance their activities has also received increased attention. The madrasas accumulate funds through various ways such as *Zakat* (a religious tax – elaborated on in part two) and grants from rich people, faith- based organizations, and from other various Muslims and Western countries.[39] Few madrasas meet their financial needs from their own assets, as some madrasas have agricultural or commercial property donated by donors or bought by madrasas. The administrative staff of madrasas also make appeals for funds in religious gatherings.[40] Other than the internal sources, another source of funding for madrasas is external – both from states as well as the Pakistani diaspora. According to the Pakistani government, 80 madrasas in the country have received financial support of USD 2.85 million from the United States, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Australia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,

(36) Tahir Andrabi and others, 'Madrassa Metrics: The Statistics and Rhetoric of Religious Enrollment in Pakistan', in *Beyond Crisis: A Critical Second Look at Pakistan*, ed. by Naveeda Khan (Routledge, 2008) <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/akhwaja/papers/madrassas_beyondcrisis_final.pdf> [accessed 8 February 2017].
(37) Saleem H. Ali, *Islam and Education - Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan's Madrassahs*, 2009; The Brookings Institution, 'Pakistan's Madrassahs and Extremism: Is There a Connection?', 2009 <https://www.brookings.edu/events/pakistans-madrassahs-and-extremism-is-there-a-connection/> [accessed 7 February 2017].
(38) Lisa A. Curtis, *U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism Through Education Reform*, 2007 <http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/us-aid-pakistan-countering-extremism-through-education-reform> [accessed 8 February 2017]; Lisa Curtis, 'Reviving Pakistan's Pluralist Traditions to Fight Extremism' <http://thepersecution-org.blogspot.dk/2009/05/reviving-pakistans-pluralist-traditions.html> [accessed 14 February 2017]; Saleem H. Ali, 'Madrassah Mayhem in Pakistan', 2007 <http://saleemali.newsvine.com/_news/2007/07/15/838116-madrassah-mayhem-in-pakistan> [accessed 7 February 2017].
(39) Fakhr-ul-Islam, 'Reforms in Religious Madaris of Pakistan', *The Dialogue Quarterly Research Journal*, 4.2 (2012).
(40) Tahir Mehmood Butt, 'Social and Political Role of Madrassa: Perspectives of Religious Leaders in Pakistan', *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, 27.2 (2004), 387–407.

and Iran over a 13-month period, but Pakistan has not provided information about the purpose and results of foreign aid.[41] According to a survey by Raza Roomi, the US has spent USD 450 million to achieve curriculum reforms in madrasas while the UK also allocated finances to madrasas.[42] A US diplomatic cable from 2008 – published by WikiLeaks in 2011 – also stated that an estimated USD 100 million made its way annually from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to madrasas and extremist recruitment network in Pakistan's Punjab province.[43] Comprehensive analysis of the financial pipelines of the madrasas is absent from the available literature. Most of the work that has been conducted deals with the nature and number of madrasas, madrasa culture in Pakistan, and madrasa reforms, but an in-depth study about the madrasas' financial sources is missing. PICSS aims to help provide information to bridge these gaps in part two of this book.

The three research questions framed above have served as overall guidelines for this study, whose intention is to help provide readers with more in-depth knowledge on the role of madrasas, especially in relation to assessing parental choice, financial pipelines, and recent developments in religious education in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

(41) Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal, *Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero* (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2011).
(42) Raza Roomi, 'Case Study - Pakistan: Education, Religion and Conflict', *Tony Blair Faith Foundation*, 2015.
(43) Michael Georgy, 'Saudi Arabia, UAE Funded Jihadi Networks in', *Reuters*, 22 May 2011.

Part one: Seminaries in Pakistan – Why do parents send their children to madrasas?

By Zeeshan Salahuddin, Center for Research and Security Studies

Introduction

The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) has conducted this study to determine the family demographics in various regions of Pakistan and to answer the central research question: Why do parents send their children to seminaries? The hypothesis for the study is that most parents in Pakistan send their children to seminaries due to economic hardship and/or religious identity.

The research was conducted from July to December 2016. For the purpose of answering the research question, only families that have sent at least one child to a seminary were engaged. A total of 558 families were surveyed in 14 cities across Pakistan. Surveys were conducted in parts of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan (represented by Quetta), and the Northern Areas (represented by Gilgit). The study determined that the average monthly income of these households was relatively low at approx. Rs. 23,161.25 (equivalent to USD 220) to sustain approx. 3.7 children and potentially other family members.

Schools are geographically accessible, and approximately 84 percent of the surveyed families stated that they were satisfied with the amenities available there. However, only approx. 1.79 children per household attended schools, while the rest attended seminaries.

Various reasons have been provided by the surveyed families as to why they send their child(ren) to seminaries. However, there are two dominating themes, which are outlined below:

- Financial stress: Seminaries are generally free of cost and have the potential to provide their students with free or inexpensive accommodation and food. This is a major attraction for parents who wish to educate their children, while relieving financial and household stress on the family. Since most seminaries offer dormitories, this further alleviates the pressure on the family.

- Preference of religious education: A large population of Pakistan is, undoubtedly, passionate about Islam, the Quran and their religious studies. Families take great pride in their children becoming religious scholars and/or *Hafiz-e-Quran* (individuals who memorize the entirety of the Quran) and believe that facilitating seminary/religious education for their children is a means of earning a higher stature in the eyes of God.

The financial status of the surveyed households, combined with a general devotion to religion, appears to be the motivating factor for parents in sending their children to seminaries instead of schools.

Geographical reach

The research areas were selected based on several factors, including access to information regarding seminary concentration in the respective areas; availability of local resources able to undertake the study in the respective areas; the safety and security of the hired field staff conducting the surveys; and the willingness of the population to engage with our team members to answer the survey questionnaire. Understandably, seminaries are a sensitive topic in Pakistan, and people are traditionally hesitant to speak openly about them. To mitigate this, we hired local resources that had roots in these communities so the respondents would feel at ease.

The research was conducted in fourteen cities across Pakistan: Peshawar, Kohat, Swat, D.I. Khan, Gilgit, Lahore, Multan, Faisalabad, Sargodha, Jhang, Quetta, Karachi, Sukkur, and Hyderabad.



Fig. 1: Geographical distribution of cities selected for research (Pakistan - CRSS)

Methodology

A survey form[44] was devised in consultation with subject-matter experts, as well as the RDDC and in order to establish the hypothesis, two methodologies were used in succession. First, after an initial set of interviewees were selected, a short survey was conducted for both males and females. This survey a) helped establish the baseline for the thought process of each individual interviewee, along with how comfortable they felt within the organization and b) provided empirical, statistical data for some key questions across both genders. Second, the very last question in the survey, being highly qualitative in nature, was answered in the form of a discussion.

(44) See Annex I for the English version of the survey form. The Urdu version, the one actually implemented, is in Annex II.

The completed forms were sealed into envelopes and mailed to the CRSS head office in Islamabad. The chief researcher opened these forms personally and only shared them with the assistant researcher. No third person has seen the forms, or the names enclosed therein. The assistant researcher then tabulated the results from all 558 respondents (at an average of about 40 responses per city) into a central spreadsheet. This spreadsheet then served as the nexus from which to draw all conclusions and tabulate all results for the study.

Problems and issues

Several respondents expressed fears of their identity being revealed in the research. To mitigate this, we promised full anonymity to the respondents. For any city, the local field asset is the only person that knows the identity of the respondents. At the offices of CRSS, the chief researcher, his assistant researcher, and the peer reviewer are the only three people who have complete access to this data. CRSS has painstakingly worked to protect the identity of the respondents. Security is of paramount importance to CRSS, and as such, we take this matter very seriously.

In hindsight, it could be argued that the range of questions for the study was too restricted. If an opportunity to conduct a related study presented itself, CRSS would expand the range of questions, and delve deeper into the socio-economic backgrounds, particularly in how they intersect with religious identity.

Another issue stemmed from translation. The interviews were conducted in seven languages: English, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, Pushto, and Saraiki. While the resource persons conducting the interviews were all versed in Urdu, English, and the language the interview/survey was conducted in, there is always the chance that one could have misconstrued some of the responses while translating them into Urdu/English.

Please also remember that this survey specifically engaged parents that send children to seminaries, and as such, it cannot be used to represent the overall population of Pakistan when making claims of where most children are sent to for their education needs. In other words, sending at least one child to a seminary was already a prerequisite for taking the survey.

Assumptions

The following are some of the assumptions used during the surveys and interviews:

- The respondents selected were an accurate cross-section of the population of Pakistan.
- The responses to the questions were accurately reported and answered, without fear of backlash or repercussions, as anonymity was promised by trusted community members.
- The respondents were provided with a warm, welcoming, accepting environment for both taking the survey and giving the interview.
- The field resource persons did not influence the responses or mislead the conversation in one way or another.

Data analysis: Financial and religious reasons

The statistics were averaged, and for the purposes of identifying anomalies, a standard deviation was conducted on the sample set to see which set of responses displayed abnormal response patterns. These anomalies were then also addressed in the interview portion of the research. Additionally, it must be stated that some markers will be wildly different.

For example, the average educational qualification of parents in the city of Karachi was found to be significantly higher than the rest of the country. This may seem anomalous but is in line with access to education in Karachi vs. the rest of the country. The same also selectively applies to variables such as salary, average number of children, etc.

The results will be presented in detail below, but suffice to say that the responses, aside from a few understandable deviations, more or less confirmed the hypothesis that most parents send their children to seminaries equally due to financial and/or religious reasons.

Quantitative analysis

The average age of the respondents was around 42 years. As seen in figure 2, the city of Sukkur in Sindh had the lowest overall age, and Jhang in Punjab was the oldest overall.



Fig. 2: Average ages of families (Pakistan - CRSS)

The average family income was Rs. 23,161.25 per month. This figure, as can be seen from the graph below (figure 3), varies wildly across Pakistan. In Lahore, Punjab, this figure is nearly double the national average, whereas in places like Swat, it is less than half, at Rs. 11,125. Therefore, the standard deviation for this data set was largely ignored, as there are is an incredibly varied set of parameters that determine household income across these very diverse geographical regions.



Fig. 3: Average salaries of families (Pakistan - CRSS)

The average education of fathers and mothers (figure 4) reveals some interesting trends. In most places in the country, fathers and mothers had roughly a similar trajectory. However, on average, in Faisalabad, Punjab, as well as D.I. Khan, Swat, and Kohat in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, and Quetta in Baluchistan, mothers were significantly less educated than fathers.

Overall, fathers had completed at least the eighth grade, whereas mothers had completed at least the fourth grade. Karachi was the most literate city in this regard, and Punjab the most literate province. Hyderabad in Sindh was the least literate for fathers, and Swat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was the least literate for mothers.



Fig. 4: Average education of fathers/mothers - average grade passed (Pakistan - CRSS)

It is also quite remarkable to see that the average level of parent education roughly coincides with the monthly household income for most respondents.

The average number of children for each family was around 3.69. As illustrated below (figure 5), this average was highest in Jhang, Punjab, at 5.40, and lowest in Karachi, at 2.15. Interestingly, the number of children

is not proportional to average monthly household income, as well as the educational qualification of the parents.



Fig. 5: Average number of children per respondent family (Pakistan - CRSS)

When it came to access to educational institutions, the bulk of all respondents stated that they had access to both a school and a seminary in their immediate areas. As seen in figure 6, 34.77 percent said that their kids could be home-schooled if needed, whereas 14.52 percent said they had access to other forms of education.

These forms included academies, tuition centers, home tuition, and on-the-job learning.



Fig. 6: Access to educational institutions (Pakistan - CRSS)

Roughly, the same number of children attended schools and seminaries per family. As seen in figure 7, on average, 1.79 children attended schools, whereas 1.78 children attended seminaries, per family.



Fig. 7: Number of child(ren) that attend schools and seminaries (Pakistan - CRSS)

It must, however, be stated that the respondents were picked solely because they had at least one child that attended a seminary. Therefore, it would be unfair to extrapolate this as an accurate depiction of all families across Pakistan. This is only true for families that have (had) at least one child in a seminary.

However, this can be used to make the assumption that for families that send at least one child to a seminary, an equal number of children in that family attend school.

The response to why children are not going to schools was in a multiple-choice format, so parents could select multiple answers if they needed to. This is why the overall percentage is well over 100.

Principally, two primary and two secondary themes emerged. As illustrated in figure 8, the primary reasons were religious and economic. Parents felt their children needed religious education in order to be good Muslims,

and/or they could not possibly afford the schools. The secondary reasons included a lack of interest from the child in the school, as well as other reasons. The 'other' category included over/under age child, mental/physical disability, helping with family income/business, dissatisfaction with the school system/environment, local customs and traditions, private tutoring for schooling at home, and the fact that certain older children were married, and thus past their schooling years.



Fig. 8: Reasons for not sending child(ren) to school (Pakistan - CRSS)

On average, children who attended seminaries had been at the seminary for 3.38 years, and nearly a quarter (23.43 percent) lived on the premises.

There is also a significant disconnect between satisfaction with school facilities and sending children to schools. 84.07 percent were satisfied with the amenities and quality of education at the schools, but only 47.94 percent would prefer to send their children to schools.

Quantitative analysis: Data interpretation

The last survey question was perhaps the most important, as the entire research is structured around this theme: "Why are you sending the child to a seminary?"

First, in order to determine a quantitative response to the very last question, we assigned a value of 0 to schools, and 1 to seminaries. If the response was "both", a value of 0.5 was assigned. The overall average gives a 47.94 percent preference for schools, and a 52.06 percent preference for seminaries.



Fig. 9: Preference for schools or seminaries? (Pakistan - CRSS)

A central question then emerges. What is the correlation between a family's income potential, education, number of children, and their decision to send one or more children to a seminary? The results are not as obvious as one might imagine.

First, a comparison against average salaries, broken into roughly Rs. 5,000 increments, reveals interesting patterns.

Income	Age	Income	Children…	…in Seminary	…in School	Freq.
0-5000	46.85	4,153.85	5.23	2.38	2.23	13
5001-10000	43.17	9,188.41	4.20	1.78	1.59	69
10001-15000	40.55	13,489.44	3.67	1.66	1.63	161
15001-20000	41.62	18,660.68	3.49	1.56	1.65	117
20001-25000	43.17	24,189.66	3.62	1.93	1.72	58
25001-30000	43.96	29,295.65	3.76	1.98	2.46	46
30001-50000	42.65	40,410.96	3.23	1.82	1.84	74
50001+	41.95	95,150.00	3.95	2.45	2.75	20

Table 1: Average salaries, number of children, and school/madrasa attendance (Pakistan - CRSS)

The Rs. 15,001-20,000 monthly salary range shows the lowest average of children sent to seminaries, as well as the third lowest average number of children sent to school. Families with an average monthly salary of between Rs. 30,001 and Rs. 50,000 have the smallest average number of children at 3.23.



Fig. 10: Correlation between monthly household income and number of children in madrasas (Pakistan - CRSS)

Interestingly, the average number of children per family seems to decrease as average monthly salaries rise, averaging around 3.6 children at higher levels.

By all accounts, there seems to be significant correlation between family income, and the parents' decision to send the child to seminaries. For the first 360 of the 558 respondent families, there is a consistent decline in the number of children sent to seminaries, as the average household income rises.

For the remaining families, with an average monthly income of over Rs. 20,000, this value sharply and anomalously increases, topping at 2.95. In fact, the group with the highest number of children in seminaries also earns the largest amount of money every month, which may seem counter-intuitive. The qualitative assessment shows that finances are a big concern, but this data point also establishes that a greater number of children are sent to seminaries at the highest income bracket. This group also has the third highest average number of children per family at 3.95.



Fig. 11: Correlation between monthly household income and number of children in madrasas (Pakistan - CRSS)

When we do a comparison of average family education against the number of children sent to seminaries, the first pattern is as obvious as it is clear.

Category	Income	Education	Children…	...in Seminary	...in School	Freq.
No Education	14,108.91	0	4.32	1.84	1.65	101
1 through 5	14,302.78	4.9	4.17	1.6	1.58	72
6 through 8	17,244.44	7.9	3.75	1.67	1.75	81
8 through 12	22,381.96	10.63	3.53	1.83	1.96	197
Some College	34,254.24	14	2.92	1.75	1.66	59
Bachelor's	39,861.11	16	3.26	2.08	1.89	36
Masters+	69,750.00	18.25	2.83	1.58	1.75	12

Table 2: Average family education, number of children, and school/madrasa attendance (Pakistan - CRSS)

The monthly income of a family increases almost exponentially with the level of education. Those with a post-graduate degree make well over four times more than those with no education. This is neither surprising nor anomalous. Education opens many doors for new opportunities, revenue streams, and improves employability. It must also be said that we have taken the **male's** education level, because most males (99 percent) are employed, whereas only 19 of the 558 families had employed females (3 percent).



Fig. 12: Correlation between male parent's education level and average monthly income (Pakistan - CRSS)

We originally suspected that the number of children sent to seminaries would decline as the level of education of the parents rose, and the data collected confirms this pattern. With the exception of one anomalous spike at the Bachelor's degree level, the average number of children that attend seminaries per family continues to drop steadily. Primary caregivers with no education had an average number of 4.32 children in seminaries, whereas those with a Master's degree or above had 2.83.



Fig. 13: Correlation between male parent's education level and average number of children (Pakistan - CRSS)

It is important, however, to consider how many families are included in each one of these education level categories. The graph below depicts this.



Fig. 14: Correlation between male parent's education level and number of children in madrasas (Pakistan – CRSS)

As may be evident, the vast majority of the respondents have never attended college. Nearly half have not completed education beyond the eighth grade, and nearly half of those have had no education whatsoever. Another way to visualize this information is as follows:



Fig. 15: Correlation between male parent's education level and number of children in madrasas (Pakistan - CRSS)

Finally, when we compare whether the number of children in a family directly affect the number of children sent to seminaries, the pattern emerged quite clearly, barring some anomalies.

