

BALOCH YAKJEHTI COMMITTEE (BYC): STRUCTURE, INFLUENCE, AND STATE RESPONSE

A COMPREHENSIVE PROFILE

Strategy Paper





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BY



April 15, 2025

Abstract

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has emerged as a key actor in Balochistan's socio-political landscape, operating under the banner of human rights advocacy while simultaneously amplifying separatist narratives. This study presents the first detailed academic profile of BYC, tracing its origins, leadership structure, mobilization strategies, financial networks, and relationship with separatist elements. Unlike its predecessors, such as BSO-Azad and the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), BYC has positioned itself as a new platform for sustaining separatist activism, leveraging mass protests, digital advocacy, and international outreach. The movement's strong female-led leadership marks a strategic departure from traditional Baloch nationalist organizations. This research critically examines the state's response to BYC, which has included restrictions on its fundraising, arrests of key figures, and financial scrutiny under counterterrorism laws. The Pakistani government has accused BYC of receiving financial backing from smuggling networks and foreign actors, particularly India, and Western entities opposed to CPEC. The study evaluates these claims while highlighting the economic dimensions of BYC's mobilization. Using Relative Deprivation Theory and the Proxy Warfare Model, this paper assesses how separatist actors have rebranded their activism through BYC, making it adaptable to modern digital and grassroots activism. The findings suggest that BYC's rise is not merely a reaction to political marginalization but part of a broader strategy to sustain separatist influence in Balochistan. The study concludes with policy recommendations, arguing for a calibrated state response that includes financial regulation, intelligence-driven monitoring, and strategic political engagement to neutralize BYC's influence without inadvertently legitimizing its activism.

Keywords: BYC, Relative Deprivation Theory, Proxy Warfare Model, Security, CPEC.

Preface

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has emerged as a significant force in Balochistan's socio-political landscape, influencing narratives related to Baloch activism, separatist movements, and state policy responses. Despite its increasing prominence, there has been a lack of structured academic research and policy-oriented assessments on BYC's organizational structure, leadership dynamics, operational strategies, and external linkages. This Strategy Paper is the first-ever comprehensive study of BYC, filling a critical gap in understanding its evolution and its broader implications for national security and stability.

At Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), we are committed to providing evidence-based research and strategic assessments to assist policymakers, security practitioners, researchers, and other stakeholders in navigating complex security challenges. This study was spearheaded by Abdullah Khan, a renowned counterterrorism expert and Managing Director of PICSS, who led an in-depth examination of BYC's rise, its role in separatist mobilization, and the state's response mechanisms. With his vast experience in security and conflict studies, Abdullah Khan has provided an objective, data-driven, and analytically sound assessment of this organization, offering practical policy recommendations for managing its influence and countering its narrative.

I also extend my sincere appreciation to the PICSS Research Team, whose dedication, expertise, and meticulous analysis have played a pivotal role in shaping this paper. Their contributions in monitoring BYC's activities, analyzing its digital footprint, and examining its financial and operational

networks have ensured that this report is comprehensive, well-researched, and strategically relevant.

This Strategy Paper is essential reading for policymakers, security agencies, academics, and analysts seeking to understand BYC's trajectory and its implications for Pakistan's internal stability and national security. It not only provides an empirical foundation for informed decision-making but also serves as a valuable resource for future research on emerging separatist trends and subnational movements.

I am confident that this study will contribute meaningfully to ongoing policy discussions and help shape a more effective and nuanced approach toward addressing the challenges posed by BYC.

Major General Saad Khattak (Retd.)

Chairman, PICSS

April 15, 2025

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This research was conducted as part of the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) security assessment initiative. I sincerely appreciate the dedication and contributions of the PICSS research team, whose efforts played a vital role in shaping this study.

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I would also like to extend my appreciation to Shumaila Khan, PICSS Office Coordinator, for providing logistical and administrative support throughout this research process. Her assistance in coordinating resources, managing communications, and facilitating research activities greatly contributed to the smooth execution of this project.

I acknowledge the various experts, policymakers, and interview respondents who provided insightful perspectives that enhanced the analytical quality of this study. Their input has helped ensure that this research remains balanced, comprehensive, and relevant to ongoing discussions on Balochistan's security landscape.

Abdullah Khan (Author)

Managing Director PICSS

April 15, 2025

Executive Summary

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has rapidly emerged as one of the most prominent socio-political movements in Balochistan, redefining the landscape of Baloch activism. This study provides a comprehensive profile of BYC, detailing its origins, leadership structure, mobilization strategies, financial networks, and its evolving role within separatist politics. Unlike previous Baloch nationalist movements, which have often been linked to militant insurgency, BYC presents itself as a non-militant platform advocating for human rights and justice while simultaneously amplifying separatist narratives.

BYC's origins trace back to the Bramsh movement in 2020, but it has since evolved into a well-organized structure with strong female leadership, decentralized coordination, and a sophisticated media strategy. It has mobilized mass support by leveraging human rights concerns, particularly enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and economic marginalization. Unlike its predecessors, such as BSO-Azad (which was banned) and the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (which lost its appeal), BYC has successfully positioned itself as a successor movement, offering separatist actors a renewed platform that operates within the domain of activism rather than outright militancy.

The Pakistani state has responded to BYC with a mix of security measures and administrative restrictions. This includes banning its fundraising activities under the Balochistan Charities Act, arresting key figures during protests, and placing leaders like Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sibghatullah Shah under the Fourth Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The

government has also accused BYC of being financially backed by smuggling networks along the Pakistan-Iran border, highlighting economic dimensions to its mobilization. These allegations align with intelligence findings that indicate BYC's ties to illicit trade networks seeking to pressure authorities into easing border controls.

Beyond domestic financial networks, allegations of foreign influence have further shaped state perceptions of BYC. Official statements suggest that India, along with certain Western actors, has attempted to exploit BYC's activism to weaken Pakistan's internal stability and challenge strategic projects like CPEC. However, while the perception of foreign funding exists, open-source evidence remains inconclusive.

This paper argues that the state's response to BYC must go beyond conventional security measures. A balanced strategy combining political engagement, financial oversight, and intelligence-driven security interventions is necessary to curb its expansion without reinforcing its victimhood narrative. Given BYC's unregistered status, the state should consider compelling it to register as a legal entity, facilitating formal financial regulation while quietly restricting any foreign funding streams.

As the first detailed academic profile of BYC, this research fills a critical gap in understanding the organization's structure, objectives, and operational strategies. By dissecting BYC's evolution, analyzing its financial dependencies, and evaluating state responses, this study provides a strategic framework for policymakers seeking to contain its influence without exacerbating separatist sentiments.

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1 Introduction

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has gained significant traction in recent years as a non-militant but politically assertive organization advocating for Baloch rights, justice, and autonomy. Unlike traditional Baloch nationalist groups, BYC has adopted a unique approach that blends grassroots activism, digital mobilization, and international lobbying efforts. The movement's rise is closely linked to the decline of earlier platforms such as BSO-Azad and the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), which either faced state suppression or lost momentum over time. BYC has successfully rebranded separatist activism, making it more accessible to students, women, and civil society actors who were previously not at the forefront of Baloch nationalist movements.

What distinguishes BYC from previous separatist-linked movements is its strong female leadership, particularly figures like Dr. Mahrang Baloch, who have played a critical role in shaping the organization's narrative and media presence. BYC has strategically positioned itself as a human rights movement, focusing on enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and economic marginalization. However, the Pakistani state views BYC as a proxy entity serving broader separatist and anti-state agendas, with allegations of foreign funding and links to smuggling cartels fueling concerns over its role in destabilizing the region.

The state's response to BYC has been multifaceted, involving security crackdowns, financial restrictions, arrests of its activists, and legal action under counterterrorism laws. Several BYC leaders have been placed under the Fourth

Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, limiting their movement, financial transactions, and public activities. Furthermore, Pakistani intelligence agencies have linked BYC's financial backing to illicit cross-border trade networks along the Pakistan-Iran border, reinforcing the argument that BYC is not merely an activist organization but an entity with economic and geopolitical implications.

This study aims to provide a comprehensive academic profile of BYC, examining its historical evolution, ideological positioning, financial structure, and mobilization strategies. Using Relative Deprivation Theory and the Proxy Warfare Model, this paper analyzes how separatist elements have adapted their strategies to sustain their influence through non-militant platforms like BYC. The research further evaluates the effectiveness of the government's countermeasures and proposes alternative strategies for dealing with BYC in a way that neutralizes its influence without legitimizing its activism.

This paper seeks to answer the following key research questions:

1. How has BYC evolved from a human rights-based movement into a politically assertive entity with separatist alignments?
2. What role does female leadership play in BYC's mobilization strategy, and how has it influenced its public perception?
3. To what extent do allegations of foreign funding and smuggling networks influence BYC's operations?

4. What measures should the state adopt to counter BYC's activities without exacerbating the grievances that fuel its support?

By addressing these questions, this research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of BYC, moving beyond simplified narratives to provide a strategic framework for policymakers, analysts, and security experts.

2 Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research approach, utilizing a combination of primary and secondary sources to analyze the rise, activities, and implications of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC). Given the sensitive nature of the subject matter, this research relies on a multi-source data collection strategy, including open-sources, media monitoring, expert consultations, and direct interactions with key stakeholders.