# of Children in Family	Income	Children…	…in Seminary	…in School	Freq.
1	25,135.14	1	1	0.54	37
2	22,565.89	2	1.5	0.96	129
3	21,685.71	3	1.71	1.5	126
4	21,114.29	4	1.92	1.97	113
5	26,438.46	5	2.06	2.58	65
6	17,234.04	6	1.83	2.43	47

Table 3: Number of children, family income, and madrasa/school attendance (Pakistan - CRSS)



Fig. 16: Correlation between number of children in family and number of children in madrasas (Pakistan – CRSS)

If we disregard the families with over eight children, and consider the first 549 of the 558 surveyed families, it is clear that there is a consistent increase in the number of children sent to seminaries, though not directly

proportional to the number of children. For instance, most families with two children have around 1.5 children attending seminaries, but families with four times as many children have 2.62 children attending seminaries. Overall, it can be safely concluded that the number of children in a family increases the likelihood of more children in that family attending a seminary.

Qualitative analysis: Interpretation of responses to the open-ended question – If any of your children attend seminaries, what is the root cause?

A few major themes emerged in the responses to this question. Most parents stated that they sent their child to seminaries for religious education, and that both religious and worldly education were necessary to have a successful life. Several parents stated that schools taught about life, and seminaries about religion. This is tacit acceptance that religious education may not prepare children for the real world. Several respondents also stated that they wanted their children both to have good jobs and be good Muslims. Several parents stated that they would send male children to schools as they have to earn and manage financial matters, and the female children to seminaries, as they need to learn how to raise their children in accordance with Islamic teachings. This inherent sexism, inevitably, translates into the socio-economic strata of the local and national context.

Themes for parents with an affinity for seminaries

For parents that showed an affinity for seminaries, the following themes in their responses emerged.

Free education

Seminaries in Pakistan are credited with not only the provision of free education but also free-of-cost food and boarding facilities. Seminaries are believed to house children from poor and less-advantaged classes of society. If one is to believe the argument of free education imparted by seminaries, then it means that around 3.5 million[45] (the number of students enrolled in seminaries) are awarded free education by this parallel education system. In fact, the contemporary scholars on seminaries agree on the point that there is "a correlation between madrasa enrolment and income

(45) Hasan Mansoor, 'Report on State of Madressahs in Pakistan Launched', *Dawn.com*, 31 July 2015.

status of the families of students."[46] A research report (based on Pakistan Integrated Household Survey-1998-99) by Social Policy and Development Center found that the majority of the students in madrasas are accessed by "lower-middle and lower-income groups."[47]

Here, the argument could be made that under the 18th amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan,[48] education has been made free for every child between the ages of five and sixteen. As such, social strata or standing should not matter. However, this is easier said than done, and even in provinces where the legislation has been passed, it still needs to be implemented. For example, in 2013 Provincial Minister for Elementary and Secondary Education Mohammad Atif Khan said, "If we pass a law providing free and compulsory secondary education, it will not be fruitful in the present scenario, as the education department is short of financial and infrastructural resources."[49]

Further, there is a range of hidden costs that seminaries tend to absorb in addition to the lack of a fee structure. For instance, there are no commuting costs, or any expenses related to stationery, supplies, and books. Parents also do not have to pay for any extra-curricular activities or incidental expenses that government schools may require.

In other words, free education is not free, and seminaries fill that gap well.

The argument that seminaries are better than government schools stems from two causes. The first is financial: Parents feel they are not cheated by hidden costs of educating their children, and seminaries absorb every bit of cost associated with the task of housing and educating children. Second, the term 'better' also has religious connotations, which are not related to the quality of education nor the level of employability after graduation.

(46) Umair Khalil, 'The Madrasa Conundrum: State of Religious Education in Pakistan' (HIVE Karachi, 2015).
(47) Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), *Social Development in Pakistan: Annual Review 2002-2003* (Karachi, 2003).
(48) National Assembly of Pakistan, 'Report on the Constitution's 18th Amendment Bill', 2008 <http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/report_constitutional_18th_amend_bill2010_020410_.pdf> [accessed 9 February 2017].
(49) Mohammad Ashfaq, 'KP Reluctant to Enact Law on Free Education', *Dawn.com*, September 2013.

Most seminaries teach memorization of the Quran, its interpretation, sayings and interpretation of the prophet, Islamic jurisprudence and its principles, Arabic language and grammar, Islamic finance, logic, Islamic philosophy, and classic Arabic literature and eloquence. As may be evident, this normally prepares a child to become a cleric or an Imam, and the child's employability in a modern, progressive society is thereby severely affected. However, becoming a cleric is a source of great pride for the parents of the child, and clerics are socially revered and exalted, thus compounding the reasoning for sending a child to a seminary.

Religious obligation

In addition to believing that it is their religious obligation to send their child to a religious schools, parents also believe that success is important in both worlds, but much more so in the hereafter.

Religion has been a key component of Pakistan's culture and identity, and therefore, seminaries hold an important position in preserving that identity.[50] Since seminaries impart religious education, they are considered to be fulfilling religious obligation. Many religious scholars believe that obtaining Islamic education is obligatory for every Muslim.

This is the reason why "religious education has been eulogized" in Pakistan.[51] Seminary curriculum includes 8 years' education in religious sciences, which include jurisprudence, Quran and its commentary.[52] Public or government and private schools are considered as imparting "worldly" or "secular" education, and over a much longer period.[53] For poorer families, sending a child to a seminary also means that the child can enter the workforce, and help win bread for the family, sooner.

Christine Fair in her study about the seminaries in Pakistan has found that Pakistanis, like other Muslims, believe that attaining Islamic education will lead to benefits in the life hereafter.[54] Life in the hereafter is a very important

(50) Sanchita Bhattacharya, 'Madrasa Education in Pakistan: In the Context of Government Policy', *Global Education Magazine*, 21 September 2014.
(51) Jan-E-Alam Khaki, 'Divide in Education', *Dawn.com*, 1 August 2014.
(52) Adeline Delavande and Basit Zafar, *Stereotypes and Madrassas: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan*, Labor and Population (New York, 2011).
(53) C. Christine Fair.
(54) C. Christine Fair.

and central concept for Islam, with this world often viewed as a temporary abode, designed to test mortal flesh and moral fiber.

Anti-Islamic education in schools

There is a general acceptance that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Father of the nation of Pakistan, has dozens of quotes attributed to him where he makes the differences between the Muslim and Hindu culture the basis for the need for a separate homeland for Muslims, where they could "experiment on Islamic principles."[55]

Thus, many believe, there should be an Islamic system regulating all the state institutions, including education. People in Pakistan are categorically divided into two groups. One group of Pakistanis considers the system as an idea that was to evolve and shape Pakistan into a modern and progressive Muslim-majority society and state. The other group sees it as an idea that was to grow and lay the foundation of a unique Islamic nation or a strong theocratic island in a sea of western ideas and of the 'pseudo-secularism' of Hindu-dominated India.

Since education is considered one of the major sources to influence the ideas and thoughts of individuals, the latter group has always believed that the modern education system and private schools are imparting secularist views among the youth that are against the teachings and ideals of Islam. That is why people prefer to send their children to the religious seminaries rather than private schools. The private school system is more focused on globalization and progressive thought. Private schools also impart soft skills, which are simply not a priority for seminaries.[56]

These parents believe that the transmission of religious knowledge is an integral part of Islam. In theory, Islamic Studies is taught in private schools, but there is no such example that shows that Islamic values are also imparted or practiced in these institutes. There are three main types of religious institutions, or Quranic schools: Mosques, schools where both the Quranic

(55) Blog, 'Ideology of Pakistan in The Light of Quid-E-Azam's Sayings', *Notes on Pakistan Blogspot*, 2013 <http://notesonpakistan.blogspot.dk/2009/08/ideology-of-pakistan-in-light-of-quid-e.html>.
(56) Nadeem F. Paracha, 'The Idea That Created Pakistan', *Dawn.com*, 25 December 2014.

and secular subjects are taught and madrasas where only Islamic learning takes place.[57] It is easy to see why persons who have only been exposed to religious education, and indoctrinated to believe that progressive thought is designed to threaten or weaken Islamic existence, view secular education as contrary to the ideals of Islam.

Moral values

Morality is a tricky subject, as religious underpinnings can steer people in a direction diametrically opposite to the accepted moral/humanitarian code on a given issue. As an example, while legislation in Pakistan criminalizes blasphemy and offers proper rules and procedures to follow on how to deal with blasphemy cases, open calls for the murder of the blasphemers and a weak implementation of the rule of law often result in mob violence and vigilantism. Al-Jazeera estimates that since 1990, at least 68 people linked to blasphemy accusations have been killed by vigilantes or mobs.[58] This includes Salman Taseer, the sitting Governor of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous and prosperous province, by a member of his own Elite Police security detail.[59]

Further, many people in Pakistan have objections over co-education, dress code, and some of the subjects (such as music, dance, and swimming) that are taught at private schools. They consider these contrary to Islamic ideals and moral values. A school in Karachi was under threat from a religious political party for introducing the topic of reproduction and music classes.

Similarly, private institutions often either succumb to pressures from the very vocal and highly organized religious right. For instance, an educational institute in Islamabad restricted its students from wearing jeans and fined many for not wearing religiously appropriate head garments.[60]

(57) Abdul Razzaq Sabir and Abdul Nasir, 'Teaching of Islamic Studies as a Subject in the Secondary Schools and Madaris in Pakistan', *Balochistan Review*, 24.1 (2011).
(58) Asad Hashim, 'Disappeared: Silencing Pakistan's Activists', *Al Jazeera*, 21 January 2017.
(59) 'Salmaan Taseer Assassinated', *The Express Tribune*, 4 January 2011.
(60) Ikram Junaidi, 'NUST Fines Girls for Wearing Jeans, Tights', *Dawn.com*, 25 September 2013.

Themes for parents with an affinity for schools

For parents that showed an affinity for government schools, the following themes emerged. Many of these are simply the other side of the coin to the themes discussed in the chapter above.

- Because the quality of education in schools is better than before
- Schools impart both religious and worldly education
- Religious education can also be provided at home
- Success comes from the education imparted by schools
- Schools will give extensive and diverse knowledge
- They are better, but I wish they imparted religious education
- Because school education is important to be able to live in society
- Because it is the need and priority of the contemporary modern era
- Because it will brighten futures
- Because it will help them build a good family
- Because then, they can get a good job
- Moral values are important

Key findings: Why do parents send their children to seminaries?

This study surveyed 558 families in 14 cities across Pakistan. The respondents were selected because they had sent at least one child to a madrasa. This means that the findings from the study cannot be seen as representative of all families across Pakistan, but they give some insights into the factors that influence and motivate families to send their children to madrasas.

- The majority of respondents stated that they had access to both a school and a madrasa in their immediate areas.

- 47.94 percent of the respondents said that they prefer to send their children to schools, whereas 52.06 percent had a preference for madrasas. This is an interesting finding, since 84.07 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the amenities and quality of education at the public schools – which means that the reasons for not sending a child to a public school must be found elsewhere.

- When asked why they did not send their children to public schools, parents most frequently mentioned religious (43.15 percent) and economic reasons (41.35 percent). However, about a third of the

respondents (30.70 percent) chose the 'other' category for this question indicating that there are numerous reasons why parents decide not to send their children to public schools. Almost a fourth of the surveyed parents (24.72 percent) indicated that the child's disinterest in attending school was a part of the decision.

- The quantitative data showed that the number of children in a family increases the likelihood of more children in that family attending a madrasa. There was also a decline in the number of children sent to madrasas, as the average household income rises. The financial status thus seemed to have an impact on the parents' decision to send their children to madrasas.

- The qualitative part of the research revealed some interesting trends in parents' motivations. Most parents said that they send their children to madrasas because they provide free religious education, and because they consider it a religious obligation to provide their children with such an education. Most parents highlighted that they believe that both religious and worldly education is necessary to have a successful life. However, the findings also shed light on gendered differences in the choice of schooling for a child. Several parents stated that they would send their male children to public schools as they have to gain knowledge on financial matters, and the female children to madrasas, as they need to learn how to raise their children in accordance with Islamic teachings.

- In sum, the economic concerns, combined with a general devotion to religion appeared to be the motivating factor for parents to send their children to madrasas instead of schools.

Part two: Identifying and analyzing financial pipelines of madrasas in Pakistan

By Gul Dad, Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies

Introduction

The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Study (PICSS), an Islamabad-based independent think tank, has undertaken this study to understand various financial streams or pipelines to madrasas in Pakistan and their impact on said madrasas. The aim has been to suggest measures for intervention and suggest alternative sources for funding to address the problem. The study is based on field research conducted from April to May 2016. The study aimed to achieve the following objectives:

- Identifying domestic and foreign financial chains for madrasas and their impacts
- Analyzing madrasas' functional dependency on different sources of funding
- Pointing out possible areas of interventions to pursue madrasa funding reforms in Pakistan
- Highlighting areas and opportunities for alternative funding for contemporary schools

Methodology

This descriptive and exploratory research adopted a mixed method of study, i.e., qualitative as well as quantitative methods for analysis of financial pipelines of madrasas.

PICSS has studied financial resources and sources of the third level of madrasas working in Pakistan – the *Dars-e-Nizami* – as this is the most important level where a student remains in the madrasa for at least six to eight years. Most of the fourth level of religious education – the *Takhassas* (specialization) – is provided in madrasas, which are already providing Dars-e-Nizami (see the 'Contextualizing madrasas' chapter for more information on the levels of madrasas working in Pakistan).

Data for this study was collected from madrasa administrations, donors, board officials, and relevant government departments. Among the madrasa administrations, it was initially planned to collect data from 40 madrasas

in such a way that our sample would comprise one madrasa from each five schools of thought, as well as from each administrative unit, namely Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Baluchistan, Islamabad Capital Territory, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), Gilgit-Baltistan, Punjab, and Sindh. However, the PICSS Advisory Board suggested collecting data from at least 80 madrasas for better understanding of the phenomena under investigation. Nevertheless, data could be collected from only 77 madrasas since madrasas of certain schools of thought in some of the administrative units were non-existent due to low number of adherents to said schools of thought. For example, in Islamabad Capital Territory there exists only one madrasa of the Jamat-e-Islami school of thought, while one madrasa each of Brailvi and Al-Hadith schools of thought were visited in Gilgit-Baltistan for similar reasons. Moreover, data in *Khyber Pakhtunkhaw* (KPK) was collected from 12 madrasas instead of 10, as some prominent madrasas, including madrasa Haqqania in Akora Khattak, one of the leading seminaries of the country, were located in this region. Data from madrasa administrations was collected using a well-structured questionnaire (attached as Annex I) with a mix of close and open ended-questions. A list of madrasas visited for data collection is mentioned in Annex II.

For better understanding of the supply side for donations, data was also collected using a close-ended questionnaire (Annex III) from 100 donors within Pakistan. The survey used convenience sampling as no sampling frame could be calculated due to donors' preference not to disclose their names for religious and other considerations. In addition, relevant authorities of five madrasa boards were also interviewed, using a close and open-ended questionnaire (Annex IV), for this study. For better understanding of the government response and policy options adopted at various tiers, relevant government officials, including officials of the ministries of interior, religious affairs, and finance were interviewed using a closed- and open-ended questionnaire (Annex V). Apart from data collection using aforementioned tools, observations of the researchers during the field visits also form part of this study.

After administrating the survey, the data was coded into an spreadsheet for analysis. For this purpose, various techniques/tools including descriptive statistical tools were used and data was presented in bar charts, pie charts, and histograms as deemed appropriate.

Theoretical framework

Organizational behavior of nonprofit organizations has been in focus in many studies. Resource dependence theory is widely used to study the organizational behavior and various aspects of organizational structure and performance in nonprofit organizations.[61] This theory explains the dependence of nonprofit organizations on external resources for their survival. The central idea of this theory is that the base of organizations' survival is connected to availability of resources. This theory is affiliated with the concept of isomorphism, initiated by DiMaggio and Powell in their institutional theory, which explains the similar behavior of organizations.[62] According to resource dependence theory, organizations are not legitimate in their power of choices; rather they are influenced by external pressure. This theory describes the theoretical framework of nonprofit organizations' compliance with financial reporting regulation.[63]

Therefore, this theory relates with one study in the early part of the 2000s that showed the growth of madrasas as having different social welfare, religious, national, and international agendas. Furthermore, their religious goals usually carried a dual purpose. These madrasas, with their driven individuals, work intensely to highlight their agenda in order to collect generous donations from donors, locally as well as from a diaspora. These madrasas are not concerned with resource acquisition, but analysts are keen to look into their diverse activities regarding revenue generation. This is so because during this type of activity, madrasas of different sects risk diverting from their given mission statements.

Madrasas depend on different activities and donors in connection with financial support. In order to entice individuals and other groups for the purpose of fundraising, they start campaigns, arrange programs, and place donation boxes. They also use other ways to pursue this task, e.g., by asking for grants or signing contracts with different foundations. Therefore, a more tentative approach revolves around the commercial activities adopted by the madrasas for resource generation to avoid dependence on donors.

(61) Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
(62) Sandra Verbruggen, Johan Christiaens, and Koen Milis, 'Can Resource Dependence Explain Not-for-Profit Organizations' Compliance with Reporting Standards?', 2009.
(63) Ibid.

Resource dependence in nonprofit organizations

This theory explains the causal relationship between non-profit organizations and resource dependency at different levels. This shows three major revenue strategies of nonprofit organizations, to elaborate source of funding including private contributions, government funding, and commercial activities. Further, this theory elaborates on questions about the legitimacy and performance of nonprofit organizations. According to the theory, nonprofit organizations are supposed to make their financial information public so donors can ascertain whether their contributions have been used efficiently.[64] However, this particular assumption of the theory might only be partially true for the study of madrasas as non-profit organizations. On the other hand, resource dependence theory involves examining the strategies for revenue generation as a means to survive and for that, madrasas need to interact with their donors.[65]

Nonprofit organizations use different strategies for revenues and funds in order to accomplish their goals. Nonprofit organizations seek funding not only from private and individual donors but also from the government sector and also employ commercial assets. Each revenue strategy has different consequences and each has different constraints in relation to donors.[66]

Resource dependence theory and its applicability to the study

Keeping factors in view such, resource dependence theory provides the conceptual framework with which madrasas in Pakistan have been studied. The basic tenets of resource dependence theory can be summarized as follows:

- Organizations depend on resources.
- These resources ultimately originate from an organization's environment.
- The environment, to a considerable extent, contains other organizations.

(64) Karen A. Froelich, 'Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations', *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 28.3 (1999), 246–68 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764099283002>.
(65) J. P. Sheppard, 'A Resource Dependence Approach To Organizational Failure', *Social Science Research*, 24.1 (1995), 28–62.
(66) Froelich.

- The resources one organization needs are thus often in the hand of other organizations.
- Resources are a basis of power.
- Legally independent organizations can therefore depend on each other.

Resource dependence theory is based on the notion that *"the key to organizational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources."*[67] Environmental conditions play a vital role regarding the provision of resources, as resources most of the time are not sufficient, consistent, and guaranteed. Hence, environmental conditions either pose a great threat to the non-profit organizations (madrasas in this case) for survival or are in its favor. An organization needs to be in contact with other individuals, groups, and other organizations who possess resources. Since madrasas are dependent on such individuals, groups or organizations, and madrasas also engage in some types of commercial activities (in the form of owning resources), the use of theory for this study makes sense.

Analysis and discussion: Madrasas' financial pipelines

Money inflow and money outflow

Financial pipelines, or finances, related to madrasas can be better understood when studied from the viewpoint of money inflow and money outflow, i.e., revenue and expenses respectively. This study intends to shed light on both money inflows and outflows to understand better not only various sources of revenue/expenses but also their impact.

Money inflow (revenue)

Madrasas generate revenue (money inflow) from two main sources: internal (domestic) and external (abroad/foreign). Revenue generation from both of these sources has its own advantages and disadvantages, which will be highlighted later in this chapter. However, before further discussions on various revenue sources, it is worthwhile to gain a clear understanding of the terminology used in this research.

- *Zakat*: Major source of funding for almost all madrasas is Zakat and a few of its sub-forms. The literal meaning of Zakat is 'to cleanse' or

(67) Ibid.

'purify.' In the Islamic faith, Zakat means purifying your wealth for the will of Allah, SWT (*Subhanahu wa ta'ala – Glory to him, the exalted*), to acknowledge that everything we own belongs to Allah, SWT, and to work towards the betterment of the Muslim Ummah. According to Islamic regulations, Zakat is 2.5 percent of one year's total cumulative wealth. This amount is then distributed to the poor.[68] Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. As such, it is compulsory for Muslims, provided they meet certain conditions and criteria. Any Muslim who possesses the required nisaab (the minimum amount of wealth that one must have before zakat is payable) for one whole year is bound to pay Zakat on that wealth.[69] The main difference between tax and Zakat is that the former is a requirement of government under the law while the latter is a spiritual act and an obligation as a caring human being. Tax rates can be changed as per desire or requirement of the government, while the Zakat rate is fixed and cannot be altered by anyone.

- *Ushr*: Ushr is the obligatory charge (Zakat) on farm produce, which is one-tenth for one kind of land and one-twentieth for others. If the farm or garden is watered naturally by rain or spring water, or river or stream water, [a] tenth part of the produce is obligatory, and if the farm or garden is irrigated by artificial means like the well, tube well, canals, etc., a twentieth part is obligatory.[70] Ushr, mostly given in-kind, continues to remain one source of income, and it is has been witnessed during the field visits that some madrasas, particularly in rural areas of Sindh and Punjab which are known for high production of wheat, etc., are given Ushr, and madrasas store such wheat for consumption throughout the year.
- *Khums*: Khums literally means one fifth. Although both Shia and Sunni believe in Khums, in practical terms only Shias currently collect and distribute Khums. In the Shia school of thought, one fifth of the cumulative wealth one acquires during a year is to be given as Khums. Then there are two further divisions of Khums, one half will be given to the Mujtahid (a religious scholar of highest stature in Shia Islam) and the other half can be directly spent on the needy people. Mujtahid has

(68) Muslim Aid, Religious Dues – Zakat
(69) Marshall Cavendish, *Modern Muslim Societies.* (New York: Marshall Cavendish Reference, 2010).
(70) A. A. Kamal, *Everyday Fiqh* (Islamic Publications, 1976).

discretion on how to spend the amount within the prescribed limits of the Shia school of thought.[71]

- *Fitrana*: Also called Zakat al-Fitr is a one-time mandatory payment applicable to every Muslim, irrespective of age, wealth, or gender (for minors, it is to be paid by their parents/ guardians) and paid between first day of Ramadan and first day of Shawal. The amount to be given is equal to approximately three kilograms of stable food (or its cash equivalent).[72] Fitrana is mostly paid to poor people in locality so that they can take part in Eid festivals, but it can also be paid to madrasas. However, this type of mandatory payment represents a negligible share in madrasa revenues and, therefore, has not been treated separately.
- *Sadqa* (voluntary donations): In addition to paying the abovementioned mandatory funds, Islam also encourages its believers to make voluntary donations to the poor and needy. However, such donations are not mandatory and one is free to determine the size of donations, if interested, as well as in his/her choice/selection of donation recipients. Since madrasas provide religious education in addition to food and shelter to the poor segment of society, they become a natural choice for such donations. The following are some of the popular methods and forms for collecting donations:
    - *Donation boxes*: For collecting donations from the public, madrasas and mosques also use donation boxes, which were previously known to be placed in various locations, including at shops in the markets, but which are now mostly limited to the madrasa's/ mosque's premises. Mostly small donations are placed inside these donation boxes.
    - *Collection at Friday Prayers*: Almost every mosque collects donations from the public after Friday sermons. For this purpose, two people move through every row in the mosque, holding a cloth while people silently put their donations therein. No receipt voucher is required for such donations
    - *Payment into bank accounts*: If the madrasa has a bank account, larger donations are also paid directly into that account. However, some reluctance has been witnessed regarding payment directly into bank accounts since procedural fees and, in some cases additional charges, are required for transferring money.

(71) Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, *Khums (The Islamic Tax)* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015).
(72) Cavendish.

  - *Direct payment to Principal/Mohtamim*: Most of larger donations are directly paid to the principal/mohtamim of the madrasa, for which the principal may or may not issue a receipt voucher.
  - *In kind*: In addition to cash donations, there is also an existing mechanism of in kind donations to madrasas. For example, some donors provide a complete stock of flour and sacks of rice that meet their monthly or even yearly needs. In addition, some donors provide other grocery items on a regular basis.
- *Animal hides*: Sacrificial animal hides are another source of income for madrasas. Muslims, who sacrifice animals on Eid-ul-Azha, donate hides to charities, including madrasas, and use them as prayer mats, or sell the hides in the market and donate the sum to madrasas.[73] Previously, animal hides were one of the key revenue sources for madrasas, but now hide donations to madrasas have decreased considerably, particularly after the appearance of Jihadi as well as welfare organizations in this domain (For example, Jamat-ud Dawah linked Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation, Jamat-e-Islami affiliated Al-Khidmat Foundation, Muttahida Qaumi Movement's Khidmat-e-Khalq Foundation, and Shoukat Khannam Cancer Hospital). These organizations now take a major share of these animal hides. Moreover, a comparative reduction of hide prices in the leather market has also made this source of income the least preferred option.
- *Madrasa assets*: Traditionally, madrasas in the Indian sub-continent possessed assets, including farmlands, which allowed them to meet their day-to-day expenses. The possession of assets freed madrasas from worries about running their day-to-day activities and thus reduced their dependency on other sources of revenue. However, very few madrasas in Pakistan today possess their own assets, yet the practice has not completely diminished.
- *Government grants*: These are instances when local governments (mostly provincial) provide grants to madrasas, but such grants have been to one-time activities and no consistent grants were given by governments to madrasas.

Since Zakat, Ushr, and Khums are mandatory for a Muslim and a religious duty, they prefer to donate these funds to a 'religious cause'. Establishing and running a madrasa is considered as one of the most important religious

(73) Hüseyin Algül, *The Blessed Days & Nights of the Islamic Year* (Tughra Books, 2008).

activities, especially in South Asia, thus they get a maximum out of this mandatory fund. For this study, mandatory forms of spending by Muslim communities are grouped into one category for better understanding, while non-mandatory forms of spending are placed separately. It may specifically be noted that despite being preferred, madrasas are not the only option available as recipients of zakat. The same applies to voluntary donations.

The external source of funding coming from Pakistani Diasporas also mainly consists of Zakat and its various forms, since the Pakistani Diaspora prefer to spend this on madrasas back home due to religious motivations, as well as desire for helping the poor (as a majority of children studying in madrasas are from poor families). Since madrasas provide education, food, and shelter to society's most worthy segment, the donors are automatically attracted to give their Zakat to be spent on these poor students. The difficulty of identifying such people in the country of their work and the obligation to ensure that Zakat is paid to the neediest one also compels Pakistani Diaspora to pay Zakat to madrasas back home. Similarly, individual donations from local Muslim communities from other countries, which are substantial, are somehow also based on this notion. Interestingly, as per Islamic principles, Zakat cannot be used to build or run Mosques, thus madrasas are the other largest noble cause that comes to mind for Muslim donors. However, it should not be construed that all Zakat goes to madrasas alone. Nevertheless, PICSS's study revealed that a major portion of madrasa funds come from Zakat, both from within the country and outside.

In Pakistan, there is an official Zakat collection system through banks from Sunni depositors as the banks are supposed to deduct Zakat automatically every year. However, people generally do not trust in the government's ability or its intentions to appropriately spend and place the religiously mandatory funds. Generally, the banks deduct 2.5 percent of the amount on first of Ramadan, but those who do not trust in the government's handling of Zakat money withdraw their money to the limit which is lower than *Nisab* (minimum amount which makes it mandatory to pay Zakat) and disburse according to their own choice. Due to rampant corruption and a history of misuse of Zakat funds by the government, the mistrust is obvious, especially when concerning a matter of religion. As private Zakat disbursement is available in abundance, the madrasas are some of the biggest contenders to get a maximum share.

There is a myth that only religiously motivated people or devout Muslims give donations or pay Zakat money to madrasas. However, this notion is not based on facts. It has been observed that the business community is one of the main donors to madrasas, irrespective of their religious inclinations. Even donors with a more liberal outlook are also found to give to madrasas. Due to their religious and social needs, ranging from leading funeral prayers, marriage nikah, and other religious rituals, liberal donors belonging to the business community also prefer their donations to go to mosques and madrasas. This concept is similar to the donations given to priests and churches in Western societies. In addition to the business community, politicians belonging to various political parties also give donations to madrasas for their political as well as social objectives. Moreover, it has also come to fore that provincial governments provided donations to madrasas for achieving their political objectives. For example, the then provincial government of the Awami National Party, despite being a liberal political party, gave a Rs. 10 million donation to a madrasa.[74] While part of the government in KPK of Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Insaf gave a grant of Rs. 30 million to Darul Uloom Haqqania, run by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq.[75] The government claims that this funding is provided to the madrasa for reforms and mainstreaming. However, the prevailing perception in the opposition is that such funding of madrasas is meant to achieve political objectives. Notwithstanding governments in Pakistan, even foreign governments, including Muslim and non-Muslim countries, are found donating money to madrasas in Pakistan for achieving their political and foreign policy objectives in addition to helping the country. In some instances, this is to achieve some social objectives like literacy, etc. Pakistan's Interior Ministry has officially conceded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, the US, the UK, and South Africa were providing funds to madrasas.[76] Moreover, the Embassy of Netherlands in Islamabad donated Rs. 2.5 million to Helping Hands Welfare Association Baltistan for students of local seminaries and schools, while the Australian High Commission provided Rs. 3 million to Malik Welfare Association Baltistan in support of seminaries. In addition to foreign governments, names of some foreign non-governmental organiza-

(74) Awami National Party, '10m for Saab Haq Madrassa', 2015 <http://awaminationalparty.org/main/?p=2739> [accessed 9 February 2017].
(75) Khalid Kheshgi, 'Rs300m Allocated for Madrassa in KP Budget, Assembly Told', *Thenews.com*, 17 June 2016.
(76) Danish Hussain, '300 Seminaries Receiving Funds from Abroad', *The Express Tribune*, 17 December 2015.

tions have also figured in providing funds to madrasas. For example, the government revealed that a US-based Kashmir Family Aid contributed Rs. 0.7 million to Helping Hands Welfare Association Baltistan for students of local seminaries and schools.[77]

The month of Ramadan is a vital month for donation collection for madrasas, since spending in this month is religiously considered to be more rewarding – up to 70 percent more than in other months. Therefore, Muslims are more inclined to pay their annual Zakat and other non-mandatory charity during the month of Ramadan.[78] It may be noted that almost all madrasas in Pakistan remain closed during the month of Ramadan but the administrations of madrasas go on collecting revenues from various sources. In some of the cases, the madrasa administrations announce vacations 15 days prior to Ramadan providing them ample opportunity to a major portion of their revenue.

As shown in figure 17, surveyed data suggested that almost 93 percent of madrasas' total revenues are collected domestically, while only seven percent of revenues are collected from foreign sources. Sources of finances for various schools of thought are also shown in figure 17. The Shia school of thought has the highest percentage in terms of revenue collected from foreign sources.

It may specifically be noted that this data shows only the latest trends and does not capture percentages from previous financing sources, as in the past some schools of thought were receiving many more finances from foreign sources (for example, Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi schools of thought from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait, and Shia and Brelvi schools of thought from the Islamic Republic of Iran). For example, Saudi Arabia and to some extent Iran, has banned any collection of donations/zakat, etc. in their jurisdiction by representatives (sometime referred to as *safeers*) from Pakistani madrasas after official requests from the Government of Pakistan. This aspect has been duly acknowledged by some of the respondents during field visits as well as during interviews with government officials. However, there is a strong possibility that madrasa administrators

(77) Zahid Gishkori, 'Year 2013-14: 80 Seminaries Received Rs300m in Foreign Aid', *The Express Tribune*, 29 January 2015.
(78) Susumu Nejima, *NGOs in the Muslim World: Faith and Social Services* (Taylor & Francis, 2015).

are still visiting foreign countries to collect donations from non-Pakistani Muslim communities. In this regard, religious leaders who have studied in a given country and have social circles or established personal rapport with locals are able to collect such donations despite bans from respective governments.

During field visits, it was also observed that some madrasas, who were completely dependent on foreign donations, have been shut down suggesting that foreign governments have withdrawn their support for said madrasas due to rising apprehensions regarding diversion of these finances towards financing terror. It may also be noted that although some madrasas denied receiving any foreign funding, circumstantial evidence, as witnessed by the data collection team, indicated that foreign entities did provide some support to madrasas either in establishing libraries, or buildings, etc. One such example was a madrasa visited in FATA whose academic block consisted of more than 16 rooms, computer lab, training workshops (for providing technical training to students like computer, radio, TV, and mobile repair), library, etc.



Fig. 17: Sources of revenue – Domestic versus foreign (National trend & schools of thought, Pakistan - PICSS)

With the given background of internal and external sources of finances, it is worthwhile to shed some light on various sources of revenue that madrasas utilize for meeting their day-to-day expenses, irrespective of whether this revenue is generated from local or foreign sources. As shown in figure 18, donations from the general public and zakat/usher/khumas are two major sources of revenue for madrasas (these two make up 75 percent of total revenue), while revenue from animal hides (nine percent), as well as the madrasas' own assets (nine percent) also have a notable share. It may also be noted that revenue from foreign sources falls into the first two categories, i.e., mandatory (zakat/usher/khumas) and non-mandatory (donations). Since the Shia school of thought has a more centralized systems of khumas, as explained earlier, it has a comparatively higher share of foreign sources. Collection of khumas for madrasas is one such source, which is duly confirmed by surveyed data, as shown in figure 23. Moreover, a majority of respondents belonging to the Shia school of thought were more open to sharing information regarding foreign sources of funding, while a majority of respondents belonging to other schools of thought (particularly, Ahle-Hadees and Deobani) were less open to sharing such information. For example, some respondents categorically rejected any foreign funding donations/aid when they were asked about foreign sources of funding. However, when data collection teams visited various facilities, it was found, and in some cases admitted by the madrasa administration, that some facilities like academic wings, mosques, libraries, etc., were funded by foreign governments/entities.



Fig. 18: Various sources of madrasa revenue (National trend, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 19: Various sources of madrasa revenue (Ahl-e-Hadith, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 20: Various sources of madrasa revenue (Brelvi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 21: Various sources of madrasa revenue (Deobandi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 22: Various sources of madrasa revenue (Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 23: Various sources of madrasa revenue (Shia, Pakistan - PICSS)

Revenue from local sources (domestic) and its impact

Regarding consistency of revenue from local sources, 69 percent of respondents stated that the revenue from the given internal sources was consistent, while 31 percent stated inconsistency in revenue streams, i.e., revenue from

the given sources varies. With some variations, reflected in figures 18 to 23, all schools of thought face some sort of inconsistency in their revenue streams. This inconsistency makes life difficult for madrasa administrations since they are supposed to make efforts to arrange required resources.