Data Collection Sources and Methods

The research is based on formal and informal interaction with subject matter experts and key stakeholders

2.1 Social Media and Digital Monitoring

The study extensively monitored BYC's official and affiliated social media accounts to analyze its narrative-building strategies, mobilization efforts, leadership rhetoric, and engagement with local and international audiences. The monitoring focused on:

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- a. BYC's public statements, protests, and calls for action on platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.
- b. Messaging trends and patterns used to frame grievances and demands.
- c. Interaction with separatist elements, sympathizers, and international advocacy groups.

2.2 Pro-Separatist Media Analysis

To understand BYC's ideological positioning and media outreach, the study analyzed pro-separatist digital newspapers and publications, including:

- a. The Balochistan Post, a key online platform that regularly publishes content on BYC and Baloch nationalist movements.
- b. Zrumbush, a Baloch nationalist media outlet that provides insights into separatist narratives.
- c. Other separatist-aligned media sources that provide firsthand coverage of BYC's activities.

This analysis provided critical insights into how separatist-aligned media outlets portray BYC, its stance on government policies, and its connections with militant groups.

2.3 Literature of Baloch Separatist and Militant Groups

A significant part of this study involved monitoring and reviewing literature from Baloch separatist militant organizations, including:

- a. Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)
- b. Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)

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- c. Other militant factions with a history of insurgency in Balochistan.

The objective of this analysis was to examine the ideological and strategic overlap between BYC and these groups, as well as their shared grievances and operational linkages. This approach helped in evaluating whether BYC functions as an independent entity or as an extension of separatist militancy.

2.4 Interviews with Key Stakeholders

To complement open-source research, unstructured interviews were conducted with individuals who possess firsthand knowledge of Balochistan's political and security dynamics. These included:

- a. Local political leaders in Balochistan, providing perspectives on BYC's political aspirations and its impact on provincial politics.
- b. Government officials, offering insights into state policies, negotiations, and counterinsurgency approaches toward BYC.
- c. Security forces and intelligence officials, sharing assessments of BYC's organizational structure, its affiliations with militant groups, and its role in regional instability.
- d. Experts on the Balochistan conflict, including researchers, journalists, and think-tank analysts, who provided academic and analytical perspectives on BYC's emergence and activities.

These interviews, while conducted in an unstructured format, allowed for flexibility in discussions, enabling respondents to share insights beyond standard discourse. However, due to the sensitive nature of the topic, confidentiality was maintained for interviewees where necessary.

E. Analysis of Government and BYC Statements

The study also analyzed official statements from:

- a. The Government of Pakistan, including statements from federal and provincial authorities regarding BYC's activities, negotiations, and legal status.
- b. BYC's official press releases, speeches, and documents, providing direct insights into its self-proclaimed objectives, grievances, and demands.

This comparative analysis of government narratives versus BYC's public stance enabled a more balanced evaluation of the organization's role and the broader geopolitical dynamics at play.

Research Limitations

While this research incorporates multiple sources and perspectives, some limitations remain:

- a. Limited access to BYC's internal decision-making processes due to the group's restricted and opaque operations.
- b. Risk of bias in separatist and pro-state narratives, requiring careful cross-verification of information.

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- c. Challenges in verifying financial transactions and foreign connections, as such data is often classified or obscured.
- d. Due to financial constraints, all interviews for this study were conducted online or via telephone, and data was collected through open-source materials available online. While this approach ensured access to relevant information, the absence of field visits to remote areas of Balochistan, in-person interviews with local communities and stakeholders, and surveys assessing public perceptions of BYC in both rural and urban settings limited the study's ability to capture on-ground realities and firsthand narratives. Incorporating these elements could have provided greater depth, richer qualitative insights, and a more comprehensive understanding of BYC's influence and perception among different segments of the population.

Despite these challenges, triangulating data from diverse sources has ensured that this study maintains objectivity and analytical rigour, providing a comprehensive assessment of BYC's structure, activities, and strategic positioning.

3 Theoretical Framework

This study applies Relative Deprivation Theory and the Proxy Warfare Model to analyze the emergence, evolution, and strategic positioning of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC). These frameworks help explain BYC's grievances-driven mobilization and its alleged geopolitical entanglements, providing a structured lens to assess its activities and influence.

3.1 Relative Deprivation Theory

The Relative Deprivation Theory, developed by Ted Gurr (1970), argues that groups engage in political violence when they perceive a gap between their expectations and their actual socio-economic and political conditions. This perception of deprivation, rather than absolute poverty, fuels social unrest and rebellion.

3.2 Application to BYC

- a. BYC positions itself as a response to long-standing grievances in Balochistan, particularly in areas such as:
 - (1) Economic marginalization – Balochistan, despite being rich in natural resources, remains Pakistan's least developed province, with high levels of unemployment and limited infrastructure development.
 - (2) Political disenfranchisement – Many Baloch activists claim that their voices are excluded from national decision-making, and that provincial leaders are either ineffective or complicit in suppressing Baloch rights.

- (3) Human rights violations – BYC’s activism is largely built around the issue of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and military operations in Balochistan, which it frames as state repression against Baloch people.
- b. The economic and political disparities between Balochistan and the rest of Pakistan reinforce this sense of deprivation, making movements like BYC attractive to those seeking a platform to express frustration.
- c. Women’s participation in BYC is also significant. Given the traditional male dominance in Baloch nationalist movements, the emergence of female-led activism under BYC suggests an intensified perception of injustice that has extended beyond conventional political actors.

Relative Deprivation Theory explains why BYC has gained momentum, particularly among Baloch youth, students, and women, by providing an organized structure to channel their grievances into political activism.

3.3 Proxy Warfare Model

The Proxy Warfare Model, a widely used concept in international security studies, describes how states and non-state actors support insurgent or separatist movements in rival countries to destabilize them. This is often done through financial aid, ideological backing, media amplification, or direct material support.

3.4 Application to BYC

- a. BYC has been accused by Pakistani officials and security analysts of being a tool of Indian intelligence (RAW) and other anti-Pakistan actors.
- b. Allegations suggest that India channels funds to Baloch insurgent movements, including BYC, through the Baloch diaspora, particularly via the UAE and Iran.
- c. Foreign media and NGOs have provided consistent coverage of BYC's activities, framing them as a human rights struggle rather than a separatist movement, which aligns with the typical strategy in proxy conflicts—where external actors use soft power to influence political outcomes.

The strategic timing of BYC's protests further aligns with geopolitical interests:

- a. The December 2023 Long March to Islamabad coincided with increased Pakistani security operations against Baloch militants.
- b. The Gwadar protests and Baloch Raji Muchi (July 2024) took place at a time when Pakistan-China relations were strengthening through CPEC investments.
- c. BYC's anti-China rhetoric and focus on "econocide" by Chinese projects reflect broader geopolitical narratives that align with U.S. and Indian opposition to CPEC.

, BYC's leadership's engagement with international human rights forums—such as Dr. Mahrang Baloch's visit to Norway in May 2024—suggests an effort to internationalize the movement, a strategy often seen in proxy conflicts where non-state actors seek external validation.

By applying Relative Deprivation Theory, this study explains how BYC capitalizes on deep-seated grievances within Baloch society, using them to mobilize protests and political activism. Simultaneously, the Proxy Warfare Model helps contextualize the allegations of foreign support, showing how BYC's activities intersect with regional and international strategic interests.

This combined framework moves beyond simplistic narratives, providing a structured understanding of BYC's motivations and its geopolitical significance.

4 Literature Review

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) is a relatively new organization that has not yet been studied extensively in academic literature. However, its emergence aligns with broader themes in research on Baloch nationalism, separatist movements, ethnic conflicts, insurgency, foreign involvement, and information warfare. This section reviews key studies that provide a relevant framework for understanding BYC's role within these larger discussions. *Baloch Nationalism and Separatist Movements*

Baloch nationalism has historically been shaped by territorial identity, economic marginalization, and political grievances.¹ Scholars have argued that the Pakistani state's

¹ Akhtar, Nasreen. "Balochistan Conflict: Internal and International Dynamics." *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences* 37, no. 1 (2017): 190-202.

failure to integrate Balochistan has fueled recurring insurgencies and separatist demands.²

The Baloch nationalist movement has evolved from tribal uprisings in the mid-20th century to organized insurgencies led by groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).³ These groups have historically resisted state control and promoted separatist ideologies through both armed struggle and political mobilization.

While militant organizations have traditionally dominated Baloch separatism, BYC represents a non-militant, grassroots mobilization that channels Baloch grievances through protests and advocacy rather than armed resistance.⁴ The emergence of youth-led and women-led activism within Baloch nationalism indicates a strategic shift in separatist movements, positioning BYC as a unique player in the evolving conflict.

4.1 Ethnic Conflict and Identity Politics in Balochistan

Ethnic conflicts in Balochistan can be analyzed through primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism.⁵ Primordialists argue that Baloch nationalism is deeply rooted in historical identity and cultural distinctiveness, making it resistant to state-led integration efforts. Instrumentalists, however, highlight political and economic factors—

² Ibid

³ Iqbal, Jehanzeb. "Decoding Bots of Terrorism in Balochistan." Margalla Papers (2024): 63-77.

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

particularly resource exploitation and political exclusion—as the primary drivers of conflict.⁶

This perspective is particularly relevant to BYC, which frames its activism not only around nationalist ideology but also around immediate socio-political issues, such as enforced disappearances and economic injustices.⁷ BYC's discourse aligns with constructivist interpretations, where identity is shaped by contemporary political struggles rather than historical grievances alone.