Fig. 24: Consistency versus inconsistency of local revenue sources (national trend + schools of thought, Pakistan - PICSS)

Strategy for coping with reduced revenue from local sources

When asked about their potential strategy for dealing with a situation with reduced revenue from local sources, the majority of respondents opted for reducing their expenses while some suggested that they would try to increase revenue from other local sources. Some madrasas have also hinted at taking out loans in such an eventuality while responses from some of the madrasas suggested that they would look to external sources in such an eventuality. The response of madrasa administrations for dealing with a situation with reduced revenue from local sources (domestic) is given in figures 25-30. The national trend is almost followed by each individual school of thought, except the Shia one (which feels more confident in increasing foreign sources) and the Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought (which has shown comparatively little confidence in increasing the share from other local sources). These responses suggested that madrasas are confident in generating more funds

from society. Even the option of taking out loans implies the same, since paying back loans could only be done through donations.

Importantly, reducing expenses is a natural strategy to cope with reduction in revenue; however, this essentially shows little confidence of madrasa administrations to attract revenue from outside the existing sources. Thus, reduction in revenue from any of the existing sources will put extra pressure on madrasa administrations. However, there is every possibility that madrasas will be able to attract more donations from the public as the responses from the interviewed donors indicated that there is a sizable number that is likely to respond positively to demands by madrasas for extra donations. Therefore, avenues for more donations from society exist.



Fig. 25: Strategy for dealing with reduced revenue (National trend, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 26: Strategy for dealing with reduced revenue (Ahle-Hadith, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 27: Strategy for dealing with reduced revenue (Brelvi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 28: Strategy for dealing with reduced revenue (Deobandi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 29: Strategy for dealing with reduced revenue (Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 30: Strategy for dealing with reduced revenue (Shia, Pakistan - PICSS)

Another aspect of money inflow to madrasas can better be explained through two different methods, which are graphically explained as shown in figures 31 to 36, wherein the resources for expansion plans are depicted for each school of thought, as well as showing the national trend. These two methods can be termed as *Push from Donors* or *Pull from Madrasas*. For example, appeals for donations for expansion means that madrasa administrations will make efforts to collect resources, with the most viable option for them being appeals for donations. On the other hand, madrasa administrations, at times, seriously think about expansion only when donors express their willingness to make finances available for such expansion or pledge that they will provide a specific amount. Most of the time, madrasa administrations use both means to materialize their expansion plan, i.e., certain amounts have been pledged/made available by donors while the remaining amount is to be generated through appeals for donations, thus the former act as stimulus for such expansion. As shown in figures 31 to 36, appeals for donations (pull strategy) has a higher share, with some variations, among the available strategies.



Fig. 31: Sources of revenue for expansion plan (National trend, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 32: Sources of revenue for expansion plan (Ahle-Hadith, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 33: Sources of revenue for expansion plan (Brelvi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 34: Sources of revenue for expansion plan (Deobandi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 35: Sources of revenue for expansion plan (Jamat-e-Islami/Neutral, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 36: Sources of revenue for expansion plan (Shia, Pakistan - PICSS)

This data, particularly the appeal for donations segment, once again highlight that madrasa administrations are quite confident that the public will respond positively to appeals for more donations. Thus, it can be construed that madrasas are quite resilient in case of financial constraints and would continue to survive. The instances in which madrasas were shut down due

to withdrawal of foreign assistance, as mentioned earlier in this study, was due to the fact that the administration of such madrasas was not linked to society; therefore, they were unable to generate revenues to run their madrasas. This clearly indicates that all those madrasas who have established a strong connection with the society are likely to survive in case revenue from any of foreign or local sources is reduced.

Interestingly, donors at times give donations to madrasas and allow madrasas to determine their allocation. This means that such donations are general purpose. However, donors may also provide donations to madrasas in specific categories. For example, donors may provide donations for construction purposes, provide finances for food/specific food item(s), provide books or finances for books, clothes or finances for clothes, finances for teacher salaries or paying salaries directly to teachers. Various categories for donations, as calculated from the donors' survey, are depicted in figure 37. As shown, donations for food or donation of food items constitute a major portion followed by donations in general, wherein madrasa administrations are given autonomy to determine expenses according to their needs.



Fig. 37: Various heads for donations to madrasas (Pakistan - PICSS)

Since the nature of donations varies, so does the nature of relations between donors and madrasa administration. For example, madrasa administrations might react positively to suggestions and advice from a regular and bigger

donor while administrations might make light of such advice from an irregular and smaller donor. However, this does not mean that a regular and bigger donor will always take part in the decision-making process, as some donors do not feel "qualified" to "interfere" in so-called religious affairs, while others may not have sufficient time to do so or totally rely on and trust in the madrasa administration or the committee that runs such affairs. During the field visit, some instances came to the knowledge of the data collection team, where it was found that either a single donor or members of a single family were bearing all the expenses of a particular madrasa. In such a situation, madrasa administrations have been found more inclined to listen to wishes and demands from donor(s).

In sum, the nature and quantity of donations have a profound impact on donor-madrasa relations. For example, out of 100 donors, 56 percent responded positively to the question regarding their input/suggestions to the madrasa while 44 percent responded negatively to this question indicating that they do not give any suggestions/input to madrasas. As shown in table 4, almost 50 percent of donors in the first two categories (comparatively smaller donors) provide input to the madrasa while this percentage increases for the donors who give more donations, almost 69 percent of the third category and almost 73 percent of the fourth category. This suggests that bigger donors tend to influence the decision-making process of madrasas. The type and nature of input from donors, of all stripes, also varies as shown in figure 38. As the figure indicates, the majority of donors remain concerned about dining/food issues, followed by teaching methods, curriculum, and construction affairs while financial affairs, co-curricular activities, teacher selection, etc., remain the lowest priority areas for the donors. It may also be noted that donations in the food category form 28 percent of total donations of surveyed data, as shown earlier in figure 37.

Size of Donations in Rs.	Frequency (overall)	% giving input
100 to 1,000	43	51.16 %
1,001 to 10,000	29	51.72 %
10,001 to 100,000	16	68.75 %
More than 100,000	11	72.72 %

Table 4: Size of donations and percentage of donors giving input to madrasas (Pakistan – PICSS)



Fig. 38: Areas in which donors provide input/suggestions to madrasas (Pakistan - PICSS)

Since madrasas' administrations are part of society, they remain cognizant of developments taking place in society. Madrasa administrations also take care of managing public perceptions of the madrasas, as these could affect their revenue streams since madrasas are wholly dependent on revenue collected from the surrounding society. When asked how critical media reporting affected madrasas, some contended that such critical media reporting has no negative impact while some (minor percentage) even suggested that it has had a positive impact as it helped improve the popularity of madrasas. Responses related to critical media coverage and its impact on madrasas are shown in figures 39 to 44, for national trends as well as for each school of thought.



Fig. 39: Impact of critical media reporting against madrasas (National trend, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 40: Impact of critical media reporting against madrasas (Ahl-e-Hadith, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 41: Impact of critical media reporting against madrasas (Brelvi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 42: Impact of critical media reporting against madrasas (Deobandi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 43: Impact of critical media reporting against madrasas (Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 44: Impact of critical media reporting against madrasas (Shia, Pakistan - PICSS)

When asked to comment on which segment of society was more affected by critical media reporting to the extent that donations from that particular segment has decreased in comparison, the majority selected the 'educated class' as the most receptive segment, as shown in figure 45 (national trend).

The same trend was seen for all schools of thought except the Shia sect, who feels that non-educated (uneducated) people were more receptive to critical media reporting against madrasas (as shown in figures 46 to 50).



Fig. 45: Critical media reporting – Reduction in donations (National trend, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 46: Critical media reporting – Reduction in donations (Ahl-e-Hadith, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 47: Critical media reporting – Reduction in donations (Brelvi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 48: Critical media reporting – Reduction in donations (Deobandi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 49: Critical media reporting – Reduction in donations (Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 50: Critical media reporting – Reduction in donations (Shia, Pakistan - PICSS)

Revenue from foreign sources: Various aspects

As explained earlier (see figure 17), the field survey indicated that revenue from foreign sources is much lower than revenue generated by madrasas

from local sources. However, this share is not so meager as to be ignored, particularly when revenue from foreign sources also impacts the policies adopted by various madrasas and their outcomes. As shown in figure 51 (national trend), Pakistani expatriates have the highest share among the foreign donors while foreign governments and non-government organizations (foreign) also have notable share. On the other hand, the share of non-Pakistani Muslim communities overseas constitutes a much smaller share among the foreign donors, although this segment had been pumping money into Pakistani madrasas in the past. Had this survey been conducted one or two years back, there is a strong possibility that this segment would have had a much higher share. The type of foreign donors for each school of thought are shown in figures 52 to 56.

During field visits it was established that one renowned madrasa (name and location are withheld due to confidentiality of the respondent) has an active Teachers' Exchange Program with an entity of a foreign government. Under this program, not only are teachers provided training in that country but they also teach in each other's madrasas while some of the teachers of the Pakistani madrasas are also paid directly by said foreign entity. Such exchange programs are likely to the practice for other Pakistani madrasas as well. It is now an open secret that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran offer scholarships for higher Islamic studies to Pakistani students (which are mostly available to students of Ahl-e-Hadith, Deobandi and Shia Sects, respectively) at the University of Madina (Saudi Arabia) and Qom University (Iran), respectively.



Fig. 51: Nature of foreign donors (National trend, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 52: Nature of foreign donors (Ahl-e-Hadith, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 53: Nature of foreign donors (Brelvi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 54: Nature of foreign donors (Deobandi, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 55: Nature of foreign donors (Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan - PICSS)



Fig. 56: Nature of foreign donors (Shia, Pakistan - PICSS)

When asked about their perception regarding expatriates sending money to madrasas, the madrasa administrations felt that religious motivation was the main driving force. Some stated that it was a desire to help the poor since the majority of madrasa students belong to lower middle class families.



Fig. 57: Motivation of foreign donors (Pakistan – PICSS)

Key findings: Pakistani madrasas' financial pipelines

Identifying and understanding financial pipelines for madrasas in Pakistan has been needed for quite some time especially following apprehensions that foreign funding to these madrasas aid militancy in Pakistan. Moreover, there was also a need to understand the impact of these funding patterns. This study has identified that madrasas in Pakistan use a mix of both internal and external funding although the share of the latter is comparatively much lower. However, those madrasas that were entirely depending on foreign funding had to shut down once foreign funding stopped. On the contrary, those who were partially funded from abroad have shown resilience in generating more funds locally and thereby continue their operations. Religious motivation, feeding the poor and educating the masses are some of the main motivations for local as well as foreign donors. In addition, donors also accrue socio-political objectives by donating their funds to madrasas. The majority of donations to madrasas fall in the category of mandatory funds like Zakat, etc., while non-mandatory (voluntary) donations also form a sizable portion. With the view to regulate and streamline financial

inflows and outflows in madrasas, there is a need for bringing transparency in the system and making the information public, which will ultimately help madrasas attract more donations from local as well as foreign donors.

1. Revenue for madrasas is generated from two sources: internal (domestic) and external (foreign), but the distributions between both sources displays much disparity. These internal and external sources could either fall in the category of mandatory (like Zakat, Ushr, Khums, etc.) or non-mandatory donations, with the former having a comparatively much larger share. Other notable financing sources are animal hides, support from non-governmental organizations, the madrasas' own assets, and government grants.
2. Since madrasas meet the religious needs of the people, in addition to providing some political and social benefits, they become natural recipients of mandatory and non-mandatory donations irrespective of donors' religious inclinations.
3. Money into madrasas comes through donation boxes, deposits into bank accounts, sums paid directly to the principal/*mohtamim* of madrasas, and/or collections during Friday prayers. In-kind donations are also one of the donation forms. Pakistani expatriates either send their donations to madrasas using bank accounts or send them through their relatives. Despite having no proper mechanism of checks and balances, donors trust the madrasa administrations. However, a desire for putting in place an auditing system does exist on the donor side.
4. The Pakistani diaspora's motivation behind giving donations to madrasas is mainly religious. However, feeding the poor and providing them with education are other motives. Individual donors from other countries also have similar motivations.
5. Irrespective of their religious inclination, members of business communities are the main donors to madrasas, while donations also come from the political class as well as the general public. This does not belittle the small donations received from the public. People and governments donate money to madrasas in order to accrue religious, political and social benefits. Considered more religiously rewarding, people are more inclined to give donations during the month of Ramadan, so madrasas make full use of this inclination.
6. Donations to madrasas enjoy more popularity, partially because the official system of Zakat collection from individuals' bank accounts as well as subsequent disbursement in Pakistan is flawed.

7. Revenues from foreign sources have decreased considerably, to an extent that those fully dependent on foreign sources have had to face closure as there was no alternative system available. On the contrary, those who were using foreign funding as one of the financing options have shown resilience and remain in operation. Thus disconnection from society means madrasas are bound to face hardships when generating finances from the general public, as such donations to madrasas are made on the basis of trust.
8. Inconsistency in donations is a threat to madrasa operations but can be used as an opportunity for relevant stakeholders for bringing about desired change.
9. Reducing expenses has been identified as the preferred choice of the majority of the madrasas in case of a revenue crunch. Options of increasing revenue from other local sources as well as from abroad have also come into light. The last two responses suggested that madrasas are confident in their ability to generate more funds from society. Even the option of taking out a loan implies the same, since paying back such loans can only be done with donors' money. Similarly, it was found that donors were inclined to donate more if needed. Thus, avenues for more donations from society exist. This assessment also seems to be justified when madrasas' expansion plans, warranting more donations from the donors, are taken into account. This clearly indicates that all those madrasas who have established a strong connection with society are likely to survive in case revenue from any foreign or local sources decreases.
10. Since money matters, there is a strong correlation between donation volume and madrasas' acceding to donors' demands. This also indicates that donors' platforms can be used to bring about required change in the madrasa system as bigger donors have the capacity to influence decision-making processes in madrasas. Madrasas remain concerned of developments taking place in society, and they are mindful of their image as any negativity among the general public about the madrasas could impact their revenue stream.
11. Among the funds received from abroad, Pakistani diaspora have the highest share while donations from foreign governments, Muslim community, and non-government organizations are also received, albeit on a lesser scale. There were some instances of informal foreign funding, but more structured foreign assistance also exists, e.g., teacher exchange programs.

12. There is an increasing trend of using bank accounts for financial transactions. A sizable number of madrasas, however, still do not have bank accounts, either due to reluctance on the side of banks to open their accounts or the madrasa administrations themselves not being interested in opening such accounts.
13. Mainly, there is a weaker tendency among madrasas to conduct external audits while the government is insisting on external audits in addition to demanding that madrasas make their transactions through bank accounts for streamlining financial inflows and outflows. Mostly, madrasa administrations lack expertise in systematic financial management.
14. Reduction in revenue is bound to disturb life in madrasas. Dining expenses, teachers' salaries and utility bills are the main heads of madrasa expenses. This is despite the fact that quantity and quality of food in some cases was questionable while teachers are paid least in most of the cases. In some parts of the country where the security situation is volatile, security expenses also form part of major expenses thus creating problems for madrasas in financial terms.
15. There is a tendency among madrasas to accept government support particularly for teachers' salaries as well as subsidies for utility bills and food items.
16. There is uncertainty regarding the registration of madrasas, because the government has not made clear its stance as to where these entities should be registered. Moreover, there is also uncertainty and confusion as to which ministry or department should deal with madrasas.
17. Madrasa boards have neither any role in financial management of madrasas nor can they provide any funds to madrasas to continue their operations in case of financial constraints. This is primarily due the fact that madrasa boards are only meant to regulate their academics (syllabus) and exams.

Part three: Evolution of madrasas and general education in Afghanistan – Post 2001

By Halimullah Kousary, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies

Introduction

The Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) based in Kabul Afghanistan conducted this study in partnership with the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) to provide an overview of sources of and trends in religious education in Afghanistan. This includes current avenues of religious and general education in Afghanistan and their sources of funding as well as government regulation of madrasas. The study also discusses strategies of both violent and non-violent religious groups to (re)assert their version of religious interpretations through (madrasa) education in Afghanistan. Finally, it tracks the violence that has been directed against public schools and madrasas, and discusses potential causes.

Research method

The study is based on qualitative and empirical research comprising key informant interviews and focus group discussions conducted from April to December 2016. The research also draws on secondary sources relevant to the study. The CAPS research team conducted key informant interviews with 19 individuals, which CAPS kept as diverse as possible to gather a wide range of perspectives, in order to gain inside knowledge on the topic of the study. The interviewees included madrasa officials and teachers, government education officials and public schoolteachers, former members of the Taliban, and tribal elders. Two group interviews with local teachers and community leaders from the Chak district of Wardak province were also conducted. Some of the interviewees requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic. A list of all interviewees can be found in Annex I. The interviews were based on a questionnaire, which took 45 to 60 minutes to complete. It consisted of both open-ended and closed-ended questions but mostly the latter. The questionnaire is presented in Annex II.

Madrasas and general education in Afghanistan

Afghanistan's first modern educational facility, the Habibia College, was established with a general curriculum in 1904. The school continued to promote liberal ideas and it became the bastion of a liberal reformist move-

ment called the Young Afghans.[79] When Ghazi Amir Amanullah Khan succeeded his father Amir Habibullah Khan in 1919 as King of Afghanistan, he publicly declared that Afghanistan would "take its proper place among the civilized powers of the world" through political and social reforms.[80] During his reign from 1919 to 1929, he was an important member of the Young Afghan movement and sought to transform Afghanistan into a modern nation state. He argued in favor of an Afghan state where aspects of international society and governance could coexist with Islam.[81]

Amanullah drafted the first constitution of Afghanistan in 1923 (the Basic Codes of the High State of Afghanistan) and with it introduced the concept of freedom of religion to the Afghan nation.[82] He brought education under the control of the central government prior to which education was influenced by the religious establishment and largely based on sacred texts. Under the newly drafted constitution, Amanullah introduced a mainly scientific curriculum along with certain Islamic subjects at the newly established schools and ordered that these schools be expanded across the country.[83]

However, the Afghan religious establishment, strongly rooted in the Afghan society at that time, perceived Amanullah's educational reforms as an effort aimed at transferring power from Islamic scholars to the state, whose legitimacy, from religious scholars' Islamic standpoint, became questionable. This perception alienated Amanullah from the general public and left him vulnerable to the widespread resentment engineered by the influential religious scholars in the country. By 1929, he was forced into exile and his reforms were abrogated.[84]

Subsequent to Amanullah's attempt at reforms and the reaction from the religious establishment, educational reforms resumed, however cautiously, during the subsequent regimes - King Nadir Shah's four-year reign (1929-1933) and his successor King Zahir Shah's reign (1933-1970s). It was during

(79) Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).
(80) Hafizullah Emadi, *Repression, Resistance, and Women in Afghanistan* (Westport CT: Praeger, 2002).
(81) Emadi.
(82) Emadi.
(83) Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929* (Cornell University Press, 1973).
(84) Saikal.

this period that many of the state-run educational institutions were built and became rooted in Afghan society.[85]

Many of the educational reforms instituted during this period, did not trigger the same reaction as against Amanullah. In part because the succeeding governments implemented the reforms with cooperation from the international Islamic religious scholars, and more importantly the government did not implement these reforms coercively.[86] The governments opted to preside rather than rule while gradually introducing the reforms and regulating madrasas. Zahir Shah established the first madrasa named Abu Hanifah in 1936 to serve as a bridge between the government and the religious scholars in the country, Maulawi Aziz-Ur-Rahman, General Director of Abu Hanifah Madrasa in Kabul, mentioned during interview with CAPS.[87] Thus, Afghanistan enjoyed a progressive period and the government expanded general education in the country from 1929 to the 1960s with little reaction by the religious scholars and madrasas that existed in the country.[88]

In the 1960s and '70s, however, Afghan communist political elites seeking to transform Afghanistan along the lines of communism, aided by the Soviet Union, invested heavily in education and tried to transform general education based on communist principles. In an interview with CAPS, Maulawi Mohammad Arif Malikyar, President of Darul Uloom, argued that Afghan communist political elites identified madrasas as places of opposition.[89] This, once again, caused general education to be seen as posing a direct challenge to madrasas and their religious values. Consequently, the religious establishment became vocal in denunciation of government schools and deemed them responsible for indoctrinating youth with communism and inciting rebellion against religious values. According to Sayed Mohammad Akbar Agha, a former high-ranking member of the Taliban, religious scholars and students (later called Mujahedeen) came to regard

(85) Fishstein.
(86) Fishstein.
(87) Interview #8, 'Interview with Maulawi Aziz-Ur-Rahman, General Director of Abu Hanifah Madrasa in Kabul', *CAPS*, 17 June 2016.
(88) Fishstein.
(89) Interview #11, 'Interview with Maulawi Mohammad Arif Malikyar, President of Darul Uloom', *CAPS*, 20 June 2016.

government schools as propaganda centers for communism and legitimate targets during the Afghan-Soviet war from 1979 to 1989.[90]

During this era, not only madrasas, almost all of which were unregistered, but even universities saw the emergence of Islamic movements. Kabul University, the largest in the country, for example, turned into a bastion of Islamic and communist movements. The university witnessed the Organization of Muslim Youth come into being, which gradually absorbed youth in and outside the university. In the meantime, the communist force within the university formed the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to counter what they called radical Islamism.[91]

The Soviet invasion in 1979 and the following resistance by the Mujahedeen joined by international allies from around the world especially the Middle East paved the way for a stricter brand of religious ideology, Salafism, to make inroads into the Afghan societies. Between 1979 and 1992 there was increasing recruitment of youth by Salafist elements and empowering of madrasas grounded in the Salafist ideology in Afghanistan, according to Maulawi Mohammad Arif Malikyar, President of Darul Uloom.[92]

Following the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan communist regime, one of the major concerns of the religious establishment, including the Taliban during the 1990s was the educational future of the country. The Taliban believed that it was the lack of solid Islamic educational systems that allowed for the infiltration of communism among the young Afghan population. Therefore, religious education became central to the Taliban's identity according to Allah Dad Balkhi, who is a former member of the Taliban.[93] The group attempted to inculcate religious values among the youth through promoting madrasa education in the country during its reign. It banned all girl schools and introduced an almost completely religious curriculum in schools in the time they ruled from 1996 to 2001, Allah Dad Balkhi explained during interview with CAPS.[94] Pre-2001, during the

(90) Interview #15, 'Interview with Sayed Mohammad Akbar Agha, Former High-Ranking Member of Taliban', *CAPS*, 2 July 2016.
(91) Nabi Misdaq, *Afghanistan Political Frailty and External Interference*, 1st edn (Routledge, 2006).
(92) Interview #11.
(93) Interview #6a, 'Interview with Allah Dad Balkhi, Former Member of Taliban', *CAPS*, 14 June 2016.
(94) Interview #6a.

Taliban regime and the regimes prior to Taliban's, general education was governmental with no private educational institutions. Afghanistan had five national universities: one in the capital Kabul, one in Nangarhar province in the east, one in Kandahar in the south, one in Herat in the west, and one in Balkh in the north. During the initial years of the Taliban from 1994 to 1996, the universities were almost all dysfunctional. When the Taliban emerged, they undertook punitive measures against certain university teachers alleged as communists. For example, when the Taliban captured Nangarhar, as Noorzad Hanif, who was a student of Nangarhar University during the Taliban reign, told CAPS during an interview, the Taliban identified two university teachers and had them drowned in the Daronta Dam near the Jalalabad city. This has urged other university teachers and administrative staff to escape the country or hide at home.[95]

However, following the Taliban's capture of Kabul in 1996 and forming the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the group announced amnesty and invited all university teachers to return and resume their jobs. The Taliban introduced their own members to the administrative positions at the universities, but the group did not replace or fire the skilled staff, such as teachers. According to a former member of the Taliban, the five universities remained largely ill equipped and The Taliban did not in fact provide the required facilities and equipment needed for a university.[96] The Taliban created madrasas within universities, and their leadership provided better facilities and accommodation to the madrasa students as compared to the university students, Noorzad Hanif explained in his interview.[97]

Evolution of madrasa and general education - Post 2001

The Afghanistan education system consists of general education (government-run public schools) and a parallel system of Islamic education. Significant progress has been made in general education with the establishment of 16,000 schools since 2002, not including the number of private schools

(95) Interview #3b, 'Interview with Noorzad Hanif, Student of Nangarhar University during Taliban Regime', *CAPS*, 5 December 2016.
(96) Interview #6b, 'Interview with Allah Dad Balkhi, Former Member of Taliban', *CAPS*, 8 December 2016.
(97) Interview #3a, 'Interview with Noorzad Hanif, Student of Nangarhar University during Taliban Regime', *CAPS*, 18 May 2016.

built in the same period.[98] Afghans now enjoy relatively greater ease of access to general education. According to the Afghan Ministry of Education, there has been a steady increase in enrolment of students from one million, almost all boys, during the Taliban regime to enrolment of more than 8 million, 39 percent of whom are girls in 2015.[99] However, Human Rights Watch reported that as security in the country has worsened, the progress that had been made toward the goal of getting all girls into school may be heading in reverse and that an estimated two-thirds of Afghan girls did not go to school in 2017.[100]

There has been a considerable increase in the number of madrasas in the same period across the country. The curricula of some of these madrasas are being regulated by the Department of Islamic Education under the Ministry of Education in certain areas mostly in cities, while the curricula

of a larger number of them are not.[101] The government formed the Islamic Education High Council in 2007 to supervise some madrasa activities as well.[102] However, the majority of madrasas across the country are still run without any support and regulation from the government, according to the Head of Sa'ad Bin Ma'az Madrasa, Maulawi Ahmadullah.[103]

Madrasas in Afghanistan can be divided into three categories: Madrasas that are run by the government; madrasas that are registered with the government but not run by it; and madrasas that are not registered with the government. In the first category, madrasas that are run by the government, the curriculum is 40 percent scientific and 60 percent Islamic.[104] The government provides these madrasas with teaching facilities and student

(98) USAID, 'Education Fact Sheet', 2016 <https://scms.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/07 FINAL Sector Fact Sheet OED July 2016.pdf> [accessed 10 February 2017].
(99) Ministry of Education, Afghanistan National Education for All (EFA) Review Report 2015, 2014 <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002327/232702e.pdf> [accessed 10 February 2017].
(100) Human Rights Watch, *'I Won't Be A Doctor, and One Day You'll Be Sick' - Girls' Access to Education in Afghanistan*, 2017 <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan1017_web.pdf>.
(101) Ministry of Education.
(102) Ministry of Education.
(103) Interview #1, 'Interview with Maulawi Ahmadullah, Head of Sa'ad Bin Ma'az Madrasa', *CAPS*, 16 May 2016.
(104) US Department of State.

accommodation, in addition to the prescribed textbooks, teachers' salaries, management support and other operational costs. Afghanistan has a small number of these madrasas and the biggest of them is Abu Hanifah Darul Uloom, located in Kabul. Abu Hanifah educates 2,000 boys and 1,200 girls from different provinces of the country. The second category of madrasas, those that are registered with the government but not directly run by it, do not receive any financial support from the government. Their curriculum, however, is recognized by the Department of Islamic Education of the Ministry of Education. Teaching a mixed curriculum, which should include scientific subjects such as mathematics and science, is a condition for registration with the government, Maulawi Aziz Ur Rahman Azizi explained.[105] The third category, madrasas that are not registered with the government, are mostly located in rural parts of the country with some in major cities including areas that are under control of the Taliban. Most of these madrasas do not want to be registered with the government, presenting the argument that registration invites preconditions from the government, which they do not accept especially in case of the curriculum, Maulawi Ahmadullah, Head of Sa'ad Bin Ma'az Madrasa, told the CAPS research team.[106]

Compared to the 16,000 general schools that the Afghan government has built with the support of international NGOs since 2002,[107] official Afghan sources report that there are 5,000 madrasas and 'Quran learning centers' across the country registered with the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, and 1,200 public and 200 private madrasas registered with the Ministry of Education.[108]

The unregistered madrasas are run without any oversight of the government and therefore the number of these are unknown. There are, however, three informal bodies formed by the Afghan religious scholars who work to create overall coordination between these madrasas. They include Islahul madrasas in the east, Itehad ul madrasas in the west and Majma'ul madrasas in the south of the country. These bodies have no legal authority to conduct oversight on how these madrasas are run and what curriculum is taught. Nor do these bodies fund any of the madrasas. They work to bring

(105) Interview #10, 'Interview with Maulawi Aziz Ur Rahman Azizi, Head of Religious Student Department at Ministry of Education', *CAPS*, 19 June 2016.
(106) Interview #1.
(107) USAID.
(108) US Department of State.

unity and coordination among madrasas and their students and leadership according to Sayed Mohammad Akbar Agha.[109] According to some other respondents interviewed by the CAPS research team, these bodies have not been successful in their work as the three bodies themselves are not united. The reasons for the disunity among them mainly stems from the different religious schools of thought that these bodies follow and the different regions in which they operate. Islahul madrasas are inclined to Salafism for example. The three bodies were formed separately and at different timings; in absence of higher body at national level, these bodies are very much focused on the regions in which they are based and do not allow each other to operate in their areas of focus. Most of the registered and unregistered madrasas (not the government-run ones) are run through fundraising in Afghanistan, neighboring countries and in the Middle East according to Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, who is the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan and founder of the Afghan Foundation, which runs schools and madrasas in Afghanistan.[110]

Avenues of education

General education schools

A former Taliban commander from Kandahar, told the CAPS research team that the Taliban view general education schools as symbols of the Afghan government's control.[111] This affiliation makes general education schools a justifiable target in the eyes of the Taliban and part of the group's strategy to weaken the control of the government. Many communities expressed hesitancy to send their children to such schools in rural areas where government control is contested, fearing reprisals from the Taliban. In the contested areas, many families choose madrasas as a second best alternative to educating their kids, according to a tribal elder from the Maidan Wardak Province.[112]

In areas where the Taliban are highly saturated into the local community, they also adopt a proactive strategy towards schools rather than violent

(109) Interview #15.
(110) Interview #7a, 'Interview with Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, Former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan and Founder of Afghan Foundation', *CAPS*, 2 June 2016.
(111) Interview #4, 'Interview with Former Taliban Commander from Kandahar', *CAPS*, 21 May 2016.
(112) Interview #2, 'Interview with Tribal Elder from Chak District of Maidan Wardak Province, Anonymous', *CAPS*, 26 May 2016.

coercion. They order calibration of the school curriculum in accordance with the Sharia law. Taliban in Chak District of Maidan Wardak Province, for example, banned a course and book entitled "The Ethics of Living" in certain district schools, local teachers and community leaders told the CAPS research team during an interview.[113] The book is government-issued and is given directly to government-sponsored schools. It is part of the standard curriculum for primary education and emphasizes ethics such as respect for human rights, women, education and honesty. A teacher from the Sherzad District of Nangarhar Province held during an interview with CAPS that the Taliban banned the book because it does not focus on Islamic virtues such as ethics according to Sharia law.[114]

In September 2016, a member of the Kunduz provincial council, Mr. Amruddin Wali, claimed that many schools in Taliban-controlled areas are operating, but that the group ordered its own curriculum to be taught in these schools.[115] The Taliban has appointed principals and teachers for these schools and banned a subject titled "Etiquettes of living." According to the Kunduz Department of Education, in 2016 there were 500 schools in Kunduz with an enrollment of 329,000 students, among them 124,000 girls[116].

In Ghazni province, the Taliban warned a local headmaster to close his secondary school because girls and boys were studying together, which they described as a western effort to corrupt Muslim societies through local allies.[117] The Taliban preconditioned that female teachers teach female students, showing zero tolerance for coeducation at schools. Otherwise, schools should be closed according to the Taliban. However, in rural areas, and especially in areas with heavy Taliban influence, women with this qualification are few. This has affected girls' schooling in rural areas, especially in the south and southeast, considerably.

(113) Interview #21, 'Interview with Local Teachers and Community Leaders from Chak District of Wardak Province (2)', *Caps*, 10 June 2016.
(114) Interview #13, 'Interview with Public School Teacher from Sherzad District of Nangarhar Province, Anonymous', *CAPS*, 22 June 2016.
(115) Pajhwok Afghan News, 'Taliban Enforce Own Curriculum in Kunduz Schools', 2016 <https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/09/22/taliban-enforce-own-curriculum-kunduz-schools>.
(116)
(117) Mustafa Andalib and Mirwais Harooni, 'Afghan Girls' Schools Shut Down, Taliban Blamed', *Reuters*, 9 May 2012.

Madrasa education

The Taliban endorse madrasa education, as it does not challenge their authority and their justification of the jihad campaign against the government. However, if these madrasas are government run or propagate against the Taliban's justification of jihad in Afghanistan, the group bans even them in areas they control and target the teachers who are dubbed as pro-government Mullahs according to a tribal elder from Asadabad District of Maidan Wardak Province, who requested anonymity.[118] In 2011, the Taliban closed two government-sponsored madrasas in Chak District of Maidan Wardak province after the teachers of these madrasas accepted their monthly salary from the government, thereby breaking one of the Taliban's conditions regarding education in the district. With support from local Taliban, a community delegation then petitioned the higher-level Taliban administration to reopen the school. Taliban authorities—reportedly in Pakistan—rejected the petition, and reiterated the conditions for education in this district. Non-local members of the Taliban in the area, after the petition was rejected, were tasked with enforcing the decision, according to teachers and community leaders from the Chak District of Wardak Province.[119]

The Afghan Ministry of Education argues that the radicalization of youth and teaching of hatred in many madrasas have prompted the government to launch and implement the regulation and reform program.[120] Part of the new policies made it obligatory for all madrasas to register with the Ministry of Education. According to officials from the Ministry of Education's Islamic education section, madrasas become official upon meeting several criteria, including registration with the Ministry of Education, use of official curriculum, qualified teachers, introduction of the official grade system, and class-based tuition.[121] While some madrasas have registered with the government, the majority remains unregistered and operates without

(118) Interview #9, 'Interview with Tribal Elder from Asadabad District of Maidan Wardak Province, Anonymous', *CAPS*, 18 June 2016.
(119) Interview #20, 'Interview with Local Teachers and Community Leaders from Chak District of Wardak Province (1)', *CAPS*, 9 April 2016.
(120) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Education, National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1385–1389, 2006; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Education, Strategy for the Development of Afghanistan's Centres of Excellence: Model Schools for a Holistic Education', 2006.
(121) Mohammed Osman Tariq, *Religious Institution Building in Afghanistan: An Exploration* (Oslo, 2011).

government oversight in the country. In return for registering with the government, the madrasas get government recognition, but do not receive any material and financial support from the government.[122]

Religious education in Afghanistan is based on two sects – Sunni and Shia. The former constitutes the majority, but the latter has in the past 15 years gained increasing momentum among the Shiite population in Afghanistan. A Shiite religious scholar established a madrasa in 2004 named Khatam al Nabiyeen – the biggest Shiite madrasas in the country, educating over 5,000 students. The madrasa leadership claims to promote and disseminate Islamic culture and to bring Sunni and Shia Afghans closer together. However, the madrasa is not seen as a unifying but rather a dividing sectarian factor. According to a former high-ranking member of the Taliban, Sayed Mohammad Akbar Agha, there is suspicion that Khatam al Nabiyeen is a vehicle for promoting and strengthening the Shiite sect in Afghanistan with support from Iran.[123] The suspicion is based on the allegation that the madrasa was built at the cost of more than USD 17 million granted by Iran. It is run by an Afghan Shiite cleric, Sheikh Asef Mohseni who allegedly has close links to Tehran and is a member of a commission that supports Shiite religious outfits in the region headed by Ali Akbar Welayati, former Iranian foreign minister.[124]