4.2 The Role of Women in Separatist Movements

The involvement of women in separatist movements is an emerging research area, with global examples including the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Kurdish movement in the Middle East. In Balochistan, nationalist movements have traditionally been male-dominated, but recent activism, particularly through BYC and figures like Dr. Mahrang Baloch, signals a shift toward greater female participation.⁸

Ali et al. analyzed the linguistic and visual discourse of the Baloch Long March, revealing how protest placards and slogans function as tools of resistance.⁹ Their study highlights how language, imagery, and gender representation shape the perception of political activism. BYC's emphasis on women's leadership fits within this broader trend, using gendered

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Ali, Ghazala et al. "Text and Power: Unpacking the Discourse of Baloch Long March Posters Through Linguistic and Textual Analysis." *Education Genius Solutions* (2024).

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Ibid

narratives to attract media attention and international support.

4.3 Foreign Involvement and Information Warfare

The role of foreign states in Baloch insurgency and information warfare is a well-documented but contentious subject. Iqbal examines how Baloch nationalist militant organizations (BNMOs) use digital platforms to craft narratives that resonate with local and international audiences.¹⁰ He argues that propaganda networks systematically amplify separatist narratives while discrediting state narratives.

Chaudhary et al. highlight India's alleged involvement in online information warfare related to Balochistan, arguing that external actors use social media to manipulate public sentiment and fuel separatist discourse.¹¹ This study is particularly relevant to BYC's information dissemination strategy, as its digital activism and protest coverage align with broader patterns of online separatist mobilization.

Fair previously testified before the U.S. Congress on Balochistan, emphasizing the historical role of external actors in fueling Baloch separatism.¹² Although there is no direct evidence linking BYC to foreign sponsorship, its advocacy and outreach efforts align with tactics observed in externally backed movements.

¹⁰ Iqbal, Jehanzeb. "Decoding Bots of Terrorism in Balochistan." *Margalla Papers* (2024): 63-77.

¹¹ Chaudhary, Ayesha et al. "Information Warfare and Twitter: A Nexus of Indian Shadow Networks on the Balochistan Issue." *NDU Journal* (2024): 16-35.

¹² Fair, C. Christine. Testimony on Balochistan Before the U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, 2012.

The State's Counterinsurgency and Political Responses

The Pakistani state has historically relied on military operations and intelligence-led counterinsurgency measures to suppress Baloch separatism.¹³ However, its approach to non-militant groups like BYC remains ambiguous.

Akhtar discusses how Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategy has evolved to address both militant and non-militant actors.¹³ While militant groups face direct suppression, movements like BYC are managed through surveillance, political containment, and selective engagement. This nuanced approach reflects a shift in state policy, where non-violent separatist movements are tolerated to an extent, allowing the state to avoid further radicalization of Baloch youth.

4.4 Gaps in Existing Literature and Contribution of This Study

Despite extensive literature on Baloch nationalism, insurgency, and counterinsurgency, research on BYC as a distinct entity remains absent. This study contributes to the field by:

- a. Analyzing BYC as a non-militant but politically active entity within the Baloch separatist landscape.
- b. Examining BYC's strategic use of women's leadership and digital activism.

¹³ Akhtar, Nasreen. "Balochistan Conflict: Internal and International Dynamics." *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences* 37, no. 1 (2017): 190-202.

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- c. Investigating whether BYC's rhetoric aligns with foreign-backed separatist movements or represents an indigenous political evolution.
- d. Assessing how the state differentiates between militant and non-militant actors in its counterinsurgency approach.

By integrating empirical analysis with theoretical perspectives, this study broadens the understanding of contemporary separatist dynamics in Balochistan, moving beyond traditional narratives of armed insurgency.

5 Formation of BYC

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) emerged in mid-2020, originally known as the Bramsh Yakjehti Committee. The organization was initially formed in response to a tragic incident in May-June 2020, when a four-year-old girl named Bramsh was injured during an attack by an armed group led by Sameer Sabzal, widely suspected of being working for Pakistani security forces in Turbat with the support of security and political state representatives¹⁴. What began as a grassroots effort to demand justice for this minor soon evolved into a broader movement advocating for the rights of the Baloch people. The renaming of the Bramsh Yakjehti Committee to the Baloch Yakjehti Committee was not a mere coincidence but a calculated move that indicated a well-orchestrated plan to expand the organization's influence and objectives.

Over time, it became evident that the BYC was more than just a response to a single event; it was part of a larger strategy to create a new political front under the guise of human rights advocacy. The BYC quickly gained prominence, particularly as it became a platform for the growing participation of women in Baloch separatist politics. This shift marked a significant departure from earlier movements, such as the 'Voice for Baloch Missing Persons' led by Mama Qadeer. Unlike Mama Qadeer's organization, which has seen a decline in relevance due to various factors, including the actions of Pakistan's Missing Persons Commission and judicial

¹⁴ "WDF Stands with Little Bramsh - Women Democratic Front." 2020. Women Democratic Front. June 3, 2020. <https://wdfpk.org/2020/06/wdf-stands-with-little-bramsh/>.

interventions, the BYC was able to capitalize on the need for a renewed and more dynamic voice within the Baloch separatist movement.

From its inception in 2020 until June 2024, the BYC lacked a formal organizational structure. However, on June 13, 2024, this changed when Dr. Mahrang Baloch, along with other leaders, announced the establishment of a proper organizational framework during a press conference at the Karachi Press Club¹⁵. Dr. Mahrang Baloch was declared the Central Organizer of the BYC, with Lala Wahab as the Deputy Organizer. No other office bearers were announced at that time, signaling a potentially strategic approach to leadership and governance within the organization.

¹⁵ 2025. X (Formerly Twitter). 2025.
<https://x.com/BalochYakjehtiC/status/1801304511119597574>.

6 Organizational Structure:

As previously noted, from its inception in May 2020 until June 2024, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) operated without a formal organizational structure. This period of fluidity allowed the BYC to grow organically, but it also limited its capacity to exert coordinated influence. Recognizing the need for a more structured approach, the BYC convened a meeting in Karachi on June 12, 2024, where a formal structure was established¹⁶. This restructuring led to the creation of several key bodies within the organization.

At the top of the hierarchy is the Central Committee, also referred to as the Core Committee. This body is responsible for making strategic decisions and guiding the overall direction of the organization. Alongside the Central Committee, a Central Organizing Body was established, currently consisting of two key office bearers: the Central Organizer, Dr. Mahrang Baloch, and the Deputy Organizer, Lala Wahab. The creation of these positions reflects a shift towards a more defined leadership within the BYC.

Moreover, a Working Committee was formed to manage the day-to-day operations of the organization. This committee will oversee various departments, including media, finance, and social welfare, among others. During the same meeting, a provisional constitution and manifesto were adopted, providing a legal and ideological framework for the BYC's activities.

Further down the organizational structure are the zones. Each zone comprises several districts, although in some

¹⁶ Ibid

cases, a large district may constitute a zone on its own. These zones are essential for local governance and mobilization within the BYC. Each zone is empowered to form its own working committees and can nominate two members to the Central or Core Committee. Currently, the BYC has established 13 zones: Shal Zone (Quetta Zone), Kech Zone, Gwadar Zone, Kharan Zone, Turbat Zone, Chaghi Zone, Uthal Zone, Naseerabad Zone, Basima Zone, Kalat Zone, Hub Zone, Karachi Zone, and DG Khan Zone. Notably, the Karachi and DG Khan Zones are located outside Balochistan, reflecting the presence of a sizeable Baloch population in these areas. Each zone is further subdivided into smaller units, allowing for more granular organization. At the time of writing, the BYC's organizational structure is still evolving.

An interesting aspect of the BYC's organizational approach is its decision not to name a specific spokesperson. While the organization regularly issues statements, these are attributed simply to "the spokesperson" without mentioning any individual's name. This anonymity could be a strategic choice, aimed at protecting key figures within the organization

or maintaining a unified voice without elevating any single person above others.




Figure 1: Organogram of BYC

7 Leadership:

The leadership of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) consists of individuals who were already active in advocating for the rights of the Baloch people through various platforms before coming together under the BYC banner. This section details the key figures within the organization and their backgrounds.

Dr. Mahrang Baloch serves as the Central Organizer of the BYC. A medical doctor by profession, Dr. Mahrang hails from Mungocher in the Kalat District of Balochistan. Her involvement in activism began at a young age following the death of her father, Ghaffar Lango, in 2011. Pro Pakistan Baloch activists and government officials claim that he



Figure 2: Dr. Mahrang Baloch

was a member of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)¹⁷, a claim Dr. Mahrang denies. He was kidnapped by unknown people from Karachi and after 17 months, his mutilated dead body was found. Pakistani intelligence agencies were blamed for his death¹⁸. This personal tragedy fueled her commitment to the Baloch nationalist cause, and she has since been a prominent

¹⁷ Wali, Raashid. 2024. "Missing Persons the Reality." The Express Tribune. February 26, 2024. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2457582/missing-persons-the-reality>.

¹⁸ Fatima, Areeba. 2023. "Mahrang Baloch's Father Was Not a BLA Militant Leader - Soch Fact Check." Soch Fact Check. December 30, 2023. <https://www.sochfactcheck.com/mahrang-balochs-father-was-not-a-bla-militant-leader/>.

figure in protests against the Pakistani government and its security forces. Dr. Mahrang completed her medical education at Bolan Medical College in Quetta¹⁹ and has since balanced her professional and activist roles, becoming a leading voice in the BYC.



Figure 3: Lala Wahab Baloch

Lala Wahab Baloch, the Deputy Central Organizer of the BYC, has a longstanding history of activism centered around Baloch rights. Originating from the Turbat district, a hotbed of Baloch nationalist activity, Lala Wahab previously served as the Deputy Organizer of the BYC Karachi. His activism is deeply rooted in Karachi's Baloch communities,

where he has been involved in organizing peaceful protests and raising awareness about human rights violations in Balochistan. One of his notable efforts includes organizing a long march from Turbat to Islamabad to highlight the plight of the Baloch people. He was arrested in October 2024 but released later. Again he was arrested on January 18, 2025 at a BYC rally in Liyari Karachi.

¹⁹ "Mahrang Baloch." 2017. Hamariweb.com Profiles. 2017. https://hamariweb.com/profiles/mahrang-baloch_14568.

Dr. Sabiha Baloch is another prominent female leader within the BYC. Before joining the BYC, she served as the Vice Chairperson of the Baloch Student Action Committee (BSAC) ²⁰ . Hailing from the Khuzdar district, Dr. Sabiha has faced significant reprisals due to her activism, including the forced disappearance of her brother and



Figure 4: Dr. Sabiha Baloch

cousin, who were later released after three months of detention. Her contributions to human rights advocacy in Balochistan have been internationally recognized, earning her an award from Front Line Defenders ²¹ . Her experience in student politics is more than Dr. Mahrang Baloch. However, Dr. Mahrang got the center stage in BYC. Dr. Sabiha always wears Hijab (mask).

Sammi Deen Baloch , although not officially associated with the BYC, is a frequent presence at the organization's public gatherings and protests. She is a prominent advocate for Baloch rights, having dedicated over 15 years to



Figure 1: Sammi Deen Baloch

²⁰ 2025. X (Formerly Twitter). 2025.

https://x.com/BSAC_org/status/1888976469650755930.

²¹ "Dr. Sabiha Baloch." 2024. Front Line Defenders. July 30, 2024.

<https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/dr-sabiha-baloch>.

highlighting issues such as enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Her activism began after her father, Deen Muhammad Baloch, went missing in 2009 following his detention by Pakistani forces. Sources within Pakistani security forces claim that Deen Muhammad was a prominent leader of Baloch Liberation Front (BLF). They also accuse that Sammi Deen Baloch spent time in BLF camps²². Since Deen Muhammad Baloch was a friend of Dr. Allah Nazar and played a crucial role in formation of BLF, some people see Sammi's struggle as cover story for her father's association with a militant group, while the others believe that Dr Deen Muhammad was picked up by intelligence agencies 15 years ago and his fate is unknown.

Sammi is another Baloch female leader who got support from international NGOs. In 2024, she was awarded the prestigious



Figure 5: Sibghatullah Shah, Central Leader of BYC

Front Line Defenders Award in Ireland and the Asia Pacific Human Rights Award for her unwavering commitment to human rights²³.

Sibagatullah Shah Jee is another key figure in the BYC leadership. He hails from the Kech district of Balochistan and is the son of the late religious scholar Maulana Abdul Haq. Initially associated

²² 2025. X (Formerly Twitter). 2025.

<https://x.com/AsfandBhattani/status/1320441302660644867>.

²³ "Sammi Deen Baloch." 2024. Front Line Defenders. May 28, 2024.

<https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/sammi-deen-baloch>.

with Jamaat-e-Islami, Shah Jee made a significant political shift in July 2023, when he refused a party ticket and declared that participating in elections under the Pakistani government was a betrayal to the Baloch people.²⁴ His involvement in the Haq Do (Give Our Rights) Movement, led by Jamaat-e-Islami leader Maulana Hidayat ur Rahman, further solidified his stance.

The BYC's leadership is predominantly female, with Dr. Mahrang, Dr. Sabiha, and Sammi Deen Baloch being the most prominent names. However, there are other influential figures within the organization, including Saira Baloch, Hafeez Baloch, and Arif Baloch. Although the names of the Core Committee members have not yet been publicly revealed, it is expected that many of these leaders will play significant roles as the BYC continues to evolve. As the organization grows, it is likely that new faces will emerge, further shaping the leadership landscape of the BYC.

²⁴ | ایڈمن. 2023. "سیغت اللہ بلوچ کا جماعت اسلامی کا نامزدگی لیٹر لینے سے انکار the Balochistan Post." The Balochistan Post. July 25, 2023. <https://thebalochistanpost.com/2023/07/%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%DB%81-%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%DA%86-%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%AF/>.

8 Major Activities:

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has swiftly risen as a prominent political platform for Baloch individuals who are ideologically aligned with separatist sentiments and oppose state policies. While the BYC regularly organizes protest rallies on various issues concerning the rights of the Baloch people, three major events have significantly heightened the organization's profile: the Long March to Islamabad in December 2023, the Baloch Raji Muchi (Baloch National Gathering) in Gwadar from July 28 to August 9, 2024 and Baloch Raji Muchi (Baloch National Gathering) on January 25, 2025 as Baloch Genocide Remembrance Day at Dalbandin²⁵.

The Long March from Turbat to Islamabad marked a pivotal moment in BYC's activism. Beginning in Turbat, a district deeply embedded in Baloch nationalist sentiments, the marchers undertook a grueling journey to Pakistan's federal capital, Islamabad. This event, which took place in December 2023, was more than just a protest; it was a demonstration of the group's resolve and its capacity to mobilize support across great distances. Upon reaching Islamabad, BYC activists staged a sit-in outside the Islamabad Press Club, enduring harsh winter conditions for several weeks. The prolonged protest drew significant media attention, placing BYC firmly in the national spotlight. The protest eventually concluded after negotiations with government authorities, but the impact of the march and the subsequent sit-in left an indelible mark,

²⁵ 2025. X (Formerly Twitter). 2025.

<https://x.com/BalochYakjehtiC/status/1884228748356300805>.

signaling BYC's emergence as a formidable force within Baloch activism.

Following the momentum from the Islamabad protests, the BYC formally announced its organizational structure on June 13, 2024. Just a few weeks later, on June 26, 2024, the organization announced plans for a major event, the Baloch Raji Muchi (Baloch National Gathering), scheduled to take place on July 28, 2024. The selection of Gwadar as the venue was strategic; Gwadar is not only a city of immense significance due to its connection to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) but also a focal point of Baloch nationalist grievances regarding resource exploitation and marginalization.

In the lead-up to the Baloch Raji Muchi, BYC successfully mobilized supporters across Balochistan, drawing large crowds that alarmed security forces. Tensions escalated, leading to clashes between BYC activists and security personnel, which resulted in the deaths of at least four individuals, including a Frontier Corps (FC) soldier. Security forces accused BYC of deliberately provoking these clashes to garner public sympathy. In response, BYC transformed the Baloch National Gathering into a Dharna (sit-in), which lasted from July 28 to August 9, 2024, in Gwadar.²⁶ The sit-in further intensified the standoff between BYC and the state, drawing widespread attention both within and outside Balochistan.

After prolonged negotiations, BYC eventually called off the Dharna, but the momentum generated by the event did

²⁶ Baloch, Behram. 2024. "Gwadar Sit-in Called Off, but Movement to Continue, Says Mahrang." DAWN.COM. August 10, 2024. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1851265>.

not dissipate. Instead, BYC leaders began a strategic journey toward Quetta, the provincial capital, organizing rallies in various cities along the way. One of the most significant rallies took place in Turbat, where thousands of supporters gathered to welcome the BYC leadership. This massive show of support further solidified BYC's influence and demonstrated its ability to rally the Baloch populace.

Through these major activities, particularly the Long March to Islamabad and the Baloch Raji Muchi in Gwadar, the BYC has not only become a household name but also a central player in the ongoing discourse surrounding Baloch rights and state policies in Balochistan. These events have positioned the BYC as a critical voice in the region, one that cannot be ignored by either the Pakistani government or international observers.

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has remained active in mobilizing large-scale gatherings, protests, and demonstrations across Balochistan, asserting its role as a key political and social force within the province. Its recent activities reflect a pattern of mass mobilization, resistance against state policies, and an emphasis on human rights advocacy.

One of the most significant recent events organized by BYC was the Baloch Raji Muchi (Baloch National Gathering) held on January 25, 2025, in Dalbandin. The gathering drew thousands of participants from different parts of Balochistan, marking the second high-profile event of its kind within six months, following the Gwadar Raji Muchi in July 2024. In the lead-up to the event, internet services were shut down, and authorities attempted to restrict public participation. However, despite these measures, a large turnout was

observed at the venue. Unlike the Gwadar Raji Muchi, which was marred by tensions and state interventions, the Dalbandin gathering proceeded peacefully. This event reinforced BYC's ability to mobilize significant support, despite administrative restrictions and surveillance measures.

In addition to large-scale public gatherings, BYC frequently organizes smaller protests across Balochistan to address various political and human rights concerns. A recent example is the coordinated series of protests on February 9, 2025, which were held in multiple cities to condemn enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and alleged state repression in Balochistan. These protests were framed around BYC's claim of an ongoing "Baloch genocide" and systemic targeting of scholars, students, and activists.