The Sunni-Shia discourse vis-à-vis madrasas in the country affected the acceptance of religious pluralism that traditionally existed in the Afghan society. Muharram and Ashura (Religious commemoration of the martyrdom of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad) were jointly observed by both Sunnis and Shias. However, now many see that with increased 'Iranization' of Shiite religious festivities in Afghanistan, the atmosphere has been changing, adding a political and sectarian dimension. In August 2015, the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) detained 30 members of the Haqqani Network, who according to NDS, wanted to attack the Khatam al Nabiyeen madrasa and other targets in Kabul.[125] Estimated to cost up

(122) Malyar Sadeq Azad, 'The Afghan Madrassa Accused of Radicalising Women', BBC News, 16 March 2014.
(123) Interview #15.
(124) Abbas Daiyar, *The Growth of Neo-Radicalism: Neo-Salafism and Sectarianism*, 2013.
(125) Khaama Press, 'NDS Detain 30 Terrorists Involved in Recent Kabul Attacks', *Khaama.com*, 31 August 2015 <http://www.khaama.com/breaking-news-suspects-involved-in-recent-kabul-attacks-detained-3853> [accessed 10 February 2017].

toward USD 100 million, Saudi Arabia with support from the government and Sunni religious scholars will build an Islamic center complete with an Islamic university and a mosque in Afghanistan. The Center will house up to 5,000 students and be named after Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz.[126] Some Afghans, according to Sayed Mohammad Akbar Agha, see this as a move by Saudi Arabia to rival the Khatam al Nabiyeen madrasa and offset the so-called influence of Shiite Iran in Afghanistan.[127]

Over and above the growing Sunni-Shiite schism in Afghanistan, fissures also emerged within the Sunni sect itself, which follows a largely Hanafi school of thought in Afghanistan. Salafism has increasingly gained momentum in the country since the 1980s and has expanded during the last 15 years. There is a steady growth in the number of Salafist madrasas in the east and north of the country. Five Saudi-funded Salafist organizations operate in Afghanistan. They include Al-Rahmah Al Afghania, Al-Nijat Foundation, Al Nadwa Al-Aalmia Li-shabab Al Islamia, Al Noor Foundation, and Al Furqan. They all build and fund orphanages, mosques, Darul Hifaz and madrasas in the country, a teacher from Nangarha, Maulawi Sirajudin, told the CAPS research team.[128]

Mosque madrasas

Across Afghanistan, it is a common practice for young children to go to the village mosque for informal religious education from a local Mullah. The mosque madrasas are deeply embedded in Afghan culture and provide basic religious learning for all children in its community—most children, both girls and boys, from 5 to 10 years of age (8 or 9 maximum age for girls) attend a mosque madrasa. Children may stop studying at mosque madrasas to attend either primary school or a madrasa with more advanced religious curriculum. Many students also attend mosque madrasas outside the hours of primary school. The education offered at the mosque madrasas is strictly basic religious education and includes seminars on how to pray and basic tenets of religion. The Taliban does not see mosque education – just like madrasas – as a challenge to their authority in local communities.

(126) AFP, 'Saudi Arabia to Build $100-Million Islamic Centre in Kabul', *Dawn.com*, 29 October 2012.
(127) Interview #15.
(128) Interview #14, 'Interview with Maulawi Sirajudin, Madrassa Teacher from Nangarhar', *CAPS*, 28 June 2016.

The group has allowed mosque education in local communities with no reported incidents of the group banning it, according to a tribal elder from Maque District of the Ghazni Province.[129] These madrasas do not have a big budget, but when they need donations they mainly raise it from within the local population, where the mosque madrasas are run.

Curriculum

General education institutions and madrasas, as well as the Taliban, see curriculum as a fundamental factor in shaping a particular mindset among the youth. As a teacher from the Sherzad District of Nangarhar Province mentioned during an interview, madrasas see it as vital to preserve Islamic ethics and values in the Afghan societies and largely describe the general curriculum as 'Western-style' education.[130] The curriculum in madrasas and general schools is often cited as a major point of contention between the two. Especially the radical religious elements believe that whoever has influence over the curriculum can win large support in the society in the long term, according to Maulawi Mohammad Arif Malikyar, President of Darul-uloom.[131] Therefore, many madrasas' emphasis on curriculum is grounded in the idea that the teaching of specific religious texts as a part of madrasas curriculum is most significant in influencing students' ideological doctrine.

According to the interviews conducted by the CAPS research team, the Taliban are known to make regular visits to schools, examine the curriculum, and find out what type of lessons teachers teach their students in districts where they are in control. A tribal elder from the Asadabad District of the Maidan Wardak Province points out that in Taliban-controlled areas the movement increased the number of school hours per day and urged that certain religious studies be taught during those hours.[132] Another interviewee exemplified this control by saying that in restive districts of eastern Nangarhar, Taliban members visited schools and warned teachers not to speak ill of jihad and the group's activities against the government in front of students.[133]

(129) Interview #12, 'Interview with Tribal Elder from Maqur District of Ghazni Province, Anonymous', *CAPS*, 7 June 2016.
(130) Interview #13.
(131) Interview #11.
(132) Interview #9.
(133) Interview #16, 'Interview with Public School Teacher from Chaprihar District of Nangarhar Province, Anonymous', *CAPS*, 2 July 2016.

Unlike in government schools, teachers' views and curriculum selection in madrasas can very well define the level of radicalization at a madrasa. Teachers in madrasas are different from professors in universities and schools. In madrasas, teachers act as spiritual leaders and as a connection to the Prophet Mohammed and his companion. The position of a teacher in a madrasa therefore holds sacredness, which plays a key role in encouraging the students to listen to the madrasa teachers and accept their religious views without any critique. Madrasa students are also expected to follow the teachers' instructions outside the four walls of the classroom. The teachers in madrasas hold the right to advise students on matters beyond the curriculum, to provide direction, order and specify how students should conduct and react to values that are dubbed as un-Islamic or anti-religious. In madrasas, both teachers and students believe that they are heirs of the prophets, giving them the obligation to perpetuate religious studies and empower religious values in their societies and defend them when they are undermined. Obedience to madrasa teachers is looked upon as a precondition for being a pious Muslim and becoming a religious scholar. This direct and intimate relationship between teachers and students of madrasas allows incredible leeway for the teachers to pursue any religious agenda/interpretation and promote it among their students.[134]

In addition, compared to general schools, in madrasas many students come from economically disadvantaged and more conservative regions, which could be another major factor in the ability of madrasas to instill whatever religious agenda/interpretation they want among the students. Social popularity among students is often determined not by a student's social class but his/her willingness to listen to the teachers, obey their religious interpretation and integrate them into their daily life.[135]

The most traditional and common use of propaganda occurs during sermons by popular scholars in madrasas. These sermons often focus on political and social issues, attacking opinions that are not shared by the madrasas. Given the popularity of religious sermons, popular religious figures are often called upon to speak on secular issues and democracy vs. Islamic rule as this is seen as a source for secular-religious infusion. In many of these sermons, the teachings and work of internationally known scholars such

(134) Abdul Ahad Mohammadi, Musab Omer, and Muhammad Moheq, *Trends in Radicalization across Unregistered Madrassas in Afghanistan*, 2015.
(135) Mohammadi, Omer, and Moheq.

as Abul A'la Maududi, Sayyed Qutb, Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab, and 12th-century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, among others, serve as a main source of disseminating a religious stance on political and social norms by teachers from various madrasas.[136]

Generally, most madrasas believe that Sharia law informs the best way of life. According to a survey conducted in Afghanistan in 2015, approximately 70 percent of the madrasa students believed that it is a duty of every Muslim to work for empowering an Islamic State and approximately 67 percent of them said that if needed, they would personally take part in the establishment of an Islamic state.[137]

Who runs madrasas in Afghanistan?

Behind the running and funding of madrasas are not only the traditional religious establishment and local communities in Afghanistan but also violent groups with foreign state and non-state support. These groups espoused different approaches, but in principle, they agree that their efforts are common in the sense that they work towards promotion of madrasa education as a religious duty and preserving the religious values and identity of their communities. Helping these groups achieve this objective are three main factors: individual or family religious faith, which encourages enrolment in the madrasas. As a Muslim, one deems it a religious duty to learn religion and help one's children to learn it too. Second, compared to general education, religious education is inexpensive considering that madrasas provide food and accommodation free of cost. This is one benefit to madrasas that attracts poor families who cannot afford general education for their kids, according to Maulawi Noorullah Azzam, who is the Principal of an Afghan Darul Uloom.[138] The third factor is relevant to the current political and security situation in Afghanistan, wherein many rural areas' madrasa education is the only available model from which the communities can benefit. CAPS's research findings indicate that the following groups have been engaged in such efforts in Afghanistan during the last 15 years and prior.

(136) Mohammadi, Omer, and Moheq.
(137) Mohammadi, Omer, and Moheq.
(138) Interview #19, 'Interview with Maulawi Noorullah Azzam, Principal of Afghan Darul Uloom', *CAPS*, 13 December 2016.

Taliban and Haqqani Network

The Taliban and Haqqani Network campaigned to establish an Islamic Emirate based on Sharia Law in Afghanistan. The factions are Sunni and run a network of madrasas in Quetta and Peshawar cities of Pakistan and in areas on the border with Afghanistan. The curriculum of these madrasas promote jihad and provide frontline fighters and suicide bombers for the movement in Afghanistan. The factions do not directly run but support numerous unregistered madrasas in Afghanistan. In September 2016, Taliban members for the first time laid the foundation of a girl madrasa in Yatim village of Chahar Dara district of Kunduz province. According to local accounts, Taliban head of education for Kunduz, Maulawi Bismillah, laid the foundation of the madrasa. The madrasa is named after the first wife of the Prophet Mohammad, Khadija-tul-Kubra, and it has been operating in a local house for the past seven years where 150 girls receive religious education from female teachers, Ahmad Gul a village elder from the Chahar Dara District of the Kunduz Province told the CAPS research team.[139]

Islamic State in Khorasan

> *"Stand up, Daud. What is this called?"*
> *"Kalashnikov [AK 47]."*
> *"Why do we use this?"*
> *"To defend the faith."*
> *"We must implement God's religion over all people. "God says do jihad until intrigue, idolatry and infidelity are finished in the world."*[140]

The above is a reported conversation between a teacher from the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) group and young boy and girl students in an ISK-run mosque madrasa in a village in eastern Afghanistan. In January 2015, the ISK declared the whole of Afghanistan and Central Asia including Xinjiang region of China as part of the Khorasan region of the Islamic caliphate.[141] ISK is described as a movement with no long-lasting territorial stronghold in Afghanistan. The group runs a few mosque madrasas and a local radio "Voice of Khelfat" in certain areas where they are operative. In these mosque

(139) Interview #17, 'Interview with Ahmad Gul from Chahar Dara District of Kunduz Province', *CAPS*, 10 July 2016.
(140) Priyanka Boghani, 'ISIS in Afghanistan: School of Jihad', Pbs.org, 1 November 2015.
(141) Adam Withnall and Danny Romero, 'Isis, a Year of the Caliphate: What Is It That the so-Called "Islamic State" Really Wants?', *The Independent*, 29 June 2015.

madrasas, ISK educate children in its caliphate ideology and train them to fight for the caliphate empowerment in the future.[142] Despite both the groups being violently radical, ISK and Taliban differences are apparent in their teachings in the religious madrasas that they run or support – the former denounces nationalism in the Muslim world and promotes transnational jihad, while the latter promotes nationalist jihad that should be carried out only within the boundaries of Afghanistan.[143]

Jamiat-e-Eslah

Jamiat-e-Eslah (the Afghan version of the Muslim Brotherhood) is one of the most disciplined religious organizations in Afghanistan and was established in 2003, two years after the US-led intervention.[144] Jamiat-e-Eslah is non-violent and its main objective is to educate the young generation of Afghans – both males and females – on religious studies and prepare them to empower an Islamic governance system in Afghanistan through non-violent means.[145] The organization runs its own madrasas and schools. It is also active in other Afghan schools and universities, especially private ones, through influential faculty members affiliated with the organization.[146]

Jamiat-e-Eslah has two Darul Ulooms in Jalalabad city of eastern Nangarhar province – one for boys and one for girls. It has one Darul Uloom in western Herat province for boys, where thousands of students receive religious education. According to a madrasa teacher from Nangarhar, Maulawi Sirajudin, the Jamiat-e-Eslah also runs several schools in Kabul, Jalalabad and Herat cites and runs a private university named Salam University with its main campus in Kabul and another campus in northern Kunduz city.[147]

Jamiat-e-Eslah is also engaged in social welfare activities and has a robust media presence. It owns various media outlets, including a TV channel in

(142) TOLOnews, 'Daesh Militants Launch Radio Station In Nangarhar', *Tolonews.com*, 16 December 2016.
(143) Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 'Spokesman of Islamic Emirate Answers Several Important Questions', *Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan*, 28 August 2015.
(144) Borhan Osman, 'Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not All of Them', *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, 2 April 2014.
(145) Jamiat Eslah, 'The Activity Report of Jameyat Eslah Afghanistan for 1392/2013 – 2014', Eslahonline.net, 1 February 2015 <http://eslahonline.net/english/?p=13> [accessed 10 February 2017].
(146) Zabihullah Ghazi, 'Pro-IS Rally at Afghan University Stirs Concern', VOA News, 10 November 2015.
(147) Interview #14.

Herat and Islamic radios in a number of provinces.[148] The social welfare activities of the organization include assistance to people affected by natural disasters. It provides winter preparation for poor families and conducts blood donation campaigns when high-casualty incidents have struck the country. In 2015, the organization prepared over 100,000 cc of blood for hospitals by volunteers from across the country for Afghan civilians injured in security incidents.[149]

Jamiat-e-Eslah is known as a movement with a considerable youth following in numerous provinces of Afghanistan. The organization runs a youth front called the Afghan Muslim Youth Association. The Afghan Muslim Youth Association is active on social media and social networks such as YouTube, twitter and Facebook. Jamiat-e-Eslah is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in ideology and activities, and the organization has raised its voice for any development pro- or anti-Muslim Brotherhood. In April 2013, when the government of Bangladesh executed the Jama'at-e-Islami leader Qamar ul Zaman, the Afghan Muslim Youth Association strongly condemned the execution and campaigned against it. It described the execution as a step in the long-term plan of the Bangladeshi government to weaken and gradually diminish Islamic parties.[150]

For the Afghan Muslim Youth Association, Jamiat-e Eslah employs a rigorous process of recruiting members, which requires attending weekly classes of ideological training for years, organized in small cells under a member's supervision. Membership also requires strict vetting of the perspective recruits for their thinking, manners and obedience to the ideas and leaders of the organization.

Jamiat-e-Eslah's take on the Taliban and ISK is that the groups to an extent have been corrupted by their leaders' political ambitions. A member of Jamiat-E-Eslah argued during an interview with CAPS that the perceived corruption of these groups make them deviant from the true Islamic movement.[151]

(148) Borhan Osman, 'Under Strange Flags: Afghans' Delayed Protests against an "anti-Islam Film"', *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, 12 September 2012.
(149) Jamiat Eslah.
(150) Jamiat Eslah.
(151) Interview #5, 'Interview with a Member of Jamiat-E-Eslah, Anonymous', *CAPS*, 8 June 2016.

Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded by a Palestinian jurist mid-20th century. The organization is active in many Muslim and Western countries. It became operational in Afghanistan post 2001 and took on a vigorous campaign in recent years in the country. Hizb ut-Tahrir's diatribe against democracy and modern electoral politics is a well-known characteristic of its campaign in Afghanistan. The organization questions the legitimacy of elections and democracy in Islam and a local Hizb ut-Tahrir leader has argued that

elections is a "system of *kufr* [infidelity] and promoting [elections] is *haram* [un-Islamic]."[152] Some of its members were arrested for anti-election propaganda in the run-up to the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections.[153]

Hizb ut-Tahrir does not run any madrasas as it is banned in Afghanistan, but it has become increasingly visible through its members in various madrasas and schools propagating its ideology. Hizb ut-Tahrir is mainly targeting educated professional youth and madrasa students, focusing on recruiting them by campaigning to establish a state based on Islamic Sharia through non-violent means.[154] This is best exemplified by a statement from Chief Executive Abdullah, where he characterizes the organization as the following:

> *"An organization under the name of Hizb ut-Tahrir is operating in the academic environment and at community level particularly among the youth. The group constitutes the unofficial or civilian branch of insurgent groups that motivate the young generation and the people to move toward terror activities."*[155]

Former members of the Taliban regime

Some former high-ranking members of the Taliban regime decided not to join the movement's ongoing military campaign against the Afghan government and international forces in Afghanistan and instead invested in

(152) Osman, 'Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not All of Them'.
(153) Osman, 'Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not All of Them'.
(154) Osman, 'Under Strange Flags: Afghans' Delayed Protests against an "anti-Islam Film"'.
(155) Mir Abed Joenda, 'Abdullah Speaks Out Against Hizb Ut-Tahrir', *TOLO News*, 23 November 2015.

religious education. They argue that education is an important front in the struggle between Islamic and un-Islamic forces, and thus they see increasing investment in madrasa education as pivotal. Former Foreign Minister for the Taliban, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, today runs a private university, which is registered with the government, and which teaches a mixed curriculum of religious and general education. The university is named "Afghan University" and is located in Kabul. Former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, initiated the "Afghan Academic Foundation", which runs madrasas and schools. The foundation runs a Darul Uloom and several madrasas and schools in Kabul. Zaeef during interviews with CAPS said that they raised funds for madrasas in Afghanistan from national businessmen and people that are well off, while the universities and schools collect monthly tuition fees from the students.[156] This perception contributes to the discourse that the government in fact does not see promotion of madrasas as an important part of its efforts towards education in Afghanistan. The government has been blamed for favoritism and being a body to the efforts at international levels to undermine madrasas.