The series of protests and demonstrations organized by BYC reflects its growing influence and ability to coordinate synchronized resistance across Balochistan. The BYC leadership frames these activities as part of an ongoing struggle for justice and human rights, calling upon both national and international human rights organizations to intervene.

In its official statements, BYC reiterates its commitment to exposing what it describes as state-sponsored violence and continues to mobilize support against enforced disappearances and extrajudicial actions. As the organization expands its reach, the state's response to its increasing activism remains a key factor in determining its future trajectory.

9 BYC Just a Rights Movement or Key Driver of Separatist Narrative?

Since the banning of the Baloch Students Organization Azad (BSO-Azad), separatist elements in Balochistan have lacked a platform to openly challenge the Pakistani state and promote their separatist ideologies. For years, separatist leaders sought to establish a political front that could serve as a vehicle for their cause, providing a space to operate within a broader political framework while continuing to challenge the state's authority. The emergence of BYC (Baloch Yakjehti Committee) appears to be a strategic response to this need.

The need for such a platform became increasingly apparent as movements like the Haq Do Tehreek (Give Rights Movement), led by Moulana Hidayat ur Rahman, began gaining traction in the coastal areas of Balochistan. However, Haq Do Tehreek, though popular, did not align with separatist ideologies. The movement was primarily focused on advocating for the rights of people in and around Gwadar within the framework of Pakistan's laws and constitution, with its leadership tied to the Jamaat-e-Islami, a party that does not espouse separatist views. As such, Haq Do Tehreek did not serve the purposes of separatist leaders seeking a platform for their ideologies.

In this context, BYC was established as a new platform with a well-crafted strategy that notably places women at the forefront, aiming to attract the sympathies and support of the broader Baloch population. This focus on female leadership is a deliberate move, intended to draw attention to the movement and gain broader acceptance within a conservative

society where women's involvement in political activism is often viewed as a symbol of moral righteousness.

BYC's rallies in Balochistan have often been marked by the presence of masked men, purportedly affiliated with banned militant organizations. These masked individuals are a frequent sight at BYC events, adding an element of intimidation and mystery. Additionally, posters and placards displaying images of killed militants from groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and its Majeed Brigade are prominently featured at BYC rallies signaling the organization's ideological alignment with these militant factions.



Figure 6: Mysterious masked men in BYC rally in Kech on August 10, 2024. The rally was addressed by Dr Mahrang Baloch and other BYC leaders

BYC is also accused of promoting exaggerated accounts of missing persons. Verifiable incidents have been witnessed that those who were portrayed as 'missing persons' in BYC rallies turned out to be hardcore militants. One such example is Wadood Satakzai whose posters as missing person were

seen in BYC rallies but he was part of the BLA's Majeed Brigade and took part in an attack on Mach city in January 2024. BLA officially released his biography in February 2024²⁷.

BYC's leaders have also refrained from condemning the violent activities of the BLA, BLF (Balochistan Liberation Front), and other similar groups, further indicating the organization's sympathies with these separatist elements. Another BLA Majeed Brigades suicide bomber Kareem Jan Baloch was even listed with the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED) but he participated in an attack in Gwadar on March 20, 2024. BLA officially claimed his association with the organization²⁸.

BYC has thus evolved into a platform where various separatist groups and organizations can coalesce, combining their efforts in pursuit of a common cause. The organization enjoys the full support of entities like the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), various factions of BSO, including BSO Azad, the Baloch National Movement (BNM), and even some sub-nationalist groups that participate in politics within the framework of Pakistan's constitution, such as the Balochistan National Party (BNP) and the National Party. Zakir Abdur Razaq was another so-called missing person who was later killed in fight against Pakistani forces in Panjgur. Adil was

مدیر۔ 2024۔ "شہدائے آپریشن درہ بولان کی لازوال قربانی ربتی تاریخ میں امر رہیگی۔ February 2, 2024. بی ایل اے - زرمیش اردو۔" زرمیش اردو - راہ آزادی <https://urdu.zrumbesh.com/1963/>.

مدیر۔ 2024۔ "گواہ میں آپریشن زر پہاڑ کے تحت پاکستانی فوج کے 25 سے زائد اہلکار ہلاک کر کے مجید بریگیڈ کے 8 فدائین شہید ہو گئے - بی ایل اے - زرمیش اردو۔" March 20, 2024. <https://urdu.zrumbesh.com/3064/>. زرمیش اردو - راہ آزادی

another missing person for whom a social media campaign was launched but later BLF released a poster admiring him as ‘martyr’. These were just few examples, there are other cases too where militants were declared missing persons in BYC’s rallies.

One of BYC’s most significant sources of support comes from the Baloch Student Councils present in major universities across Pakistan. During BYC’s sit-in in Islamabad during the winter of 2023, members of the Baloch Student Council in Islamabad’s universities played a crucial role in organizing and administering the protest, as well as in raising funds. According to some sources, Baloch students managed to collect over one million Pakistani rupees to support the sit-in.²⁹ In addition to the Baloch Student Councils, BYC also enjoys the backing of the Baloch Students Action Committee (BSAC). Many experts view BYC as an extension of BSAC, expanding its influence beyond student politics and into broader social and political arenas. Notably, many of BYC’s leaders were previously associated with BSAC, suggesting a continuity of leadership and ideology between the two organizations.

In one of her speeches in Quetta, Mahrang Baloch takes a separatist tone when she says that we have to tire Pakistan military. She also said that the ‘war’ is not just limited to mountains, it is everywhere in every house³⁰. Despite killings

²⁹ Interview with a BYC-affiliated activist, location withheld for security reasons, January 22, 2025

³⁰ 2025. X (Formerly Twitter). 2025.

<https://x.com/MrPakistani89/status/1889967569890857102>.

of innocent people by the militants, BYC leaders seldom condemn any of such incidents.

In short, BYC appears to have been established as a calculated response to the separatist movement's need for a new platform that could openly challenge the state while uniting various factions under a common banner. Through its strategic positioning of women in leadership roles, its alignment with militant ideologies, and its ability to mobilize support across different sectors of Baloch society, BYC has rapidly become a focal point for separatist activism in Balochistan.

10 A Human Rights Group or Heir to Militants? Navigating BYC's Dual Identity

One of the most recent and telling developments reflecting the controversial posture of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) emerged in the aftermath of the Jaffar Express hijacking incident in March 2025. On March 11, 2025, militants affiliated with the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) hijacked the Jaffar Express in the Mashkaf area of Bolan, taking hostage over 200 passengers, a large number of whom were armed forces personnel traveling to their hometowns on vacation. In the ensuing rescue operation by Pakistani security forces, at least 33 militants were killed. Some of the bodies were transported to Civil Hospital Quetta for identification, including five unclaimed corpses³¹.

³¹ Report, Dawn. 2025. "Protesters Take Away Bodies from Quetta Hospital Morgue." DAWN.COM. March 21, 2025. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1899300>.

In a move that raised serious questions regarding BYC's alignment and intentions, Dr. Mahrang Baloch, BYC's Chief Organizer, accompanied by a group of activists, appeared at the hospital and demanded the release of these bodies, despite having no legal authority or familial connection to claim them. The protest led by BYC insisted that these bodies may belong to "missing persons," even though hospital authorities and local police clarified that they were the remains of militants killed during the operation. Rather than deferring to official procedures, the BYC activists forcefully removed the corpses, prompting a swift response from law enforcement ³². Although police later claimed to have recovered the bodies from the protestors, the incident highlights a strategic ambiguity in BYC's public behavior and messaging.

The government's position was rooted in the concern that killed militants may be publicly glorified, as has occurred in the past when such individuals were buried and venerated as martyrs. The protest at the hospital culminated in the arrest of several BYC leaders, including Dr. Mahrang Baloch, Sabiha Baloch, Sibghatullah Shah Jee, and Gulzadi Baloch. As of April 15, 2025, these individuals remained in custody for their involvement in this particular incident.

What further complicates BYC's narrative is its selective silence. Despite the high-profile nature of the protest and

³² Abdullah Zehri. 2025. "Balochistan Police Official Questions BYC's Legitimacy." DAWN.COM. April 2, 2025.
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1901651>.

arrests, BYC's official X (formerly Twitter) handle made no mention of the hospital protest or the militant corpses. Instead, their public narrative appeared to reframe the episode as a protest against the arrest of another BYC figure, Bebag Baloch, who had been detained days before the Jaffar Express incident. This conspicuous omission suggests an intentional distancing from actions that might explicitly link BYC with fallen militants, particularly in the eyes of the international community, while simultaneously projecting solidarity with militant elements to domestic audiences.

Such duality in public messaging reinforces concerns that BYC is not merely a rights-based advocacy group but a key enabler of separatist narratives, carefully navigating between international human rights discourses and domestic political symbolism. The hospital incident underscores how BYC's actions can blur the lines between civilian activism and indirect support for militant actors, thereby deepening the ambiguity about its true ideological alignment.

11 Economic Interests and Political Activism: The Alleged BYC-Smuggling Connection

The relationship between the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and smuggling networks in Balochistan has been a subject of increasing scrutiny. During the course of this research, multiple independent sources, including security officials and local stakeholders in Balochistan, indicated a convergence of interests between BYC and powerful smuggling cartels operating along the Pakistan-Iran border. While BYC presents itself as a grassroots political movement advocating for Baloch rights and justice, evidence suggests that smuggling networks have provided financial and logistical support to the organization.

Pakistan has imposed strict restrictions on smuggling activities, particularly the illegal trade of Iranian fuel, which has historically been a multi-billion rupee business. However, despite these efforts, Iranian fuel continues to be widely available on the black market, even reaching major cities such as Islamabad and Lahore. According to sources interviewed for this study, smugglers have sought to align themselves with BYC, viewing its activism as a mechanism to apply pressure on Pakistani authorities to ease border restrictions. Interviewees suggested that smuggling networks play an instrumental role in supporting BYC's political mobilization by funding its activities, assisting with logistics for protests, and helping to mobilize large crowds for demonstrations. While BYC has organically attracted the support of Baloch youth, students, and political activists, the role of smuggling cartels in strengthening BYC's presence cannot be overlooked. Several narratives promoted by BYC emphasize the economic impact

of border closures, aligning with the interests of smuggling networks that seek to maintain the flow of illicit goods across the border.

In a further complication of the security landscape, some government officials, including elements within Pakistani security forces allegedly involved in smuggling, have been reported to tacitly support BYC's activities. Multiple background interviews suggest that certain security officials engaged in illicit trade view BYC's activism as beneficial, as it indirectly challenges policies that restrict smuggling operations. These claims, while difficult to verify comprehensively, highlight the complexity of economic and political alliances in the region.

The alignment between BYC and smuggling interests was further evident during campaign speeches ahead of the Baloch National Gathering in July 2024. BYC leaders strongly criticized Pakistan's border control policies, arguing that these restrictions disproportionately affect the livelihoods of impoverished Baloch communities. While BYC frames this as an economic justice issue, critics argue that such rhetoric indirectly reinforces the agenda of smuggling cartels, which have a vested interest in minimizing state regulation of cross-border trade.

The connection between BYC and smuggling networks reflects a broader intersection of economic interests and political activism. Given the limited formal economic opportunities in Balochistan, many individuals rely on smuggling as a primary source of income, and the practice is often not perceived as illegal at the local level. However, the economic entanglement of BYC with smuggling cartels raises

concerns about the financial and political dynamics driving the organization's activism. While BYC continues to position itself as a social and political resistance movement, the influence of external economic actors, particularly those involved in cross-border illicit trade, adds another layer of complexity to its operations. This relationship further complicates governance and security efforts in Balochistan, making it a critical issue for policymakers seeking to balance economic stability with law enforcement priorities.

12 External Influences and Allegations of Foreign Support

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has been the subject of growing speculation regarding its alleged links to foreign actors, with Pakistani government officials and pro-state activists viewing the organization as an Indian proxy promoting an anti-Pakistan agenda in Balochistan. Official sources claim that BYC receives financial support from India, allegedly funneled through the Baloch diaspora in the Middle East, Europe, and America. It has been suggested that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran serve as primary routes for financial transfers, where networks linked to India's intelligence agency, RAW, reportedly operate using multiple fronts to coordinate funding and activities. The special coverage given to BYC's activities in Indian media further contributes to the perception of an Indian connection.

Beyond Indian involvement, Pakistani official sources have also pointed to alleged backing from Western countries, particularly those critical of Pakistan's strategic alliance with China under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The recent European visit of Dr. Mahrang Baloch, BYC's Central Organizer, in May 2024 has been cited in this context. During her trip to Norway, she attended various human rights forums, including the World Expression Forum in Oslo, where she spoke on issues concerning Balochistan. This international exposure has elevated her profile as a representative of Baloch concerns, reinforcing speculation that BYC receives political and financial support from foreign entities.

Moreover, the recent announcement by the United States to allocate over 100 million dollars toward promoting

democracy in Pakistan and reducing the country's economic dependence on China has also been referenced in discussions about BYC's external links. Given BYC's active stance against Pakistani state policies and its ability to mobilize support within Balochistan, some analysts speculate that the organization could be seen as an actor aligned with broader Western geopolitical interests.

While conclusive evidence of direct foreign funding remains unavailable in open-source data, the perception of external influence on BYC persists within state institutions and nationalist circles. The organization's strong media outreach, international engagements, and positioning against state policies are viewed as aligning with broader geopolitical strategies aimed at countering Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy objectives. These allegations, however, remain a matter of political contention, further complicating the discourse surrounding BYC's activism and its role within the Baloch nationalist landscape.

13 China Factor

Beyond advocating for the rights of the people of Balochistan, one constant theme in all Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) rallies, meetings, gatherings, and literature is their strong anti-China sentiment. This anti-China stance is particularly pronounced concerning China-led projects in



Figure 7: BYC Broucher about anti-China Conference in Quetta on May 18, 2024

Balochistan. Over the past four years, BYC's activities have increasingly focused on Gwadar, the hub of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In 2024, The Gawadar Baloch National Gathering, initially planned as a one-day event, was extended into a two-week sit-in in Gwadar. This protest was strategically timed

to disrupt the official inauguration of Gwadar International Airport on Pakistan's Independence Day. However, the sit-in failed to maintain a significant presence, leading BYC to call off the protest, claiming that the government had accepted its demands.

Baloch Yakjehti Committee: Structure, Influence, And State Response

In its criticism of China, BYC has coined the term "econocide," accusing the Pakistani state of committing genocide against the Baloch people while China is allegedly engaged in an "econocide" of the Baloch population. BYC frames China-run projects as part of a broader colonization effort in Balochistan, labeling these initiatives as "imperialist mega projects" that threaten the survival of the Baloch nation. This anti-China narrative aligns closely with that of Baloch militant groups, reflecting a shared opposition to Chinese influence in the region.

While the Pakistani government portrays China as a friend and benefactor to the people of Balochistan, BYC's narrative has successfully tarnished China's image in the province. The lack of visible Chinese presence in Balochistan through social welfare projects, independent of government initiatives, has contributed to the effectiveness



Figure 8: Another Statement by BYC against CPEC and China issued on May 11, 2024

of BYC's anti-China rhetoric. A more proactive Chinese engagement in Balochistan, particularly in the form of social welfare activities, could have countered this narrative and improved China's public perception in the region.

BYC's opposition to China extends beyond mere rhetoric; the organization actively promotes scholarly discourse on the subject. For instance, on May 18, 2024, BYC organized a full-day academic conference on the fencing of Gwadar at the Quetta Press Club. Farzana Baloch, one of the conference's key speakers, outlined the event's objectives: to spark scholarly debate on Gwadar's fencing, strategize resistance methods, assess socio-economic and political impacts, and examine the legal and international laws related to the port city's fencing.

Notable speakers included Mir Muhammad Ali Talpur, who presented a paper titled "CPEC, Gwadar Fencing, and its Geopolitical Impact on Balochistan." He argued that CPEC is the primary catalyst for Gwadar's fencing and that the mega project has been detrimental to the Baloch people. A panel discussion followed, focusing on strategies to resist Gwadar's fencing. Shahgi expressed concern that the fence would severely impact the local population's access to the sea, their primary livelihood source. Dr. Sabiha Baloch condemned the state's alleged plans to turn Gwadar into a "mega-prison" for its native population, while Dr. Manzoor Baloch stressed the need for more research and scholarly work on Balochistan's issues, including the fencing of Gwadar.

Another panel discussion centered on "CPEC and the Militarization of Gwadar." Abira Ashfaq argued that Gwadar's fencing constitutes crimes of apartheid and genocide,

suggesting that the Baloch could take their case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Advocate Hafeez Baloch criticized the lack of transparency in Balochistan's mega projects, describing them as neo-colonialist endeavors benefiting only Pakistan's military establishment and feudal elite.

Through such academic and public engagements, BYC has not only galvanized local opposition to Chinese projects but has also contributed to an emerging narrative that frames China's role in Balochistan as exploitative and harmful, resonating with broader anti-colonial and human rights discourses.

14 State Response & Policy Measures

In an August 6, 2024, press conference in Rawalpindi, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Lt. General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry stated that the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) functions as a proxy for terrorist organizations and criminal mafias operating in Balochistan. He accused BYC of deliberately maligning law enforcement agencies, spreading anti-state propaganda, and fueling controversies surrounding developmental projects in the province. According to Chaudhry, BYC has adopted foreign narratives, engaged in tactics to mislead civilians, and sought to challenge state authority while portraying itself as a victim on international platforms. He referenced recent protests and sit-ins in Gwadar as part of this strategy and asserted that despite ongoing negotiations between the government and BYC, the organization continued to instigate public demonstrations across multiple cities in Balochistan.³³

A significant aspect of Chaudhry's statement was his mention of BYC's links to the "illegal spectrum", a term used to describe smuggling networks, illicit trade, and other unauthorized economic activities along the Pakistan-Iran border. This aligns with findings from the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), which, through its own research, identified BYC's connections to smuggling cartels that seek to use the movement to pressure authorities into

³³ Our Correspondent. 2024. "BYC Is a Proxy of Terrorists Says ISPR." The Express Tribune. August 5, 2024.
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2485855/byc-is-a-proxy-of-terrorists-says-ispr>.

easing border restrictions. The ISPR chief's remarks reinforced concerns that economic interests tied to illicit trade have played a role in sustaining BYC's mobilization capacity, allowing the organization to fund its activities, organize mass gatherings, and extend its influence beyond mere advocacy.

Chaudhry further emphasized that the state had successfully re-established its authority in Gwadar despite persistent unrest, signaling the government's commitment to maintaining control over the region and countering BYC's influence. His statement reflects a broader security perspective on BYC, framing it as an entity that not only challenges state policies but also serves as a tool for actors involved in illegal economic activities and anti-state elements.

In July 2024, the Deputy Commissioner of Gwadar, Hamood Rehman, issued a notice warning citizens against unlawful fundraising activities, referencing Sections 18 and 20 of the Balochistan Charities Act 2019 and relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code. This action was taken in anticipation of the Baloch Raji Muchi event organized by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC). The notice emphasized that no unregistered or illegal organization would be permitted to collect donations unlawfully. Similarly, the Assistant Commissioner of Tump, under directives from the Deputy Commissioner of Kech, issued a notification banning the collection of donations by unregistered entities, citing Section 18 of the same Act.³⁴

³⁴ "Deputy Commissioner Gwadar Warns against 'Unlawful' Fundraising for Baloch Raji Muchi | the Balochistan Post." The Balochistan Post. July 23, 2024. https://thebalochistanpost.net/2024/07/deputy-commissioner-gwadar-warns-against-unlawful-fundraising-for-baloch-raji-muchi/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

In a related development, the Balochistan government has placed the names of several individuals, including BYC leaders Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sibghatullah Shah, on the Fourth Schedule under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Inclusion in the Fourth Schedule designates individuals as proscribed persons, imposing restrictions such as passport embargoes, freezing of bank accounts, bans on financial support and credit, arms license embargoes, and employment clearance restrictions. This move reflects the government's stance on monitoring and regulating entities and individuals it deems associated with activities contrary to national security interests.³⁵

The Balochistan government has adopted a policy of calculated restraint towards the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), balancing between maintaining law and order and avoiding exacerbation of tensions in the province. Over time, the government signed three separate agreements with BYC on various issues, hoping to address grievances through dialogue and negotiation. However, Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti has publicly stated that BYC has repeatedly violated these agreements, undermining the government's efforts to maintain peace.³⁶

Despite these violations, the Balochistan government has continued to extend invitations to BYC leaders for talks,

³⁵ Shahid, Saleem. 2024. "Dozens Put on Fourth Schedule in Balochistan." DAWN.COM. September 10, 2024.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1858032?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

³⁶ News Desk. 2024. "Balochistan CM Accuses BYC of Creating Unrest under Guise of Protests." The Express Tribune. August 15, 2024. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2488215/balochistan-cm-accuses-byc-of-creating-unrest-under-guise-of-protests>.

signaling a willingness to resolve issues through peaceful means.³⁷ This approach highlights the government's recognition of the complex socio-political dynamics in Balochistan, where outright repression could lead to further alienation of the Baloch populace.

Chief Minister Bugti has also condemned BYC's activities, particularly those involving the removal of Pakistan's national flag from government buildings and the hoisting of the 'Independent Balochistan' flag. Such actions have crossed a significant red line for the government, which has made it clear that while it is open to dialogue, it will not tolerate any activities that challenge Pakistan's territorial integrity.

The government's stance is increasingly strained due to events, particularly around Pakistan's 78th Independence Day. In many militancy-hit areas of Balochistan, celebrations were disrupted or could not take place at all. Reports of militants entering schools in Quetta to forcibly halt Independence Day activities have added to the government's concerns about escalating separatist sentiments.

Adding to these tensions, the singing of the 'Independent Balochistan' anthem at BYC protest rallies has become a norm, further challenging the authority of the provincial government. This not only undermines the state's efforts to foster a sense of national unity but also poses a direct challenge to the government's legitimacy in the eyes of

³⁷ Web Desk. 2024. "Bugti Invites Baloch Yakjehti Committee for Talks." Aaj English TV. July 26, 2024. <https://english.aaj.tv/news/330371598/bugti-invites-baloch-yakjehti-committee-for-talks>.

the local population. The Balochistan government is now at a crossroads, needing to decide whether to continue its policy of restraint or take a firmer stance against BYC to reassert its control over the region.

The situation escalated significantly following the Quetta Civil Hospital incident on March 20, 2025. In the aftermath of the Quetta Civil Hospital protest on March 20, 2025, the Pakistani government initiated a comprehensive crackdown on the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and its leadership. This response was triggered by BYC activists forcibly removing bodies from the hospital morgue, which authorities identified as those of militants killed during the Jaffar Express rescue operation. The BYC contended that these could be victims of enforced disappearances, leading to heightened tensions.

On March 22, 2025, security forces arrested several key BYC figures, including Chief Organizer Dr. Mahrang Baloch, during a sit-in protest in Quetta. The government charged them with inciting violence and terrorism, alleging their involvement in the hospital incident. The crackdown extended beyond Quetta, with arrests in Karachi and other regions, and was marked by the use of tear gas, water cannons, and live ammunition against protesters.

14.1 Political Interventions and Separatist Narratives in Balochistan: Analyzing the BYC Factor

The role of intelligence agencies in shaping Balochistan's political landscape has long been a subject of scrutiny among scholars and policy analysts. Multiple experts have argued that over the years, state institutions have played a decisive role in influencing electoral processes, political alignments, and governance structures in the province. While

such interventions are often framed as necessary for maintaining national security and political stability, they have significantly altered the political fabric of Balochistan. Analysts observing the region note that the manipulation of electoral outcomes, engineered political fragmentation, and selective patronage of political actors have contributed to a governance model that is widely perceived as lacking credibility among the local population. This, in turn, has created an environment where separatist narratives find greater resonance, with organizations like the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) positioning themselves as the true representatives of the Baloch people in opposition to state-managed political structures.

Experts on Balochistan's political history frequently point to a recurring pattern in which political leadership is selected and removed through informal mechanisms rather than democratic processes. It has been noted that provincial governments are often shaped by extra-parliamentary influences, with elected representatives sidelined or replaced based on considerations that extend beyond electoral outcomes. Researchers examining state interventions in the region argue that the fragmentation of nationalist parties has been another prominent strategy used to weaken the influence of Baloch political voices. By encouraging defections, engineering internal disputes, and promoting splinter factions, state institutions have significantly diluted the effectiveness of Baloch nationalist parties within the formal political system. This has resulted in a political landscape where pro-establishment figures are given disproportionate influence, often at the expense of those who advocate for greater provincial autonomy. As a consequence, political actors who

may have otherwise pursued their objectives through constitutional means have found themselves marginalized, leading to an erosion of trust in electoral politics.

Several political commentators have observed that the widespread perception of managed political representation in Balochistan has profound implications for the province's governance. When political parties and elected officials are seen as extensions of state authority rather than independent representatives of the people, public engagement with formal political processes diminishes. This disengagement has allowed alternative actors such as BYC to gain prominence, as they present themselves as untainted by the established political order and unaligned with state-backed governance structures. Analysts tracking political trends in Balochistan suggest that as a result of this political vacuum, many disillusioned Baloch, particularly among the younger generation, have gravitated toward non-electoral movements, perceiving them as more effective in voicing their grievances. The weakening of mainstream political institutions has created conditions in which separatist movements can claim to be the only true voice of the Baloch people, a claim that gains traction when traditional political actors are seen as compromised or ineffective.

The long-term effects of intelligence-driven political management in Balochistan have been counterproductive to the goal of national cohesion, according to several researchers focusing on security and governance. While such interventions may have provided short-term stability by controlling electoral outcomes and limiting the rise of political actors perceived as adversarial to state interests, they have also deepened political alienation. Political analysts argue that the perception

that Balochistan's political landscape is shaped not by the will of its people but by security considerations has fueled resentment, making it easier for separatist narratives to gain traction. Scholars studying conflict dynamics have described the state's attempt to maintain control over Balochistan's political process as paradoxical: while intended to curb anti-state sentiment, it has created the very conditions that allow movements like BYC to flourish. The decline of credible nationalist political representation has left a gap that organizations outside the formal political framework have been quick to fill, reinforcing the cycle of distrust between the state and the Baloch people.

A relevant case study that illustrates an alternative approach is the example of Sindh, which has followed a markedly different political trajectory. Experts on provincial politics highlight how the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), despite its historical anti-establishment stance, has been allowed to function and maintain electoral dominance in Sindh. Over the years, PPP has successfully positioned itself as both a champion of Sindhi rights and a major participant in national politics. Political scientists studying party dynamics in Pakistan argue that PPP's continuous presence in Sindh's political sphere has effectively left little space for separatist movements such as Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) and other factions that advocate for Sindh's independence. Unlike in Balochistan, where nationalist forces have been systematically fragmented, PPP's ability to engage with the system rather than being pushed to the margins has allowed it to absorb much of the political discontent that might have otherwise fueled separatist sentiments. Experts suggest that a more inclusive approach to political engagement—one that

allows for the participation of popular regional political actors rather than attempting to engineer or control the political landscape—can help integrate discontented communities into the national framework rather than pushing them toward alternative movements like BYC. The contrast between the political strategies employed in Sindh and Balochistan underscores the risks of excessive intervention in electoral politics. While Sindh has a functioning political structure that allows for grievances to be addressed within the system, Balochistan's heavily managed political environment has created a vacuum that separatist and non-state actors have been able to exploit.

This perspective, widely discussed among political observers and security analysts, highlights the broader implications of intelligence interventions in electoral processes. While state authorities have sought to maintain stability through strategic political management, this approach has, in many ways, been counterproductive, inadvertently strengthening separatist narratives. By limiting political space for credible Baloch representation within the formal system, the state has reinforced the perception that mainstream politics offers no viable path for addressing Baloch grievances. As a result, movements like BYC, which frame themselves as alternatives to a controlled political order, have gained traction, particularly among younger generations seeking political agency outside the electoral system.

15 Recommendations for Addressing BYC and Its Activities

Given the increasing influence of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and its ability to mobilize large-scale support, a strategic and multifaceted approach is essential to effectively address its activities. Instead of relying solely on reactive measures, a combination of political engagement, economic development, strategic communication, and security measures can help foster stability in Balochistan while addressing BYC's concerns in a balanced manner.

To better understand how BYC should be dealt with, subject matter experts were consulted, including individuals from academia, politics, and journalism. Formal and informal discussions with subject matter experts gathered perspectives on BYC's legitimacy and the appropriate state response. The discussion revealed diverse opinions, with 21 percent of respondents stating that BYC strives for legitimate rights, while 42 percent acknowledged genuine concerns but suggested that BYC needs to bring balance to its approach. Meanwhile, 13 percent described BYC as a controversial entity, and 24 percent expressed no opinion. Importantly, when asked whether the state should engage with BYC through dialogue, an overwhelming 82 percent of respondents favoured engagement rather than confrontation.

15.1 Political Engagement and Dialogue

Given the broad consensus among experts that dialogue is the preferred approach, the state should adopt a structured engagement strategy with BYC leadership. Recognizing that a segment of BYC's activism is rooted in genuine concerns, the government should:

- a. Establish formal channels for dialogue with BYC's leadership, particularly its youth representatives, to address grievances within the constitutional framework.
- b. Differentiate between legitimate political activism and external influences, ensuring that indigenous concerns are heard while monitoring potential foreign manipulation.
- c. Engage local politicians and civil society actors in Balochistan to mediate discussions and prevent further radicalization of BYC supporters.

15.2 Electoral Inclusion

The managed nature of electoral politics in Balochistan has led to a widespread perception of illegitimacy among local communities, which BYC and similar movements have successfully exploited. The erosion of public trust in the political process has been a critical factor in BYC's rise, as disillusioned youth and activists have sought alternative avenues for political expression. A key recommendation is for state institutions to recalibrate their approach toward political management and allow greater political space for indigenous nationalist voices within the electoral system.

Instead of engineering the political landscape through extra-constitutional means, the state should encourage the emergence of credible Baloch leadership through democratic mechanisms. Lessons from Sindh illustrate that when regional political actors, such as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), are allowed to function within the system, they absorb political grievances that might otherwise manifest in separatist movements. A similar approach in Balochistan, where

moderate nationalist elements are integrated rather than excluded, could help reduce the appeal of non-state actors like BYC. Facilitating the participation of nationalist voices in electoral politics, rather than attempting to weaken them, could channel grievances into structured political discourse rather than street activism.

15.3 Economic Reforms and Alternative Livelihoods

The economic marginalization of Balochistan has been a longstanding issue, exacerbating political discontent. BYC has capitalized on economic grievances, particularly restrictions on cross-border trade, unemployment, and resource distribution. Addressing these issues through meaningful economic reforms is essential for diminishing the movement's influence. The state should:

- a. Implement policies that ensure greater local ownership of economic resources and include Balochistan's population in decision-making processes related to economic projects such as CPEC and Gwadar Port development.
- b. Create alternative economic opportunities for communities dependent on smuggling and informal trade, recognizing that these networks are often exploited by groups seeking to undermine state authority.
- c. Expand vocational training and employment programs targeted at Baloch youth to prevent their alignment with movements that oppose state policies.

15.4 Financial Oversight and Transparency Measures

Given the growing influence of BYC, its financial resources must be rigorously scrutinized to determine the sources of funding, the mechanisms through which finances are transferred to its leadership, and how funds are ultimately utilized. While security agencies should already be monitoring BYC's finances, current efforts may not be sufficient due to the absence of formal oversight mechanisms. The state should adopt a multi-tiered strategy to control potential foreign influence while maintaining pressure on existing funding networks.

One of the most critical vulnerabilities of BYC is that it is not a registered entity and, therefore, cannot officially operate a bank account. This limitation forces the organization to rely on informal channels of financial transactions, making it difficult to track its sources of funding. A strategic way to enhance financial oversight while simultaneously integrating BYC into the legal framework is to encourage and facilitate its registration as a formal entity. During the process of engagement with BYC leadership, as recommended earlier, the government should:

- a. Encourage BYC to register as a political or civil society organization, ensuring that it operates within a legal framework.
- b. Facilitate BYC in opening an official bank account, which would bring its financial transactions under regulatory scrutiny and limit the risk of foreign funding through informal networks.

- c. Introduce strict monitoring mechanisms for financial transactions linked to BYC, including tracking its sources of funding and how funds are being spent.

Simultaneously, a rigorous but discreet investigation into BYC's current financial structure should be undertaken to determine:

- a. The sources from which BYC receives financial contributions.
- b. The channels through which these funds are transferred to its leadership, including the use of informal networks such as hawala.
- c. The internal financial oversight mechanisms of BYC, if any, to assess whether funds are being managed by a central leadership or distributed through decentralized networks.

While overt financial crackdowns could provoke a backlash, targeted restrictions on suspected foreign funding sources should be quietly implemented, ensuring that any external financial support to BYC is choked off without creating unnecessary political friction.

15.5 Security and Intelligence-Based Monitoring

Although BYC presents itself as a non-militant political movement, its growing influence and alignment with anti-state narratives require a measured security response. However, an overreliance on repressive tactics risks further radicalization of its support base. Security measures should be intelligence-driven rather than broad-based, focusing on dismantling potential external funding networks, identifying

key actors driving anti-state discourse, and limiting foreign exploitation of BYC's activities.

Security agencies should ensure that:

- a. Surveillance of foreign-backed financial inflows into Balochistan is enhanced to prevent external actors from strengthening BYC's political positioning.
- b. BYC's organizational structure is mapped out, determining whether it is centrally coordinated or operates as a decentralized movement.
- c. Individuals with known links to external intelligence agencies are quietly neutralized through legal and administrative measures, preventing the movement from serving as a tool for foreign interference.

It is important to emphasize that a purely security-driven response would be counterproductive if not paired with political and economic initiatives. While disrupting external interference is crucial, it must be complemented by efforts to address the underlying causes of BYC's appeal, including economic disenfranchisement, political marginalization, and governance deficiencies.

15.6 Media and Narrative Management

BYC has successfully leveraged social media and digital platforms to spread its message and mobilize support. The government needs to develop a more proactive and credible counter-narrative by:

- a. Engaging local influencers, academics, and civil society to highlight alternative perspectives on Balochistan's development and governance.

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- b. Ensuring transparency and timely responses to allegations of human rights violations to prevent the spread of misinformation.
- c. Strengthening community media initiatives that provide balanced reporting on issues related to Balochistan.

15.7 Integration of Baloch Youth into National Institutions

BYC's appeal among students and youth indicates a gap in meaningful political and social engagement for Balochistan's younger generation. To counter this, the state should:

- a. Provide greater representation of Baloch youth in policymaking and governance structures, ensuring that their concerns are addressed at a national level.
- b. Expand higher education and scholarship opportunities to integrate more Baloch students into mainstream academia and employment sectors.
- c. Establish youth exchange programs between Balochistan and other provinces to promote a sense of inclusion and national unity.

16 Conclusion

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has established itself as one of the most influential platforms for separatist-aligned activism in Balochistan, evolving from a rights-based movement into a strategically positioned entity advocating for anti-state narratives. Unlike previous organizations like BSO-Azad or the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), which lost traction due to state suppression and internal decline, BYC has rebranded separatist mobilization through female leadership, digital activism, and mass protests.

The state has recognized BYC as a growing threat and has implemented restrictive measures, including banning its fundraising activities, placing its leaders under the Fourth Schedule, and cracking down on its public demonstrations. Additionally, Pakistani intelligence agencies have highlighted BYC's financial dependence on smuggling cartels, which benefit from pressuring the state to ease border regulations. While foreign influence allegations persist, concrete evidence remains inconclusive, though BYC's international advocacy and alignment with anti-CPEC rhetoric suggest external strategic interest in its survival.

Effectively neutralizing BYC's impact requires a multifaceted approach that integrates security, financial regulation, and controlled engagement. Encouraging BYC's registration as a legal entity would allow for greater transparency in its financial transactions, providing the state better oversight while limiting informal funding streams. Simultaneously, intelligence-driven financial scrutiny should focus on tracking BYC's revenue sources, informal money

transfers, and spending patterns, ensuring that foreign funding channels, if found, are quietly dismantled.

A purely repressive approach risks fueling BYC's legitimacy as a movement representing Baloch grievances. Instead, the state must strike a balance between legal restrictions, financial oversight, and controlled engagement, ensuring that legitimate concerns are addressed through formal governance channels rather than anti-state activism.

As the first detailed academic study of BYC, this paper contributes to understanding its structure, strategies, and vulnerabilities. The state's ability to manage BYC's rise effectively will depend on strategic decision-making that prioritizes regulation over outright suppression, ensuring that it does not evolve into a more radicalized, externally influenced movement in the years to come.

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