General trends in Salafi groups' influence over religious education

Salafist ideology seems to be growing with external backing among the young generation in Afghan societies, especially in eastern and northeastern provinces of the country. Afghan Salafis do not have any known organization that runs madrasas or schools in in the country, but Salafi religious scholars individually run their own madrasas and hold free religious courses in their mosques in Kabul and in various provinces, according to Maulawi Sirajudin, a madrasa teacher from Nangarhar.[157]

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Salafism began to emerge as an important player in the country's religious landscape. Now the movement is among the new wave of ultra- conservative Sunni Islam, which traditionally had not had a significant role in Afghan society. Saudi Arabia played a key role in promoting Salafism with the complicity of Pakistani Salafist organizations to counter communism in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Since then Saudi Arabia has financed its Salafist propaganda

(156) Interview #7a.
(157) Interview #14.

in the country, and it is claimed that the country has funded the ideology vigorously during last three decades.[158]

According to Maulawi Sirajudin, Salafis and Hiz-but-Tahrir generally have a stricter attitude towards Shia Muslims, democracy, and western culture.[159] In the southeastern Khost province, where Salafism is on the rise due to a considerable diaspora from this province in the Middle East, students from Salafist madrasas view elections as un-Islamic because they have been imported from the West and because they are not based on Islamic principles of governance.[160]

At a Salafi mosque in Kabul, hundreds of worshippers come every Friday to listen to the sermons by Abu Obaidullah Mutawakil, a well-known Salafi scholar in Kabul. Books and CDs of his teachings are sold from a table near the front gate. Originally, from the Hanafi school of thought, Abu Obaidullah Mutawakil turned to Salafism after being educated in a Salafi madrasa in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region during the 1980s. Abu Obaidullah Mutawakil's repeated message during his sermons is that "this government came through a general election and general elections are not in Islam."[161] Abu Obaidullah Mutawakil targets Shia Muslims as well. He argued once: "They [Shia Muslims] are not bringing us light — instead they bring darkness and in future this will cause differences and a big clash inside the country as each action has a reaction."[162]

The violent Salafi groups mainly engage the male Afghan youth in their madrasas to deploy them on the battlefield later on. Human Rights Watch research[163] shows that the Taliban added scores of children between the ages of 13 and 17 to their ranks in 2015. The Taliban had been recruiting and training children from various madrasas in areas under its control and deployed many of them for military operations. For example, Human Rights Watch reported that in Chahar Dara district in Kunduz Province, the Taliban

(158) Yousaf Butt, 'How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism', The World Post, 22 March 2015.
(159) Interview #14.
(160) Osman, 'Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not All of Them'.
(161) Osman, 'Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not All of Them'.
(162) Osman, 'Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not All of Them'.
(163) Human Rights Watch, 'Afghanistan: Taliban Child Soldier Recruitment Surges - Children Trained in Madrasas to Fight, Plant IED', 2016 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/17/afghanistan-taliban-child-soldier-recruitment-surges>.

had increasingly used madrasas to provide military training to children and some of them were later employed in combat. According to Human Rights Watch, the madrasas controlled by the Taliban attract many poor families because the movement covers expenses for the families and provides food and clothing for their children. In some cases, according to Human Rights Watch, the Taliban had even offered cash to families for sending their boys to the madrasas. In Chahar Dara district, one of the madrasas was run by Maulawi Abdul Haq, a scholar sympathetic to the Taliban. His madrasa had about 80 students as of late 2015, and Human Rights Watch held that all of these children were vulnerable to Taliban recruitment.

The non-violent religious groups target not only male but also female youth. The motive behind this act is the belief that both the forces of population have to be engaged to empower an Islamic rule in the long run. Groups such as Jamiat-e-Eslah and Hizbut Tahrir view girls as sisters and daughters that in time will become mothers, and the groups believe that the females could be used as a vehicle in the long term to transform the societies in line with their interpretations of Sharia law. The following quote from one of the girls who studied in these madrasas indicate that these madrasas have been able to make some accomplishments towards the aimed transformation. One female madrasa student in Kabul said, "I have a special interest in getting Islamic education and decided to serve the Muslims by providing them with religious knowledge and to counter the impact of cultural wars and [western] proselytizing campaigns in Afghanistan."[164] Traditionally girls have not attended madrasas but schools or universities in cities. However, post 2001, there has been a steady spike in the number girls going to madrasas. Statistics from the Ministry of Haj and Religious Affairs show that 40,000 girls attended 104 madrasas in 2015 and that the number of the girl madrasas increased to 120 only in 2016.[165] This indicates growing popularity of madrasas in the city population and that religious education is becoming parallel to general education for girls.

An unregistered girl madrasa in northern Kunduz province has been accused of radicalizing thousands of girls. The madrasa was established by two influential religious scholars in Kunduz in 2010, where now about 6,000 women and young girls study. The head of the madrasa, Mullah Abdul

(164) Naheed Bashardost, '49,000 Girl Students Enrolled in Kabul-Based Religious Schools', Pajhwok Afghan News, 24 February 2016.
(165) Bashardost.

Khaleq brazenly said, "In the beginning of Islam, Muslim girls used to take part in religious activities. They even used to participate in wars… but we Muslims have now lagged behind." He argued that "those who oppose this madrasa [Ashraf-ul Madares] are actually unaware of Islam or are influenced by countries that support non-Islamic ideas and values in Afghanistan and want a decline in Islamic values."[166]

In 2009, the Elimination of Violence Against Women law was enacted by a presidential decree and has been applied – albeit patchily – in courtrooms ever since. In May 2013, many girls from their madrasas took to the streets in Kabul and other provinces to protest the law. They condemned it and chanted slogans such as "democracy is *kufr* [infidelity]" and "democracy is bestial." They carried placards reading: "The first step for enforcing Islam is abolishing democracy" and "democracy means *kufr*, democracy means dishonor, democracy means obscenity, democracy means bestial behavior."[167]

Key findings: Madrasas and general education in Afghanistan – Post 2001

Perceptions within the Afghan government and the population on madrasas in Afghanistan are diverse. Many see madrasas as a factor in radicalization and promotion of religious extremism among youth in the country, while others argue that there has been an exaggeration about all madrasas being drivers of radicalization and extremism. In discussions with madrasa scholars, it is assessed that their perspectives on radicalization and extremism do not match those propagated by the governments and other international actors. Madrasas – particularly those that are not registered but also the local communities in general – argue that what the government deems as radical and extremist is a religious duty for madrasas. The Deputy Head of Education of the Afghan Institute of Higher Education, *Maulawi Nasrun Minallah, for example, argued in an interview with CAPS that the gap between the public schools and the madrasas "is the work of foreigners" and that religious scholars and madrasa students do not believe that such a fissure exists. He further held that democracy has been brought to Afghanistan by foreigners to promote un-Islamic practices in the Muslim world, but that the true followers of Islam "will not allow un-Islamic values to replace Islamic*

(166) Azad.
(167) Borhan Osman, 'The EVAW Law – an Evil Law? The Backlash at Kabul University', *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, 26 May 2013.

values."[168] *The General Director of the Abu Hanifah madrasa in Kabul also highlighted the importance of both religious and 'worldly' needs of human beings:* "Humans have two wings – one is connected to religion and the other to worldly needs. If either is missing, a man cannot survive."[169]

A third group sees madrasas from an academic angle and attributes the largely stagnant character of madrasas and their exploitation by non-state actors to the government's inability to support and accommodate them.

The majority of madrasas have full autonomy on what and how they teach and whom to approach for financial support. In many of these madrasas, the teaching materials rely on the most conservative interpretation of religious books. Several school teachers stated during interviews with CAPS that most of such madrasas have been used as the major vehicle for radicalization among the youth. In recent years, this issue has reached a critical point, where it has been described as a dimension of the destabilization of the country. Whereas other madrasas that are registered with and under the oversight of the government seem to keep a balance in religious and general education in their curriculum, thereby providing a bridge between religious and general education.

Other than only focusing on madrasas, understanding non-religious drivers of radicalization and extremism in a society is also vital to designing effective counter strategies. Certain madrasas are engaged in radicalization of the youth because they deem it their religious duty. However, contributing to these madrasas are also socio-economic factors and perceptions of them in the Afghan societies. Not only radical religious ideologies that are taught in various madrasas but also socio-economic and political grievances, poor governance, and personal hardships drive people, mostly youth, especially those in madrasas, to resort to violence. In such situations, radical narratives can resonate. They are in fact carefully crafted to capitalize on existing grievances.

In November 2015, dozens of University students in Jalalabad raised the flag of Taliban, Islamic State in Khorasan, and Hizb-e-Islami in a rally they staged against the government. They chanted slogans in favor of an

(168) Interview #18, 'Interview with Maulawi Nasrun Minallah, Deputy Head of Education, Afghan Institute of Higher Education', *CAPS*, 14 June 2016.
(169) Interview #8.

Islamic Emirate. Different circles and media outlets in response described the event as an indicator of extremism and radicalization at the Nangarhar University. However, the students who carried the flags of the three groups in government custody said that they were tired of the government and the reason for their protest was the rise in corruption, the failure to address students' complains and the poor management in the universities. Corruption is prevalent at various levels of government institutions, including the educational sector. Schoolbooks that should be given to the students for free are not available, and the students have to buy them from the markets. The problem of corruption in the education sector in Afghanistan appears to be significant. Funds are siphoned off before reaching schools or universities. The phenomenon of 'ghost teachers', who do not come to work but still receive a salary, is another type of corruption common to the educational sector. The 'ghost teachers' result in large classroom sizes given that a school has far fewer teachers, and it also results in classes being cancelled, which has contributed to a general lack of faith in the educational system. In addition, there is the phenomenon of petty bribery by the educator from the students for grades and graduation. Talented students are held back by these practices that favor connections, bribes, influence, and power.[170]

These two educational institutions – madrasas and schools – have increasingly become bastions of widespread cynicism about each other and provided a fertile ground for radical activists, especially in madrasas, to radicalize the youth. In addition, families also play an important role in promoting or countering radicalization. According to the principal of an Afghan Darul Uloom, Maulawi Noorullah Azzam, some families encourage their sons to attend madrasas.[171] Some even encourage them to engage in violent acts depending upon the religious background and perception of religion of those families.[172]

(170) Matthew Hall, Corruption & Afghanistan's Education Sector - Part 2 of a 6-Part Series on Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan, The Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2011.
(171) Interview #19.
(172) Belquis Ahmadi, Afghan Youth and Extremists Why Are Extremists' Narratives So Appealing? (Washington, D.C., 2015).

Conclusion and policy recommendations

This book set out to assess the development in religious education by focusing on three main questions in relation to madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the assumption that the madrasa systems in both countries, in one way or another, have a destabilizing effect. This should not be confused with the assumption that all madrasas are part of a militant production pipeline. On the contrary, the research conducted by RDDC and its partners CRSS, PICSS, and CAPS shows no major documentation of such a general link. The research does indicate, however, that the majority of madrasas are detached from the public education system without any control of curricula and teachers' education. Although registration efforts and reforms aim at including madrasas in the state education systems, more has to be done in order to prevent the continued evolution of a parallel education system. In and of itself, this presents a factor of instability and a threat toward national coherence that needs to be addressed, in both countries, at the same level as stabilization through military means. To secure such a development, the education systems require capacity building and political prioritizing internally as well as at the international level.

This study's result is by no means adequate in terms of grasping all perspectives of this development. Most of all, it provides insights into elements of the role of madrasas in the two countries and what elements future reforms should seek to incorporate in order to provide progressive solutions. For these solutions to be sustainable, further research within this area is also required, along with a critical view of the results in this book. As stated in the introduction, it was (and remains) the intention of RDDC that the Afghan and Pakistani governments, along with security and educational institutions of both countries, will use the key findings and recommendations of this book in their future work on reforms in relation to education as a factor of stabilization.

The three parts of this book each provide sound insights into the role of madrasas by assessing the parental choice, the financial pipelines, and the recent development of religious education in Pakistan and Afghanistan. CRSS found that economic concerns and a general devotion to religion appeared to be the most frequent motivations for Pakistanis to send their children to madrasas instead of schools. They surveyed families that had sent at least one child to a madrasa. Interestingly, and contrary to popular belief,

PICSS found that madrasas in Pakistan are primarily financed through mandatory religious donations from local communities in Pakistan. CAPS helped provide an overview of trends in religious education in Afghanistan and found that there is a gap between the perceptions of Afghan government officials, madrasa officials, and the local communities in regards to whether madrasas are linked to militancy.

In concluding this book, RDDC, along with CRSS, PICSS and CAPS, offers recommendations for the governments, policy makers, and administrations in Afghanistan and Pakistan in view of promoting increased debate over how reform of the madrasa education systems and investment in public education can mitigate some of the negative consequences of madrasas:

Prioritize investment in public education – The public education system in Pakistan needs a significant overhaul. There are 25 million children in Pakistan not attending schools,[173] who need to be enrolled. Pakistan's literacy rate is also at an abysmal level. The government has quoted various figures over time, including 59.9 percent. However, a report by UNESCO puts the overall literacy rate at a mere 46 percent. Please also bear in mind that in most places in Pakistan, "literacy" is equated with the ability to sign one's own name, unassisted. Another recent UN report from September 2016 states that Pakistan's education is 50 years behind the rest of the world.[174]

Government buy-in is needed for improvement of critical thinking, innovation, and entrepreneurship in institutions of learning across Pakistan. Currently this buy-in is non-existent. Most entrepreneurs and innovators in the country believe that there is a severe shortage of skilled, educated labor and that the workforce produced, especially by the public educational institutions, leaves a lot to be desired.

The problem of corruption and nepotism in the education sector in Afghanistan appears to be significant, and it needs to be addressed.

(173) Alif Aliaan, *25 Million Broken Promises* (Islamabad, 2014) <https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/alifailaan/pages/540/attachments/original/1434016427/Alif_Ailaan_report_25_million_broken_promises_English.pdf?1434016427> [accessed 9 February 2017].
(174) UNESCO, *Global Ecucation Monitoring Report 2016 - Education for People and Planet: Creating Sustainable Futures for All*, 2016 <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002457/245752e.pdf>.

Build trust with madrasas through financial and technical support – With the view to achieve the objective of oversight and monitoring of madrasas, there is a dire need for reducing the trust deficit between government and madrasas. For this purpose, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan should take practical steps including, but not limited to, providing training to madrasa administrations for financial management. The governments should also ensure that banks do not create undue hurdles in opening bank accounts for madrasas.

In Pakistan, the government may consider paying teachers' salaries to reduce the financial burden of madrasas. Ideally, the government can consider devising a plan wherein madrasa teachers (including teachers of religious and contemporary education) are appointed by the government and paid salaries from national exchequer as it is being done for public sector educational institutes. Such a system will provide ample opportunity to the relevant government institutions to keep a check on what is taught and how it is taught in addition to providing a strong relationship between the government and madrasas. The government may also consider providing subsidies for utility bills. As an immediate step, the government should direct relevant companies not to charge madrasas' utilities at commercial rates. The government's financial assistance is required for madrasas who were shut down due to sudden blockade of funds from foreign sources. This financial assistance could be made available for a certain period, allowing the administrations of those madrasas to generate revenue from society.

In Afghanistan, it is vital that the government should espouse accommodative policies towards madrasas through providing financial support and employment opportunities for the madrasa graduates and stipulating regulation of madrasas in the country.

Ensure madrasa registration – All seminaries should be geo-tagged and registered. In order to encourage madrasas to opt for registration, the governments of both countries should streamline and facilitate the madrasa registration processes by announcing the requirements of registration as well as nominating a single body to whom madrasas should be registered. Madrasas should be given a reasonable timeframe to get themselves registered and no unregistered madrasas should be allowed to function after the given time.

Encourage and facilitate transparency and accountability in madrasa financing – Receiving funds from any source, internal or external, is not and should not be an issue. However, the source and target of such donations must be known. For this purpose, all transactions should be made through bank accounts. Moreover, madrasas should be encouraged and facilitated to conduct annual audits of their accounts so that a proper system of monitoring could be established.

Initiate teaching as well as curriculum reform – All madrasa curricula should be government approved and must include contemporary subjects and disciplines. Provinces will have to take the main responsibility in carrying out reforms of madrasas in their respective territories. This task should be further delegated to district level authorities such as Executive District Officers.

Ensure effective communication with madrasas – Everybody's responsibility is nobody's responsibility. In Pakistan, the government may nominate a single body/ministry to deal with madrasas to avoid confusion and ensure effective communication between government and madrasas. Ideally, the Ministry of Education should be nominated for this purpose since it is dealing with other educational institutions in the country. The same practice should be followed at the provincial level.

In Afghanistan, the government should consider forming a board of religious scholars bringing in members from the three religious bodies (Itehadul Madaras, Majma ul Madaras, and Islahul madaras) with a well-defined mandate to allocate budgets for madrasas at provincial levels. This way the government could stipulate the distribution of madrasas geographically - mosque education at the village level, madrasa at the district level, and Darul Uloom at the provincial level. The board could then gradually be developed into a National Islamic Center. The oversight of such a board or National Islamic Center can only be effective when they offer annual budget allocation for madrasas and Darul Ulooms.[175]

Streamline donation flows to madrasas – In Pakistan, with a view to encouraging the general public to submit their donations and Zakat to the

(175) Interview #7b, 'Interview with Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, Former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan and Founder of Afghan Foundation', *CAPS*, 13 December 2016.

government for better utilization, the government must remove flaws in the existing system and ensure that Zakat is paid out to the most deserving people. In addition, corruption in the system and the practice of payment of Zakat on the basis of political affiliation should be dispensed with. Since donors are one of the most effective channels for bringing about required change, an awareness campaign for the public should be initiated to encourage donors to pay their donations only to those madrasas that are registered, conduct their annual audit, and make their financial information public. Foreign governments and non-government organizations may be encouraged to route their assistance to madrasas through government channels. In this connection, making the official Zakat collection and disbursement system more efficient and corruption-free will go a long way in encouraging foreign donors to pay their donations to the government.

In Afghanistan, local communities are a major source of funding, and they can use this leverage to engage with the leadership of madrasas on the nature of religious education.

Provide security to madrasas – In conflict zones, as well as in the areas where sectarian tensions are high, madrasas are bound to adopt additional security measures thus putting extra pressure on their finances. Security should be provided to these madrasas when registered.

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Appendices

Part one: Survey forms

Annex I: Survey Form (English)

Basic Information

Father's Name	Age
Monthly Income	Town or City/District
Father's educational qualification	Mother's educational qualification
1. What does the father/mother do?	
2. How many children do you have and what are their ages?	
3. How can children in your area get an education? - School - Home - Seminary - Other	
4. How many of your children attend schools?	
5. If one or more of your children do not attend school, what is the reason? - School expenses - Lack of schools in local area - Child not interested in school - Religious reasons - Female children - Other	
6. If you have school-attending children, are you satisfied with the quality of education?	
7. How many of your children attend seminaries, and since when? Do they live there?	
8. If any of your children attend seminaries, what is the root cause?	

Annex II: Survey Form (Urdu)

بنیادی معلومات

نام والد:		عمر:
ماہانہ آمدن:		شہر/ضلع:
والد کی تعلیم قابلیت:		والدہ کی تعلیم قابلیت:
.1	آپ (بچے کے والد/والدہ) کیا کام کرتے ہیں؟	
.2	آپ کے کتنے بچے ہیں اور ان کی کیا عمریں ہیں؟	
.3	آپ کے علاقے میں تعلیم حاصل کرنے کے کون کون سے مواقع دستیاب ہیں؟ ایک سے زائد جواب پر ٹک	سکول گھر مدرسہ دیگر
.4	کتنے بچےسکول پڑھنے جاتے ہیں؟	
.5	اگر کوئی بچہ سکول نہیں جاتا تو اس کی وجہ کیا ہے؟	تعلیعمی اخراجات علاقہ میں سکول نہ ہونا بچہ کی دلچسپی نہ ہونا دیگر
.6	اگر کوئی بچہ سکول جاتا ہے تو کیا آپ سکول کی معیار تعلیم اور سہولیات سے مطمئین ہیں؟	
.7	آپ کے کتنے بچے مدرسہ جاتے ہیں اور کتنے عرصے سے جا رہے ہیں؟	
.8	آپ اپنے بچے، بچی کو مدرسہ میں کیوں پڑھارہے ہیں؟	

Part two: Questionnaires and list of madrasas surveyed

Annex I: Questionnaire-Madrasa Administration

Name of the Madrasa: _____
Name of Principal: _____
School of Thought: _____
Affiliated with: _____
Address: _____
Total Area: _____
Year of Establishment: _____
Building Status: Owned_____ Rented_____

Type/Nature of Education in Madrasa:

_____ Darse Nizami
_____ Takhasas
_____ Nazra
_____ Hifz

Nature of Students:

_____ Boarding
_____ Day Scholar

Does this building meet your requirement?

_____ Yes
_____ No

Do you have any expansion Plan?

_____ Yes
_____ No

If you have an expansion plan, how will you meet up expenses for expansion?

_____ Appeal for donations
_____ Donor(s) pledged
_____ Madrassah's assets
_____ Others

What are negative implications of media propaganda?

_____ Reduction in Donations
_____ Reduction in Students
_____ Reduction in Madrasa Popularity
_____ No affect
_____ Others _____ (please specify)

Which segment of society was more affected by media propaganda?

_____ Business community
_____ General public
_____ Educated class
_____ Non-educated class
_____ Others _____ (please specify)

What type of facilities do you provide to your students?

Accommodation
Food
Books
Clothing
Contemporary Education
Monthly Stipend
Medical
Others _____ (please specify)

Medical facility for critical diseases?

_____ Yes
_____ No

If you provide medical facility for critical diseases, how you arrange resources for that?

_____ NGOs
_____ Self-arrangement
_____ Donors
_____ Others _____ (please specify)

What are annual expenses of Madrasa?

Rs _____

What is the percentage of expenses vis-a-vis?

_____ Dining
_____ Utility Bills
_____ Teachers' Salaries
_____ Medical Facilities
_____ Recreational / Studies Trips
_____ Monthly Stipends
_____ Contemporary Education
_____ Others _____ (please specify)

Do you conduct annual audit?

_____ Yes
_____ No

If yes, who conducts this audit?

_____ Internal

_____ External Firm

Do you have bank Account?

_____ Yes

_____ No

If yes, did you face any problem in opening Bank Account?

_____ Yes (please specify)

_____ No

If no, what are the reasons?

_____

What percentage of total expenses are met through Madrasa's own assets?

_____ %

Which hospital do you visit in case of emergency?

_____ Public (government)

_____ Private

What is percentage share of various sources of revenue for Madrasa?

Donations _____ %

Zakat/ Ushar/ Khumas _____ %

Animal Hides _____ %

Govt _____ %

Welfare organizations _____ %

Agriculture _____ %

Madrasa Assets _____ %

_____Others _____ % (please specify)

What percentage of total expenses are collected in Ramadan?

_____ %

What is percentage of total revenue collected by your representatives while visiting other cities/ countries?

_____ %

What is the percentage of total expenses met through donation boxes?

_____ %

What is percentage of revenue collected inland (local sources)

_____ %

Does income from local sources come consistently?

_____ Yes

_____ No

What strategy will you adopt incase revenue from inland (local) sources is reduced?"

_____ Increase other local sources
_____ Increase revenue from foreign sources
_____ Will Take loan
_____ Reduce expenses

What will you do to reduce expenses? which action will you take first?"

_____ Reduce students
_____ Reduce teachers
_____ Reduce dining expenses
_____ Reduce expenses on contemporary education
_____ Reduce expenses on security
_____ Reduce research related expenses
_____ Others (please specify)

In such eventuality, how can government help you? (What will be your priority/ preference?)

_____ Utility Bills
_____ Teachers' Salaries
_____ Security Expenses
_____ Research Expenses
_____ Accommodation Facilities
_____ Subsidy on Food Items
_____ Others (Specify)

Do donors take part in decision making process?

_____ Yes
_____ No

Donors do not take part in decision making process because:

_____ It is Principal's responsibility
_____ They don't spare time
_____ Not possible due to spread
_____ Committee makes decisions

Yes, their input is sought in:

_____ Administrative matters
_____ Educational matters
_____ Construction matters
_____ Others (specify)

What is percentage of revenue collected through foreign sources?

_____ %

Do income from foreign sources received consistently?

_____ Yes
_____ No

What is the nature of foreign donors?

_____ Islamic Governments
_____ Pakistani Expatriates
_____ Non-Pakistani Muslim community
_____ NGOs
_____ Others (specify)

What strategy will you adopt incase revenue from Foreign sources is reduced?

_____ Will try to increase local sources
_____ Will try to increase revenue from other foreign sources
_____ Will take loan
_____ Will try to reduce expenses

What are basic motivations for foreign funding?

_____ Religious motivations
_____ Improving Literacy
_____ Helping poor
_____ Others (specify)

How do expatriates send you money?

_____ Bank Account
_____ Through relatives

Annex III: Questionnaire – Donors

Name: _____
Profession: _____

Do your children study in Madrassah?
_____ Yes
_____ No
If yes, what is nature of their studies?
_____ Darse Nizami
_____ Takhasas
_____ Nazra
_____ Hifz
How much do you donate to Madrassah annually (Pakistani Rupees)?
_____ 100 to 1,000
_____ 1,001 to 10,000
_____ 10,001 to 100,000
_____ More than 100,000
If due to some financial issues Madrassah administration asks you additional donations, will you respond positively?
_____ Yes
_____ No
How do you pay donations to Madrassah?
_____ Principle/ Mohtamim
_____ Donation Box
_____ Madrassah's Representative
_____ Madrassah's Bank Account
What are your motives behind donations?
_____ Helping Orphan/ Poor Children
_____ Promotion of Religious education
_____ Others
How do you ensure that your money has been used appropriately?
_____ Trust in Administration
_____ Trust in Committee
_____ No such system exists
If no such system exists, do you think it must be developed?
_____ Required
_____ Not required
What are the other areas where you help and facilitate Madrassah?

_____ Food
_____ Construction
_____ Teachers' salaries
_____ Clothing
_____ Stipend
_____ Allied facilities
_____ All

Do you provide any suggestions to Madrassah?

_____ Yes
_____ No

In which areas your suggestions mostly fall?

_____ Teaching Methods
_____ Teachers' Selection
_____ Curriculum
_____ Co-curricular activities
_____ Administrative affairs
_____ Financial affairs
_____ Construction affairs
_____ Food/ dining issues
_____ Others (please specify)

How can Madrassah administration improve its system and attract more donations?

_____ Transparency in financial affairs
_____ Run affairs through Committee
_____ Seek input from donors on key issues
_____ Seek input from general public
_____ Start contemporary education
_____ Others _____ (please specify)

How to cope with problems/ issues due to irregular donations?

_____ Madrassah must own assets
_____ Govt should Finance
_____ NGOs should finance
_____ Others _____ (please specify)

Annex IV: Questionnaire – Madrasa Boards

Name of Madrassah Board: _____
Name of Authority/ official: _____

1. To what extent institutions affiliated with you are depending on you?
   _____ Curriculum/ Syllabus
   _____ Criteria for hiring staff
   _____ Exams Regulations
   _____ Financial Assistance
   _____Others (specify) _____
2. How can you help sustain those madaris who are facing financial constraints?
   _____
3. How can madaris be made financially stable?
   - Government assistance
   - Building assets to generate constant income
   - Others (specify) _____
4. In what domain/ areas can government provide financial assistance?
   - Salaries of teachers imparting religious education.
   - Salaries of teachers imparting contemporary education
   - Utility bills.
   - Subsidized food items.
   - Others (specify) _____
5. There are concerns in some quarters regarding foreign funding of madrassahs. What mechanism will you suggest to keep a check on funds received from abroad?
   _____

Annex V: Questionnaire – Government Officials

Name of Department/ Ministry: _____
Name of Official: _____
Designation: _____

1. In what field the reforms have been introduced or the government intends to bring reforms?
   a. Curriculum/ Syllabus
   b. Registration Process
   c. Monitoring
   d. Streamlining of Funding/ financial resources
   e. Selection of teachers
   f. Adoption of modern technology/ tools.
   g. All of above
   h. Others _____
2. What is the priority of the government in terms of introducing reforms (select as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
   a. Curriculum/ Syllabus _____
   b. Registration Process _____
   c. Monitoring _____
   d. Streamlining of Funding/ financial resources _____
   e. Selection of teachers _____
   f. Adoption of modern technology/ tools _____.
   g. Others _____
3. What is progress on each category of reforms?
   a. Curriculum/ Syllabus _____ %
   b. Registration Process _____ %
   c. Monitoring _____ %
   d. Streamlining of Funding/ financial resources _____ %
   e. Selection of teachers _____ %
   f. Adoption of modern technology/ tools _____ %
   g. Others _____ %
4. Given the importance of Madrassah in providing schooling, housing and other facilities to low income families, how can government help madrassahs? (Tick all that apply)
   _____ Financing/ Provision of Teachers for Contemporary education.
   _____ Provision of subsidy/ free electricity, gas, etc.
   _____ Provision of Books.

_____ Provision of clothes, etc.
_____ Provision of subsides food items.
_____ Others (specify) _____

5. Presently, the government has engaged Madrassah's through their representative body of their respective boards, do you think this representative body is effective in bringing about required change? How it can be more effective?

   _____

6. What mechanism has the government introduced to monitor financial inflows in Madrassahs?

   _____

7. In your opinion, what is the percentage of Madrassah dependent on foreign funding?

   _____

8. Madrassah administration complained that Banks are reluctant to open bank accounts of madrassahs and use delaying tactics, your take on that:

   _____

9. Since madrassahs provide services to public and remain highly dependent on donations from public, do you have any mechanism to engage general masses in reforming madrassahs to make them more transparent to their donors as well as to public?

   _____

10. What are positive and negatively implications of foreign funding on Madrassah?
    Positive: _____
    Negative: _____
11. Have the relevant government departments made an assessment of the negative impact (for example closure of madrassahs) of reduction/ stoppage of foreign funding? If yes, how will the government prefer to cope up with the situation?

    _____

Confidentiality/ anonymity: Any reservations to specifically mentioning your name, or that of your institution/ ministry, in the report?

_____

Part three: List of interviewees and questionnaire

Annex I: List of interviewees

#	Name	Description/title	Date
1	Maulawi Ahmadullah	Head of Sa'ad Bin Ma'az madrasa	16 May 2016
2	Anonymous	Tribal elder from Chak district of Maidan Wardak province	26 May 2016
3a	Noorzad Hanif	Student of Nangarhar University during Taliban Regime	18 May 2016
3b	----------		05 Dec 2016
4	Anonymous	Former Taliban commander from Kandahar	21 May 2016
5	Anonymous	Member of Jamiat-e-Eslah	08 June 2016
6a	Allah Dad Balkhi	Former member of Taliban	14 June 2016
6b	----------		08 Dec 2016
7a	Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef	Former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan and founder of Afghan Foundation	02 July 2016
7b	---------		13 Dec 2016
8	Maulawi Aziz-ur-Rahman	General Director of Abu Hanifah madrasa in Kabul	17 June 2016
9	Anonymous	Tribal elder from Asadabad district of Maidan Wardak province	18 June 2016
10	Maulawi Aziz ur Rahman Azizi	Head of Religious Student Department at Ministry of Education	19 June 2016
11	Maulawi Mohammad Arif Malikyar	President of Darul Uloom	20 June 2016
12	Anonymous	Tribal elder from Maqur distrct of of Ghazni Province	07 June 2016
13	Anonymous	Public school teacher from Sherzad district of Nangarhar	22 June 2016
14	Maulawi Sirajudin	Madrasa teacher	28 June 2016
15	Sayed Mohammad Akbar Agha	Former high-ranking member of Taliban	02 July 2016
16	Anonymous	Public school teacher from Caprihar district of Nangarhar province	02 July 2016
17	Ahmad Gul	From Chahar Dara district of Kunduz province	10 July 2016
18	Maulawi Nasrun Minallah	Deputy Head of Education, Afghan Institute of Higher Education	14 June 2016
19	Maulawi Noorullah Azzam	Principal of Afghan Darul Uloom	13 Dec 2016
20	Group interview	Local teachers and community leaders from Chak district of Wardak province (1)	09 April 2016
21	Group interview	Local teachers and community leaders from Chak district of Wardak province (2)	10 June 2016

Annex II: Research Questionnaire

1. In your opinion, what is the role/influence of the Taliban on education in your province?
2. Does your district have a Taliban shadow administration?
3. What types of threats are given to schools, school teachers, students?
4. In what ways do the Taliban encourage specifically religious education for boys?
5. What is the Taliban's religious justification for school burnings and banning girls schools?
6. How do Taliban actions with regard to education impact family decisions to send their boys and girls to school or madrassas in areas of control?
7. Has the content of the textbooks changed at all? In what way?
8. What do you think about the condition of education in the province?
9. In your opinion, please share and describe us some roles (Policies) of the Taliban about the education?
10. Please tell us about the roles of the Taliban accessing the residents for education in your area?
11. In rural schools in your province, what sort of changes has happened to the curriculum as a result of Taliban influence?
12. What do you think about the condition of education in the province?
13. Do you see Taliban influence over education as a part of a larger strategy of the Taliban asserting themselves in the community?
14. What is the role of security forces (ANSF and ISAF) in causing violent acts against education in the province?
15. How do you see the balance in the Afghan government policies towards schools/universities and madrassas:
    a. Do you think the government is providing more support to the schools and ignoring madrassas?
    b. Please tell us about the types of madrassas in Afghanistan? Are there madrassas that the government runs just like schools and university?
16. If the government are not supporting madrassas financially, who is providing the financial support? How these madrassas are run?
17. What curriculum is taught in madrassas?
    a. Is it only religious subjects or mixed of both religious and scientific subjects.

18. There are claims that madrassas receive funding from abroad, please tell us about it. Do you think the government should allow it or ban it and why?
19. What do madrassas graduates do after graduation?
    a. Do they look for jobs with the government? Or is the government providing them job opportunities?
20. How can the government engage the madrassa graduates?
21. Do you think madrassas are where mindset against the government is shaped?
    a. What do you think about the claims that madrassas are used by Taliban to recruit and by other Islamic groups active in Afghanistan to radicalize youth?
22. How many students study in your madrassas?
    a. Are there girls too who come to study? And who teach them, male or females?
23. Is the madrassa registered with the government?
    a. If yes, what support does the madrassas receive from the government?
    b. If no, why not registered?

ROYAL DANISH DEFENCE COLLEGE

Since the 9/11 attacks on the US and the subsequent 'Global War on Terror', religious seminaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan – the madrasas – have been in the international limelight. In the West, these madrasas are often perceived as incubators of violent extremism and key elements in the food chains of militancy; moreover, they are designated as a cause of general instability. Internally in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the madrasas have also received much attention over the past years, with calls for political reforms surfacing in both countries. In Pakistan, the issue was even incorporated into the National Action Plan countering terrorism in 2015.

That same year, the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) developed the initial outline for a research project combining three main questions related to madrasas. In a cooperative framework, three research institutions – CRSS & PICSS from Pakistan and CAPS from Afghanistan – were each provided with a single separate research question so that they might conduct field studies independently of one another. This book is the combined result of all three studies edited by the RDDC. The intention is to provide a more nuanced view on the role of madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan by addressing some of the core questions pertaining to these institutions: Why do Pakistani parents decide to send their children to madrasas instead of public schools? From which sources do the Pakistani madrasas generate their funding, and how dependent are they on this funding? What are recent developments and which groups run madrasas in Afghanistan?

This book presents the findings from the extensive data-collection conducted by CRSS, PICSS, and CAPS and concludes by offering a set of recommendations concerning which elements continued reforms of the madrasas should strive to incorporate to provide progressive solutions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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PICSS
Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies

CAPS
Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies