Pakistan’s Comprehensive National Security Profile 2025

Countrywide Militant Attacks in 2025

The security situation in Pakistan further deteriorated in 2025, with militant attacks expanding both geographically and in lethality. A total of 1,066 militant attacks were recorded nationwide during the year, resulting in 1,510 deaths and 1,998 injuries. These figures point to a more intense and destructive phase of militancy, marked not only by a higher number of incidents but also by significantly elevated casualty levels among both civilians and security forces.

Compared to 2024, militant violence in Pakistan intensified markedly in 2025, with increases evident across all key indicators. Militant attacks rose by 17% (from 908 to 1,066), reflecting an expansion in both operational reach and frequency. Deaths increased by 30% (from 1,158 to 1,510), indicating a clear rise in the lethality of attacks, while injuries surged by 53% (from 1,303 to 1,998), indicating the growing human cost of militancy for both civilians and security forces. Overall, the pattern suggests that while 2024 already marked a deteriorating security environment, 2025 represented a more intense and destructive phase of militant activity, with higher casualty ratios and sustained pressure on Pakistan’s internal stability.

The monthly distribution of militant attacks in 2025 reveals a fluctuating but persistently high level of violence, with clear phases of escalation and relative decline. The year began with moderate but steadily rising violence, as attacks increased from 74 in January to 79 in February, before surging sharply to 105 attacks in March, which also marked the deadliest and most injurious month of the first half, with 228 deaths and 258 injuries. This spike indicates a phase of intensified militant activity. Violence declined in April, with attacks falling to 81 and deaths dropping sharply to 83. However, this lull proved short-lived, as attacks and casualties remained elevated through May, June, and July, reflecting sustained low-to-medium intensity violence with consistently high injury figures, particularly in June. A second and more pronounced surge occurred in August, when attacks peaked at 143, accompanied by 194 deaths and 231 injuries. Following August, violence declined again in September, but deaths (135) and injuries (173) remained relatively high despite fewer attacks, indicating continued lethality per incident. The final quarter of the year (October–December) showed no sustained de-escalation, with attacks fluctuating between 68 and 97 per month and injuries remaining consistently high, particularly in December, where lower attack numbers still resulted in 167 injuries. Comparative reduction in number of attacks in December followed an historical pattern but it may be noted that militants always tried to carry out high profile attacks at the start of new year. The possibility of such high profile attacks in January 2026 cannot be ruled out.

Regionally, mainland Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) once again emerged as the epicentre of militant violence, recording 419 attacks, the highest among all regions. These incidents resulted in 449 deaths and 538 injuries showing the province’s continued vulnerability due to persistent militant presence, cross-border linkages, and frequent targeting of security forces. Balochistan witnessed 310 attacks that proved particularly lethal, resulting in 561 deaths and 706 injuries—the highest casualty figures among all regions. The scale and intensity of violence in Balochistan depict both the operational capabilities and evolving tactics of Baloch militant groups, as well as their continued focus on security forces, civilians, and symbolic targets linked to the state. The erstwhile FATA districts remained another major hot spot, with 280 attacks causing 446 deaths and 687 injuries, reflecting sustained militant entrenchment and the limited success of stabilisation efforts in these areas.

Militant attacks in Sindh remained comparatively limited but persistent, with 34 attacks causing 28 deaths and 23 injuries, largely concentrated in urban centers. Punjab reported 16 attacks, resulting in 10 deaths and three injuries, indicating that while the province remained relatively insulated from large-scale militancy, it was not entirely immune. Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) experienced five attacks, leading to three deaths and five injuries, while the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) recorded two attacks, which resulted in 13 deaths and 36 injuries, demonstrating the symbolic and psychological impact of even limited militant activity in the federal capital.

Incidents of kidnappings further illustrated the operational environment in 2025. A total of 215 kidnappings were reported nationwide, with the highest numbers in Balochistan (82), FATA (66), and KP (61), showing the continued use of abductions as a tactic for coercion, extortion, and intimidation.

Militant attacks in 2025 reflected a broader geographic spread, higher casualty ratios, and sustained pressure on security forces, particularly in mainland KP, Balochistan, and the tribal districts of KP. The continued dominance of these regions as conflict zones, alongside sporadic but high-impact attacks in urban and politically sensitive areas show the evolving and persistent nature of Pakistan’s militant threat landscape. Groups/alliances such as the TTP, IMP, BLA, BLF, ISKP remained central to this violence.

As depicted on the map, the geographical distribution of violence exhibited a concentration in areas proximate to the western borders mainly Afghanistan but also Iran. The districts most severely impacted (with 45+ attacks), included Bajaur, North and South Waziristan of ex-FATA region and Bannu and Lakki Marwat in Mainland KP. Provincial Capital Quetta and DI Khan in KP were the other districts which recorded attacks between (36-45). Kech, Kalat and Mastung in Balochistan and Khyber (ex-FATA) and Peshawar (mainland KP) witnessed attacks between 26-35. Similarly, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Kacchi (Bolan) in Balochistan; Tank, Karak, Kohat and Lower Dir in KP and Kurram in erstwhile FATA witnessed 16-25 attacks throughout the year showing concentration of violence. districts where 1-5 attacks were recorded during the year were shown in gray.

Security map

Militant Attacks in 2025 — Affected Districts

Among those killed in militant attacks, 39 percent were security forces personnel, 35 percent civilians, 24 percent attacking militants and two percent pro-government Peace Committees’ members (volunteers/Razakar fall under combatants for state). This means that militants not only targeted security forces personnel and their installations but also did not spare the civilians while 24 percent killing of attacking militants indicate not only better response from the law enforcement agencies to thwart such attacks but also the commitment on the part of the militants despite higher risk of being killed. Among those injured, almost half were security forces (49 percent) while civilians (47 percent) also remained affected.

Assessment of Types of Militant Attacks in 2025

In 2025, militant groups in Pakistan employed a diverse array of attack types, contributing to the overall escalation in violence with 1,066 incidents recorded by PICSS, resulting in 1,515 fatalities and 1,998 injuries. These tactics ranged from high-lethality methods like suicide attacks and tactical assaults to lower-impact harassment tools such as grenade throwing and mortar/rocket fire, reflecting militants' adaptation to security countermeasures and their focus on disruption, financing, and psychological warfare. The following subsections analyze each major type, including suicide attacks (SA/VBSA), drone usage (QC), tactical assaults (TA), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnappings (K), targeted killings (TK), grenade throwing (GrA), and other indirect fire methods (MrA/RA), with provincial distributions, group attributions, and comparisons to 2024 where relevant. This breakdown highlights the evolving insurgent strategies, with Baloch groups emphasizing infrastructure sabotage in the south and TTP affiliates prioritising border-area ambushes in the northwest.

Evolving Militant Threats in 2025: In-Depth Assessment of Major Non-State Armed Actors

The year 2025 marked a complex and evolving militant landscape in Pakistan, characterized by intensified operations from Islamist, sectarian, and separatist groups across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and urban centers like Karachi and Quetta. Islamist factions such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan escalated asymmetric warfare in tribal border regions, forming new alliances like Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan while competing for influence and resources. Sectarian outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi persisted with targeted killings despite fragmentation, while transnational actors including Islamic State Khorasan Province and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent focused on propaganda and sporadic high-impact strikes. Iranian-backed Shia militia Liwa Zainebiyoun (Zainebiyoun Brigade), officially banned by Pakistan in March 2025, was accused of involvement in sectarian violence, including targeted killings of Sunni religious scholars (Ulama), heightening inter-sect tensions in regions like Kurram. Baloch separatist groups under the Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar umbrella, including Balochistan Liberation Front, Balochistan Liberation Army (both factions), and Baloch Republican Guards, dominated southern militancy with infrastructure sabotage, suicide tactics, and economic disruption, posing severe threats to internal security and foreign investments. Emerging entities like Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan and cross-border threats from Jaish al-Adl further complicated the security environment, underscoring the need for integrated counterterrorism strategies amid fragile regional relations.

State’s Response to Evolving Security Challenges

Security Situation in Balochistan

Security situation in Balochistan remained highly volatile in 2025, indicating a continuation—and in several respects an intensification—of the militant attacks observed in 2024. During 2025, the province recorded 310 militant attacks, resulting in 561 deaths and 706 injuries. In comparison, 2024 had witnessed 293 attacks, causing 404 deaths and 569 injuries. This represents a 6 percent increase in the number of attacks, a 39 percent rise in deaths, and a 24 percent increase in injuries over the previous year. While the overall rise in attack frequency was relatively modest, the sharp increase in deaths indicate a notable rise in lethality, suggesting improved militant capability, better coordination and the use of more destructive tactics. Throughout the year, violence in Balochistan exhibited an uneven pattern. While the number of attacks showed relatively less inconsistency, the resulting human impact—as reflected in deaths and injuries—fluctuated markedly over time.

Tactical assaults (TA) and guerrilla-style attacks remained the most lethal form of violence in 2025. A total of 82 tactical assaults were recorded, slightly higher than the 79 incidents in 2024, but deaths increased sharply from 144 in 2024 to 208 in 2025. This indicates that although the number of such attacks rose marginally, their deadliness increased substantially, particularly in direct engagements with security forces and civilians.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks continued to be a core militant tactic. In 2025, 74 IED attacks were reported, compared to 68 in 2024, causing 100 deaths and 231 injuries. While the increase in incidents was limited, IEDs remained the single largest contributor to injuries, reflecting militants’ continued emphasis on disruption, ambushes, and infrastructure sabotage/damage.

Targeted killings registered one of the most significant year-on-year increases. Eighty targeted killing incidents were recorded in 2025, compared to 44 in 2024, with deaths rising from 90 to 144. This sharp increase points to a deliberate strategy of intimidation and selective violence, particularly against civilians, tribal elders, political actors, and individuals linked to state or economic activity.

Suicide attacks and vehicle-borne suicide attacks (VBSA), though limited in number, remained highly lethal. Combined suicide and assault operations caused over 60 deaths and more than 125 injuries in 2025. Compared to 2024—when suicide attacks were fewer but deadly—2025 reflected a greater reliance on hybrid attack modes, combining explosives with armed assaults.

Kidnappings also emerged more prominently in 2025, with 14 incidents, indicating the increasing use of coercive tactics for leverage, intimidation, and possibly financing—an element far less visible in 2024.

Civilians continued to bear a heavy burden of violence in 2025. Of the 561 deaths, civilians accounted for 254, while 433 of the 706 injured were non-combatants. This mirrors—and reinforces—the trend observed in 2024, when civilian casualties had already risen sharply compared to earlier years.

Security forces remained under sustained pressure, suffering 198 deaths and 261 injuries in 2025. Compared to 2024, this reflects a clear escalation in militant focus on direct confrontation with state forces, particularly through tactical assaults, sniper attacks, and IED ambushes while suicide attacks were mostly targeted against security forces installations.

Whereas in the past groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and occasionally the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) carried out coordinated attacks. However, now it seems that the alliance of Baloch militant groups under the banner of the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) taking a more prominent role. In late August, BRAS launched an offensive in Zehri tehsil of Khuzdar district, maintaining effective control over much of the area for more than a month though security forces later regained control of Zehri town. Militants established their own patrols, hoisted flags, and restricted the movement of pro-government politicians, particularly from the influential Zehri tribe. This development is notable as it marks the first time Baloch militants have maintained territorial control for an extended period, in contrast to earlier operations that were limited to brief takeovers lasting only a few hours. BRAS also claimed to have established similar control in Sohrab district.

In May, BLA briefly took over Mangochar (Kalat district), attacked police installations, looted a bank, and abducted officers. In June, BLA carried out coordinated attacks in Mastung district torching several government offices, attacked a Levies post and blocked the Quetta-Karachi Highway in Khadkocha and Kirdgab areas where militants set fire to the offices of NADRA, Judicial Magistrate and Assistant Commissioner. BLF carried out similar attempt in Chiltan town of Panjgur district in December where a large number of militants (some reports claiming as high as 100) assaulted banks and looted money while taking control of the town for brief period. The BLA, as the main constituent of BRAS, is believed to have carried out most of these activities, though statements were deliberately issued under the BRAS platform to project a broader, collective identity. This approach also served to reduce direct international scrutiny of the BLA, especially at a time when its possible designation was under consideration at the UN Security Council, a move initiated jointly by Pakistan and China but temporarily blocked by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

The district-level distribution of violence in 2025 reflects both continuity and expansion from patterns observed in 2024. Quetta remained the most affected district, with 41 attacks, resulting in 67 deaths and 147 injuries. Although the number of attacks declined slightly compared to 2024 (45 attacks), casualty figures remained high, indicating sustained militant capacity in the provincial capital. Kech recorded 35 attacks, causing 66 deaths and 119 injuries, maintaining its position as a core theatre of militant activity and reflecting continued pressure on security forces and civilians.

Kalat experienced a further escalation, with 30 attacks and 83 deaths, making it one of the deadliest districts in 2025. Compared to 2024, this points to greater lethality per incident, rather than a simple rise in attack numbers. Mastung, Khuzdar, and Kachhi continued to witness frequent violence. While attack numbers did not increase dramatically compared to 2024, deaths and injuries remained high, suggesting a shift toward fewer but more destructive attacks. Panjgur, Naseerabad, Dera Bugti, and Noshki remained persistently affected, confirming that militant activity has become entrenched beyond traditional hotspots. Gwadar, despite recording only eight attacks, continued to attract militant attention due to its economic and strategic significance, mirroring patterns observed in 2024. Violence in 2025 reflected a phase of entrenched and increasingly lethal militancy. The modest increase in the number of attacks, combined with a sharp rise in deaths, suggests that militant groups have improved their operational effectiveness, diversified tactics, and normalized violence across a broader geographic space. Without parallel progress on political inclusion, economic grievances, and governance—alongside sustained intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts—the trends observed in 2025 indicate a high likelihood of continued or intensified militant violence in 2026.

Militants carried out numerous significant attacks in various parts of Balochistan through out the eyear. On 4 January, the Balochistan Liberation Army’s (BLA) Majeed Brigade attacked a bus carrying Frontier Corps (FC) personnel in Turbat, killing five soldiers and injuring 56 others. This was followed on 28 January by a vehicle-borne suicide attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on an FC post in Gulistan, Qila Abdullah, killing two soldiers, while five attackers were also killed. On 31 January, the BLA-Azad launched a coordinated assault in Mangochar (Kalat), killing at least 25 security personnel and executing 20 individuals, including 18 FC members, making it one of the deadliest attacks of the year.

February witnessed continued violence against civilians and state infrastructure. On 3 February, an IED blast in Harnai killed 12 coal miners and injured six others. On 5 February, militants executed seven Punjabi passengers in Barkhan, highlighting the continued targeting of non-local civilians. Additional incidents included an IED explosion in Quetta on 10 February, injuring nine people, and the torching of a NADRA office in Panjgur on 12 February, disrupting essential public services.

March marked a sharp escalation in both targeted killings and mass-casualty attacks. On 5 March, two senior JUI-F leaders, Wadera Ghulam Sarwar and Molvi Amanullah, were assassinated in Khuzdar. On 8 March, the BLA-Azad deployed a female suicide bomber in Kalat, killing one officer and injuring four others. Militants also attacked the Makran Coastal Highway on 12 March, destroying multiple vehicles, including gas bowsers, and on 17 March executed four Punjabi labourers in Kalat.

The most significant incident of the year occurred on 11 March, when militants hijacked the Jaffar Express near the Mashkaf Tunnel in Kachhi district after sabotaging the railway track. The attack resulted in the deaths of 21 security personnel and four civilians. A 36-hour rescue operation followed, during which at least 33 militants were killed, and all remaining hostages were safely rescued, making it one of the most complex militant operations in Balochistan in recent years. Later in the month, an IED blast in Khuzdar Bazaar targeted tribal elder Abdul Samad Samalani, killing five people.

Violence persisted through April, May, and June, particularly in Quetta, Kalat, Mastung, and Khuzdar. Quetta experienced ambushes on police vehicles, grenade attacks on police installations, targeted killings of Punjabi barbers, and a deadly magnetic bomb near a bus terminal in June. A PPP rally was also targeted with hand grenades, with the BLA claiming responsibility for several incidents.

In Kalat, an IED attack in April killed a JUI-F leader and two women, followed by targeted killings and body recoveries. In May, BLA militants briefly took over Mangochar again, attacked police installations, looted a bank, and abducted officers. In June, two FC personnel were killed in an IED blast, and CTD officer Fida Ahmed was assassinated.

Mastung witnessed repeated violence, including an IED blast in April that killed three policemen and injured 20 others, and the killing of two Levies officials escorting a polio team. In June, BLA and BLF militants looted a Levies post, torched government buildings, and killed a police official and a civilian.

In Khuzdar, a suicide bombing on a school bus in May killed ten people and injured 39 others mostly students. Pakistani authorities blamed Indian state-backed proxies, with senior officials claiming evidence of external involvement. A separate armed attack on a CPEC-linked checkpoint killed four Levies personnel. The district also saw the assassinations of tribal elder Kamran Jattak and Attaur Rehman Mengal, along with grenade attacks on officials’ residences.

Violence spread to other districts as well. In Noshki, militants killed an FC soldier, carried out grenade attacks on law-enforcement posts, abducted and executed four truck drivers, and attacked construction and residential sites. In Surab, militants raided the town in May, looted a bank, torched government offices, and killed ADC Hidayatullah Buledi. In Kachhi (Bolan), a BLA-claimed IED attack killed seven security personnel, while in Qila Abdullah, a car bombing near an FC fort in May killed four people and injured 20 others, an attack claimed by the TTP.

Other notable incidents included the assassination of journalist Abdul Latif Baloch in Awaran, the killing of two policemen by BRA militants in Dera Bugti, an ISPP-claimed attack in Pishin that left one dead and two injured, and an IED blast in Gwadar in April that killed two security personnel. In Kohlu, a civilian was killed after stepping on a landmine, while in Sibi, a grenade attack targeted a livestock office.

In July, Mastung witnessed a sustained militant offensive involving attacks on government offices, banks, convoys, and security installations, including hostage-taking, arson, and roadside bombings. During the same month, nine Punjabi passengers were abducted and later executed on the Zhob–Loralai border, an act later claimed by the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).

In August, the tempo of violence escalated further. In Panjgur, a coordinated militant assault on three security posts killed at least eight soldiers, injured 11, and left three missing, while an ambush in Washuk killed nine soldiers, including a captain. Repeated IED attacks targeted railway infrastructure, particularly the Jaffar Express, while selective assassinations of Levies officials, tribal elders, and religious clerics were reported in Kalat, Pishin, Chagai, and Chaman, raising concerns over growing sectarian and political targeting. BRAS also tookover Zehri twon in mid-August which was eventully taken back by the security forces at the end of September.

In September, a suicide bombing near Shahwani Stadium in Quetta killed 15 people and injuring 34, claimed by the Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP). Days later, a suicide car bombing and armed assault near FC headquarters killed ten people and injured more than 30 others. In Kech, an IED blast in Mand killed five soldiers, while an ambush in Dasht-i-Kuddan killed 12 security personnel, including intelligence officers. Mass abductions were also reported in Dera Bugti and Ziarat, including the killing of an assistant commissioner who had been held captive for two months. Civilian casualties mounted further with a suicide bombing at a Chaman taxi stand that killed six people.

In October, militant activity continued across Kalat, Kech, Kharan, Kachhi, Mastung, Noshki, and Khuzdar, involving kidnappings, assaults on Levies stations, arson attacks on government buildings, targeted killings of police officials, and renewed attacks on railway infrastructure. The Jaffar Express narrowly escaped a rocket attack in Notal, underscoring the persistent threat to passenger rail services.

In November., four individuals—including tribal leaders Shakir Saadullah Langove and Shakir Khairullah Langove—were gunned down in Khaliqabad area of Kalat district, while a separate attack in the same area killed six security personnel, including two commandos. In Dalbandin (Chagai), tribal elder Sardar Hussain was assassinated while FC headquarters in Nokundi came under attack after a female suicide bomber detonated at the main gate, followed by an attempted armed assault. Security forces repelled the attack, killing six militants. Repeated attacks on the Jaffar Express in the Bolan Pass, and foiled attempts to sabotage railway tracks near Dera Murad Jamali.

December’s notable attack was BLA claimed coordinated assault in Panjgur district where dozens of armed militants (some reports claimed as high as 100) looted three private banks in Chitkan Bazaar holding staff hostage. Militants attempted to loot two other banks but were engaged by CTD and police. Baloch militant groups also carried out mutiple attacks in the province targeting railway tracks in Sibi–Mushkaf (Bolan Pass), Dasht area of Mastung, targeting Jaffar Express and Bolan Mail and Notal area of Naseerabad, damaging tracks and disrupting rail services

On the other hand, security forces remained heavily engaged in Balochistan throughout the year, conducting sustained intelligence-based and kinetic operations against militant networks. In Quetta, a major terrorist plot was foiled in January on Sariab Road, while two militants, including a suicide bomber, were killed in Derakhshan. Kech remained one of the most volatile districts, where security forces killed five militants in separate operations in Buleda and Turbat during April and May, including BLF operatives. In Noshki, forces repelled multiple attacks and arrested Farid Baloch, a commander of the BLA’s Majeed Brigade. In Mach and Kolpur, IBOs resulted in the killing of seven militants, while in Duki, five suspected militants were killed during an April IBO in the Bhabar Pahari area. Ziarat witnessed a major operation in April in Choteer, where seven militants were killed after resisting with grenades, followed by a CTD operation in Jungle Piralizai in June that killed five militants. In Musakhail, four suspected militants were neutralised during an IBO in Rarsham.

Operations intensified further in the latter half of the year. In July, security forces in Mastung neutralised two attackers and injured three others following coordinated assaults on government offices, while a CTD raid killed ISPP-linked suspect Hasham alias Imran and two associates. Kalat saw multiple operations resulting in eight militants killed and large weapons caches seized, while in Awaran, three militants were killed in an operation that also claimed the life of Major Syed Rub Nawaz Tariq and injured a sepoy. August marked one of the most significant counterterrorism actions, with a two-day anti-infiltration operation in Zhob’s Sambaza sector killing 47 TTP militants, followed by three more during sanitisation efforts. In Quetta, authorities foiled a planned BLA attack ahead of Independence Day, arresting Dr Usman Qazi, a BUITEMS professor accused of facilitating militants, including aiding the bomber involved in the earlier Quetta Railway Station attack.

In September, CTD and security forces engaged a TTP-linked cell in Pishin’s Akalzai Yaro area, killing four militants and seizing a large cache of arms and explosives. Mastung recorded another intelligence-led operation that killed four militants, while Khuzdar emerged as a major battleground. Two IBOs eliminated nine militants, followed by a large-scale offensive in Zehri tehsil, supported by helicopter gunships, which killed seven militants, injured at least ten, and recovered advanced weaponry, allowing security forces to reassert control of the town after more than a month of militant dominance. In Turbat (Dasht), CTD units killed two suspects caught planting explosives on the M-8 motorway, averting a potential high-casualty attack.

Operations peaked again in October, when a CTD operation in Aghbarg, on Quetta’s outskirts, resulted in a prolonged gun battle that killed ten militants and injured two personnel. In Sherani, forces targeted a TTP camp in Mughal Kot, killing eight militants, including commander Haideri, with several Afghan nationals among the dead. Further operations killed three BLA-linked militants in Kech, six suspects in the mountains of Dalbandin (Chagai), and five militants in Sibi after an hour-long encounter. A major counterterrorism offensive in Khuzdar’s Zehri area killed 14 BLA militants and injured around 20 others, while raids in Buleda and the Chiltan Mountains near Quetta resulted in the killing of four and fourteen militants respectively, dismantling key militant strongholds.

In December, security forces recorded several landmark developments. In Dera Bugti, 100 militants led by Wadera Noor Ali Chakarani surrendered in Sui, while a separate IBO killed five militants and recovered weapons. Forces also foiled a major attack on the Peshawar-bound Jaffar Express in Naseerabad by detecting and defusing an IED planted on the railway track in Notal. In Kalat, two major IBOs killed 12 militants in one operation and eight others in another. Further end-of-year operations included the killing of five militants in Kohlu on 25 December and four militants in Panjgur on 26 December. In Panjgur, CTD and police also engaged heavily armed bank robbers, forcing their retreat after a gun battle that left one CTD official and one civilian dead and three police personnel injured.

Security Situation in erstwhile FATA (Merged Tribal Districts)

In 2025, the security situation in the erstwhile FATA deteriorated further compared to 2024, reflecting both an expansion in militant activity and a sharper human impact. The number of militant attacks increased from 259 in 2024 to 280 in 2025, representing an 8.1% rise. Deaths rose more sharply, from 374 deaths in 2024 to 446 in 2025, an increase of 19%, while injuries climbed from 450 to 687, marking a 53% surge. As shown in the graph, the number of militant attacks in erstwhile FATA region witnessed a consistent pattern except in August when there was notable surge. However, number of deaths and injuries witnessed an inconsistent pattern.

Security forces bore the brunt of escalation in militant attacks in 2025, with deaths rising from 148 to 180 (22% increase) and injuries increasing from 174 to 382, a dramatic rise of 120%, indicating more intense and sustained engagements. Civilian deaths declined from 135 in 2024 to 117 in 2025 (13% decrease), but civilian injuries increased from 219 to 258 (18% increase), underscoring continued civilian exposure to violence. Militant fatalities in these attacks rose from 89 to 131, an increase of 47%. Except one incident where 30 militants were killed when an IED exploded prematurely during assemblage, majority of militants deaths came in their tactical assaults as 84 attacking militants were killed during their attacks when security forces responded showing comparatively enhanced preparedness/ alertness of the forces. However, killing of this number of militants in assaults point to the higher commitment on the part of militants besides greater availability of such committed “foot soldiers” . It may be noted that the nature of such assaults have evolved over the recent past as previously such assaults were considered hit and run but now they prefer to get killed but only inflicting as much damage as possible.

A district-wise assessment shows a continued concentration of militancy in the Waziristan belt, with South Waziristan emerging as the most affected district in 2025. The district recorded 95 attacks, resulting in 85 deaths and 151 injuries, reinforcing the trend observed in 2024 and highlighting the consolidation of militant influence. This shift reflects the expanding footprint of the TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group following the weakening of local power structures that had previously constrained their operations. North Waziristan remained the second most volatile district, witnessing 55 attacks that led to 141 deaths and 180 injuries. Combined, North and South Waziristan accounted for a substantial share of overall violence and casualties in the merged districts, underlining their role as the epicentre of militancy.

Bajaur continued to experience high levels of instability, reporting 65 attacks that resulted in 86 deaths and 194 injuries, indicating sustained militant presence and repeated targeting of security forces and civilians. Khyber witnessed 31 attacks, causing 29 deaths and 40 injuries, while Kurram, despite recording only 20 attacks, suffered a disproportionately high human cost with 76 deaths and 80 injuries, reflecting the lethal nature of violence in the district. Orakzai and Mohmand reported fewer incidents—nine and five attacks respectively—yet the persistence of violence even in these districts underscores the geographically diffused nature of the militant threat across the merged areas.

Law enforcement agencies—particularly the police—remained the most frequently targeted, followed by Frontier Corps personnel, reflecting a deliberate militant strategy aimed at weakening the state’s front line security apparatus at the local level. The persistence of guerrilla-style tactical assaults further suggests that militant groups have adapted to sustained military pressure by decentralising operations, and relying on pre-planned attacks that reduce their vulnerability to intelligence-based operations.

The tactical profile of attacks in 2025 reveals a clear preference for Tactical Assaults (TA)—guerrilla-style attacks on static and moving targets inter alia involving ambushes, coordinated fire assaults, hit-and-run attacks by small militant units, etc. These attacks accounted for the largest share of incidents and casualties, highlighting militants’ reliance on asymmetric warfare, terrain familiarity, and local intelligence networks to offset the state’s conventional military superiority. The killing of 110 security forces personnel and injuries 269 others in such assaults besides damage to infrastructure including schools, bridges and roads as well as military installations and police checkpoints/ stations speaks volume of various militant groups’ (mainly TTP and IMP alliance) intent and capacity, which is also reflected in six vehicle-born suicide attacks in tribal districts.

Moreover, IED attacks remained a major cause of injuries, particularly among security forces and civilians, while target killings continued to claim a significant civilian toll besides targeting of security forces personnel mainly policemen. Although vehicle-borne suicide attacks were limited in number, they caused high casualties, demonstrating militants’ retained capability to conduct complex and high-impact attacks. Militants frequently opted for kidnapping of people including lone policemen, employees of national companies as well as other prominent persons either to instill fear or for extortion to generate finances. Mortar attacks mostly targeted civilians while militants have shown the access and use of quad-copters/ drones for dropping bombs and targeting military installations.

The deterioration in security conditions during 2025 was driven not only by aggregate increases in attacks and casualties but also by a series of high-profile and symbolically significant incidents across the merged districts. Early in the year, North Waziristan and Kurram witnessed targeted abductions and executions, including the killing of truck drivers and police personnel, signalling militants’ intent to disrupt movement and intimidate law enforcement. The threat environment escalated sharply in June, when a suicide car bombing in Khadi Khel, Mir Ali, killed 13 soldiers and injured several others, an attack claimed by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group. This was followed by additional high-impact incidents, including motorcycle suicide attacks, IED strikes on patrols, and a drone-like explosive attack that killed children in Mir Ali, highlighting both the expanding tactical repertoire of militant groups and the growing civilian toll.

The summer and autumn months were marked by increasingly coordinated and lethal operations. Bajaur emerged as a major hotspot, where a roadside bombing killed the Assistant Commissioner of Nawagai and a Tehsildar, alongside multiple other casualties—one of the deadliest attacks on the civil administration in the merged districts in recent years. South Waziristan experienced a wave of ambushes, mortar attacks, kidnappings, and targeted killings, including assaults on police convoys, attacks on Frontier Corps positions in Azam Warsak, and the assassination of tribal elders and local contractors linked to state institutions. In Kurram, repeated ambushes and IED attacks caused disproportionate casualties among security forces, including the killing of a captain and several soldiers in Sultan Kalay, while mortar fire and landmines inflicted heavy civilian losses. Orakzai and Mohmand, though witnessing fewer incidents, also saw deadly attacks on police posts and joint security positions, reflecting the geographically diffused nature of militant operations.

The final quarter of the year underscored the militants’ retained capacity for complex and high-impact attacks. In November, an APS-style assault on Cadet College Wana involved a vehicle-borne suicide attack followed by an attempted hostage operation, underscoring both intent and planning sophistication despite eventual neutralisation of the attackers. December saw continued violence across multiple districts, including coordinated ambushes in Kurram that killed security personnel, cross-border firing incidents, quadcopter drone attacks on joint security posts in Bajaur, and the destruction of government schools in North Waziristan. The attempted breach of a military camp in Boya, involving a suicide vehicle ramming the perimeter wall, resulted in significant security and civilian casualties and damage to nearby civilian infrastructure. These prominent attacks collectively illustrate that militancy in the merged districts during 2025 was not sporadic but sustained, strategically calibrated, and increasingly focused on high-visibility targets to undermine state authority, deter governance, and project operational resilience.

Overall, the security trends in the erstwhile FATA during 2025 point to an intensification and consolidation of militancy, particularly in South and North Waziristan and Bajaur. Despite sustained kinetic operations and increased militant fatalities, groups such as the TTP, ISKP, and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group retained operational resilience and tactical adaptability. This indicates the limitations of a predominantly kinetic approach and underscores the urgent need for a more comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy—one that combines security operations with political consensus, governance reforms, and socio-economic interventions—to prevent further entrenchment of militancy in the merged tribal districts.

In response heightened militant attacks, security forces actions in the erstwhile FATA during 2025 reflected a marked shift toward sustained, high-intensity counterterrorism operations, both in scale and geographic spread. A total of 139 notable security forces actions were recorded across the merged districts, resulting in the killing of 872 militants and the injury of 113 others, alongside 69 arrests. North Waziristan and South Waziristan remained the primary theatres of kinetic activity, jointly accounting for a majority of militant fatalities, while Bajaur and Kurram also emerged as critical zones of counterterrorism engagement.

North Waziristan witnessed the most sustained pressure on militant networks where 44 notable security forces actions led to 384 militant deaths, reflecting the dismantling of multiple operational cells of various militant groups. The trend was reinforced by a series of large-scale operations throughout the year, including multi-phase offensives in Hassan Khel, Razmak, Datta Khel, Spinwam, Shawal, and Boya. Several of these operations neutralised entire militant formations and foiled imminent suicide attacks, including vehicle-borne suicide bombings. Notably, the Boya incident in December demonstrated both the effectiveness and the cost of such operations, as security forces successfully eliminated all attackers but suffered fatalities and civilian infrastructure damage due to the blast. These actions point to a deliberate strategy aimed at degrading operational depth of the militant groups especially TTP and pre-empting high-impact attacks.

South Waziristan emerged as the second most active counterterrorism zone, with 27 notable actions resulting in 132 militant deaths. Operations in Sararogha, Jawar Mela, Birmal, Badar, and Gomal Zam targeted both leadership figures and foot soldiers. The killing of key militants, including Zabiullah alias Zakran, alongside repeated interdiction of suicide bombing attempts, illustrates the security forces’ focus on disrupting command structures and logistical preparation. However, several engagements, particularly in Sararogha, also resulted in casualties among security personnel and civilians, underlining the increasingly contested nature of these operations and militants’ willingness to fight to the death rather than disengage.

Bajaur and Kurram reflected a complementary operational pattern combining kinetic action with area clearance and consolidation. In Bajaur, 28 security forces actions resulted in 59 militant deaths, alongside the progressive clearance of militant strongholds in Lowi and War Mamund tehsils. The elimination of high-value targets, including relatives of senior TTP leaders and commanders carrying financial bounties, coupled with the declaration of dozens of villages as militant-free, marked tangible territorial gains. Pakistan achieved a significant counterterrorism success with the elimination of Qari Amjad (alias Mufti Mazahim), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) shadow defence minister, key member of TTP’s Rahbri shura and former deputy emir, in an intelligence-based operation (IBO) in Bajaur. This marks one of the most consequential take downs of a TTP leader since the group’s resurgence. Unlike the earlier eliminations of TTP heads - Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud and Fazlullah – through U.S. drone strikes, the operation was executed indigenously—signalling Pakistan’s growing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability.

Kurram, despite fewer actions (15 operations), recorded 85 militant deaths, largely due to precision strikes against high-value operatives and infiltration groups. Operations in Teri Mangal, Ghaki, Dogar, Manato, and Marzai disrupted cross-border movement and neutralised commanders responsible for past high-casualty attacks, highlighting Kurram’s role as both a transit and staging area for militant activity.

Mohmand, Orakzai, and Khyber, though recording fewer incidents numerically, nonetheless saw significant outcomes. Mohmand’s nine actions resulted in 87 militant deaths, including the neutralisation of large infiltration groups near the border and the use of drone strikes against concealed hideouts—an indicator of evolving operational tools. Orakzai stood out for the exceptionally high militant toll relative to the number of actions, with 65 militants killed in just three operations, suggesting concentrated strikes against large militant assemblages. In Khyber, 13 actions led to 60 militant deaths, including actions in Tirah Valley that eliminated Afghan-origin militants operating under local commanders, reflecting the transnational character of the threat. It appears that authorities are planning a full-scale military operation in Tirah Valley of Khyber district where militants not only have enhanced their presence but there is closer link between drugs, weapons and militancy. While local tribes were previously resisting large scale operation that also warrants evacuation of local population but after the successful operation in parts of Bajaur and speedy return of the family gave hope to the local residents that the government intends to make operation in Tirah a swift one. Authorities have reportedly agreed to facilitate the evacuation and for financial compensation.

The pattern of security forces actions in 2025 demonstrates a transition from reactive engagements toward proactive, intelligence-led, and clearance-oriented operations, aimed at dismantling militant infrastructure, leadership, and infiltration routes. While these actions produced significant militant losses and restored state writ in several contested areas, they also revealed the resilience of militant groups, the persistence of cross-border sanctuaries, and the continued risk of high-cost engagements for security forces and civilians alike. The scale and intensity of operations underline the state’s commitment to kinetic counterterrorism in the merged districts, even as questions remain about the sustainability of these gains without parallel political, governance, and cross-border measures.

Security Situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)

In 2025, the security situation in mainland Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) deteriorated further, marked by a sustained rise in militant attacks and a sharper human impact compared to 2024. A total of 419 militant attacks were recorded, resulting in 449 fatalities and 538 injuries. Among those killed were 197 security forces personnel, 129 civilians, 113 militants, and 10 pro-government Razakars, showing the continued targeting of both security forces and the civilian population. Injuries included 310 security personnel, 211 civilians, 11 militants, and six Razakars, while 61 kidnappings were reported during the year, reflecting the persistent use of abductions as a tactic for intimidation, coercion, and financing.

Compared with 2024, militant attacks increased from 308 to 419, representing a 36 percent rise. Fatalities rose from 331 to 449, an increase of 36 percent, while injuries more than doubled, climbing from 244 to 538—a 120 percent surge. Losses among security forces intensified significantly, with fatalities increasing from 189 to 197, and injuries jumping sharply from 161 to 310, indicating more frequent and intense engagements. Civilian deaths rose markedly from 89 to 129 (45 percent increase), while civilian injuries climbed from 80 to 211, showing the expanding spillover of violence into populated areas. Kidnappings also rose further, from 47 in 2024 to 61 in 2025, reinforcing concerns about weakening writ in the most troubling districts.

A district-wise assessment reveals that southern KP remained the epicentre of militancy. Districts bordering erstwhile FATA—particularly Bannu, Lakki Marwat, DI Khan, Tank, Kohat, Hangu, and Karak—accounted for a dominant share of attacks and casualties. Bannu and Lakki Marwat again emerged as major hotspots, while DI Khan recorded high fatality figures relative to the number of incidents, indicating the lethal nature of attacks in the district. Collectively, southern KP accounted for the bulk of security force casualties, reinforcing the assessment that militant groups continue to exploit proximity to not only Afghanistan but also North and South Waziristan for cross-border and cross-district mobility, logistics, and operational depth. At the same time, violence was no longer confined to the southern belt alone. Peshawar, Swat, Lower Dir, and Shangla continued to experience intermittent but high-impact attacks, including suicide and targeted attacks. The persistence of violence across more than 20 districts demonstrates the geographically diffused nature of the threat, even though its intensity remains uneven.

Monthly trends in 2025 reflected persistent but uneven militant activity, with violence sustained throughout the year rather than concentrated in isolated spikes. Tactical assaults and targeted killings ensured that even months with fewer incidents continued to produce high casualties, suggesting deliberate militant efforts to maintain pressure on security forces and state authority rather than pursuing episodic escalation.

The tactical profile of attacks in 2025 further illustrates the evolving militant strategy. Tactical Assaults (TA)—guerrilla-style attacks involving ambushes, coordinated small-unit attacks as well as hit-and-run attacks—accounted for the largest share of incidents and casualties. These assaults alone resulted in 164 attacks, causing 164 deaths and 249 injuries, most of them among security forces. Targeted killings (TK) also remained a key tactic, with 112 incidents resulting in 142 deaths, predominantly civilians and local security personnel, reflecting militants’ continued reliance on intimidation and selective violence to erode state presence at the grassroots level.

IED attacks, while fewer than tactical assaults, continued to cause significant harm, particularly to security personnel, while suicide attacks—both standalone and combined with tactical assaults—produced disproportionately high casualties, showing militants’ retained capability to conduct complex, high-impact attacks. Mortar attacks and quadcopter-based strikes, though limited in number, signalled growing experimentation with stand-off and remote-delivery methods.

Hence, the security situation in mainland KP during 2025 reflects a qualitative and quantitative escalation of militancy. The sharp rise in injuries, sustained pressure on law enforcement agencies, continued kidnappings, and the widening geographical spread of violence show the limits of containment-focused approaches. Militant groups—primarily the TTP and allied factions—demonstrated both resilience and adaptability, maintaining operational tempo while inflicting mounting costs on security forces and civilians alike. Without complementary political, governance, and judicial measures, the trajectory observed in 2025 suggests that KP will remain a central theatre of militant violence in the near term.

Beyond aggregate figures, 2025 was marked by a series of high-impact and geographically dispersed militant attacks across mainland Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, underscoring both operational reach and tactical evolution. Early in the year, coordinated and complex attacks set the tone: on 4 March, militants stormed Bannu Cantonment, killing 18 people, including 13 civilians, while a suicide car bombing in North Waziristan on 10 March killed two soldiers and injured ten. As the year progressed, Bannu and Lakki Marwat emerged as focal points of violence, witnessing repeated ambushes, IED attacks, drone-delivered explosives, and direct assaults on police stations. Bannu alone saw targeted killings of CTD and police personnel, attacks on Miryan police station involving light and heavy weapons, quadcopter strikes, kidnappings of oil company drivers and government officials, and, in September, a vehicle-borne suicide attack on the FC headquarters that killed six soldiers and triggered a prolonged clearance operation.

Lakki Marwat experienced a parallel trajectory of escalation, with militants combining targeted assassinations, sabotage of gas pipelines, destruction of schools, mortar fire on civilian settlements, and the use of suicide bombers and quadcopters. Attacks increasingly blurred the line between security and civilian spaces, as seen in the killing of peace committee leaders, jirga elders, students, and government employees. DI Khan and Tank also remained volatile, with repeated attacks on police stations, assassinations of Elite Force and police personnel, abductions of officials and polio workers, and large-scale assaults such as the October attack on the Police Training School in Ratta Kulachi, which involved an explosives-laden vehicle and a prolonged firefight. Elsewhere, militant violence extended into Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu, Swabi, Karak, Swat, Charsadda, and Chitral, including high-profile suicide attacks, cross-border RPG fire from Afghanistan, and targeted killings of political and religious figures. By the final quarter, attacks had become both more frequent and more sophisticated, with December witnessing suicide bombings, quadcopter strikes, coordinated sniper–drone attacks, destruction of bridges, and assaults on security camps across southern and central KP.

In response, security forces adopted an increasingly aggressive and sustained counterterrorism posture throughout 2025, reflected both in the scale of operations and the intensity of engagements, as captured in the security forces actions data. Across the province, intelligence-based operations (IBOs), search-and-strike missions, aerial surveillance, drone support, and coordinated police–CTD–military actions were employed to hinder militant momentum. Early operations in Bannu, Lakki Marwat, DI Khan, Karak, and Peshawar resulted in the killing or arrest of multiple TTP commanders and facilitators, dismantling local cells and disrupting planned attacks. As violence escalated mid-year, security forces expanded operations into forested belts, riverine areas, and urban peripheries, frequently supported by local peace committees and armed villagers, particularly in Lakki Marwat and southern districts.

From July onward, counterterrorism actions intensified further. Large-scale operations in Bannu, Bajaur, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Kurram, and Orakzai led to the killing of dozens of militants, including several high-value commanders carrying government bounties, and the recovery of weapons, suicide vests, quadcopters, and large quantities of explosives. Notably, training centres and hideouts embedded in civilian infrastructure—including schools—were raided, reflecting militants’ increasing use of populated areas for concealment. In September and October, security forces eliminated entire militant formations following major attacks, including those responsible for suicide assaults on FC and police installations. November and December saw some of the most decisive actions of the year, with sustained operations killing senior TTP and ISKP commanders, neutralising bomb-making experts, foiling vehicle-borne suicide attacks, and dismantling networks across Bannu, Lakki Marwat, DI Khan, Tank, Hangu, Karak, Swabi, Peshawar, and Mardan.

Mainland KP reflected a cycle of militant escalation met by force-heavy state response. While security forces demonstrated improved responsiveness, intelligence penetration, and operational depth—preventing several mass-casualty attacks—the sheer frequency of incidents, the widening geographic spread, and militants’ continued ability to strike police stations, cantonments, and civilian targets highlight the persistence of the threat. The year underscored that although militant groups failed to hold territory, they retained the capacity to impose sustained human and economic costs, making KP one of the most contested theatres of militancy in Pakistan during 2025.

If prevailing trends and underlying drivers remain unchanged, the security situation in mainland KP is likely to deteriorate further in 2026. A modest improvement is possible if Pakistan succeeds in persuading the Taliban government to end, or at least meaningfully scale down, facilitation for the TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. However, even under a more cooperative cross-border environment, residual networks and operatives that have already infiltrated KP will continue to pose a serious and sustained challenge.

The trajectory will also be shaped by the internal political-security context. Prolonged friction between the PTI-led provincial government and the security establishment risks weakening coordination, diluting policy coherence, and creating operational gaps that militants can exploit. Restoring a unified approach, strengthening intelligence-led operations, and insulating counter-militancy priorities from political contestation will be essential to reversing current trends. Ultimately, improving security in KP will require ending the enabling environment that allows militant elements to regroup, recruit, fundraise, and operate with impunity.

Security Situation in Punjab

The security situation in Punjab in 2025 showed a slight improvement in terms of frequency compared to 2024, but it continued to reflect persistent militant intent to maintain a foothold in the province. A total of 16 militant attacks were recorded during the year, down from 21 incidents in 2024, indicating a 29% decline in the number of attacks. Despite this reduction, militants succeeded in causing 10 deaths and three injuries showing that even fewer attacks were capable of producing tangible human impact. Notably, no security force personnel were killed in militant-initiated violence, suggesting improved protective measures and rapid response capabilities, particularly in sensitive areas.

District-wise data indicate a clear concentration of violence especially in Taunsa Sharif, which accounted for 11 of the 16 attacks, along with eight deaths and two injuries. This pattern reinforces the vulnerability of districts bordering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where militant spillover and facilitation networks remain active. Rawalpindi recorded two incidents, while Attock, Mianwali, and Taunsa witnessed isolated attacks, reflecting a limited but geographically dispersed militant presence. The absence of attacks in major urban centres such as Lahore during 2025 marks a notable shift from previous years, suggesting more effective intelligence-led disruption of urban cells.

In April, TTP militants abducted two security personnel in Taunsa Sharif, who were later released following mediation by local elders. The same area also witnessed a heavy-weapons attack on a police patrol. In May, counterterrorism vigilance in urban Punjab led to the arrest of two TTP militants in Lahore with explosives, while in Pakpattan, a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi operative, Muaviya, was apprehended in possession of bomb-making material. Violence resurfaced in August with the assassination of Sunni Ulema Council leader Mohammad Omer in Rawalpindi, while an IED planted in a graveyard near Dera Ghazi Khan was successfully defused, preventing civilian casualties.

In terms of tactics, Tactical Assaults (TA) dominated militant activity, accounting for nine incidents, followed by target killings (three) and a small number of IED and mortar-related attacks. The dominance of low-scale, targeted operations indicates a preference for minimizing exposure while sustaining psychological pressure and operational relevance. Kidnappings, though limited in number, persisted in border districts, highlighting militants’ continued reliance on coercion and extortion as supplementary tools.

Punjab in 2025 experienced a lower volume of attacks but continued exposure to localized and cross-regional militant threats, particularly in districts adjoining traditional conflict zones. The trends suggest that while counterterrorism measures have constrained militant expansion into core urban areas, southern Punjab remains susceptible due to its geographic proximity to militant strongholds and entrenched facilitation networks. Sustained intelligence coordination, border-area policing, and disruption of logistical and financial networks remain critical to preventing any renewed escalation.

Alongside these incidents, security forces actions (SFAs) in Punjab during 2025 were extensive and intelligence-driven, focusing on pre-emptive disruption of militant cells and foreign-linked networks. In April, a major raid in Makarwal, Mianwali, resulted in the killing of ten suspected militants, marking one of the deadliest counterterrorism actions in the province during the year. A significant intelligence breakthrough followed in Jhelum, where suspected Indian agent Abdul Majeed was arrested; authorities alleged he had orchestrated 47 attacks inside Pakistan under Indian military direction. In May, a multi-district operation across Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, and Jhelum led to the arrest of 34 suspected militants and the seizure of explosives and banned literature, while two TTP operatives were detained in Mandi Bahauddin for fundraising on behalf of the outlawed group. In June, a critical blow was dealt to militant leadership in South Punjab with the killing of TTP’s regional intelligence chief, Habib ur Rahman alias Saifullah, in Taunsa Sharif, alongside the dismantling of a foreign-linked espionage network in Toba Tek Singh, where six suspects were arrested.

Counterterrorism operations expanded further in the second half of the year. In July, six TTP militants were killed in operations in Taunsa and Bahawalpur. August saw CTD-led operations in Chak Ladan and Mianwali, neutralising several militants, including Bilal Khosa alias Basheer (TTP), and the arrest of a suspected Daesh operative in Okara. A planned IED attack in Dera Ghazi Khan was again safely defused. In November, investigations into the Islamabad suicide bombing resulted in the arrest of seven facilitators in Rawalpindi.

Security Situation in Sindh

In 2025, Sindh experienced a moderate increase in militant attacks compared to the previous year, though the overall threat environment remained low-intensity and episodic rather than sustained or insurgent in nature. The number of militant attacks rose by 42 %, increasing from 24 incidents in 2024 to 34 in 2025. Fatalities increased by 8%, while injuries declined by 30%, indicating that although attacks became more frequent, their average lethality and physical impact were relatively contained. This pattern suggests improved preventive policing and emergency response, even as militant networks retained the capacity to conduct targeted violence.

Karachi remained the primary focal point of militant activity, accounting for the overwhelming majority of incidents in the province. Of the 34 attacks recorded in Sindh during 2025, Karachi alone accounted for 24 incidents, reaffirming the city’s continued vulnerability as a dense urban centre, economic hub, and symbolic target. These attacks resulted primarily in targeted killings rather than mass-casualty events, with police personnel, political figures, and alleged informers emerging as the most frequent victims. Interior Sindh witnessed sporadic incidents in districts such as Shikarpur, Badin, Qambar Shahdadkot, Jacobabad, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Dadu, and Ghotki, reflecting a limited but noticeable geographic diffusion of militant activity beyond Karachi.

The tactical profile of attacks in 2025 was dominated by targeted killings, which constituted the single largest category of incidents. This reliance on selective assassinations underscores militants’ preference for low-risk, high-visibility actions designed to intimidate security personnel, silence perceived collaborators, and maintain relevance without provoking large-scale counterinsurgency responses. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), grenade attacks, and tactical assaults were employed sparingly, often against infrastructure or symbolic targets such as railway tracks, police checkpoints, or government facilities, rather than crowded civilian spaces. Notably, the derailment of the Jaffar Express in Shikarpur by a Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)-planted IED marked one of the few high-profile kinetic incidents of the year, injuring several passengers and highlighting the continued vulnerability of transport infrastructure.

A diverse set of militant and extremist actors remained active in Sindh during 2025. These included the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA), Baloch separatist groups such as the BLA, sectarian outfits, and transnational networks including Al Qaeda–linked operatives. Security assessments also pointed to the growing footprint of the Iran-backed Al-Zainabiyoun Brigade, particularly in sectarian and targeted violence in parts of Karachi and upper Sindh. This multiplicity of actors, each pursuing distinct ideological and operational objectives, continues to complicate the security landscape and necessitates a multi-dimensional counterterrorism approach.

Notable militant attacks during the year reinforced these trends. In Karachi, a series of assassinations targeted police personnel and politically affiliated individuals, including the killing of a policeman near Ghousia Biryani in April, the assassination of a PPP Union Council chairman in Orangi Town, and the murder of a traffic constable near Mai Kolachi Road. Journalists and media-linked individuals also came under threat, most notably when a journalist and his brother were injured in a targeted shooting in Malir. In interior Sindh, SRA militants killed two Punjabi labourers in Qambar Shahdadkot, while petrol bomb attacks in Hyderabad targeted police installations. The derailment of the Jaffar Express in Shikarpur and earlier sabotage of railway tracks in Jacobabad underscored militants’ intent to disrupt transport and economic confidence rather than inflict mass casualties.

Against this backdrop, security forces in Sindh adopted a sustained intelligence-led and disruption-oriented counterterrorism posture throughout 2025. The Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), Rangers, Sindh Police, and intelligence agencies prioritised dismantling militant cells, intercepting foreign-sponsored networks, and preempting high-impact attacks, particularly in Karachi. Early in the year, CTD arrested TTP operative Jameel Ahmed alias Qari, along with multiple BLA-linked suspects involved in urban militant activity. Rangers and CTD operations in Lyari led to the arrest of BLA militant Darvesh alias Sagar, while several TTP operatives were detained in Korangi and Manghopir, disrupting local facilitation and logistics networks.

A significant feature of counterterrorism efforts in 2025 was the emphasis on counter-espionage and external threat mitigation. Karachi’s Special Investigation Unit (SIU) claimed to have dismantled a RAW-linked espionage and assassination network in Malir’s Quaidabad area, arresting multiple operatives accused of spying on military installations and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects. Subsequent operations in the second half of the year further exposed foreign-linked cells, with CTD and federal intelligence agencies arresting suspects and recovering arms, explosives, and communication equipment.

Operations extended beyond Karachi into interior Sindh. CTD arrested SRA operatives in Shaheed Benazirabad and Hyderabad, while targeted raids in July and August dismantled separatist cells and recovered explosive material. In Karachi, security forces neutralised militants involved in earlier attacks on Chinese engineers and arrested facilitators linked to transnational extremist networks, including Al Qaeda operatives. These actions prevented the escalation of militancy into coordinated or mass-casualty campaigns.

In short, the security situation in Sindh during 2025 was characterised by persistent but contained militant violence, marked by targeted killings and symbolic attacks rather than sustained insurgency. While the increase in attack frequency signals that militant networks remain operational and adaptive, the absence of large-scale attacks reflects the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing, preventive arrests, and coordinated counterterrorism efforts. Nevertheless, Sindh’s continued exposure to a mix of religiously motivated, separatist, sectarian, and foreign-sponsored threats underscores the need for sustained vigilance, institutional coordination, and proactive intelligence penetration to prevent low-intensity violence from evolving into more destabilising forms.

Security Situation in AJK, ICT and GB

In 2025, the overall security environment in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) remained comparatively stable and low in intensity when measured against Pakistan’s primary conflict zones. Militancy in these regions did not translate into sustained campaigns or frequent attacks; however, the incidents that did occur carried disproportionate symbolic, strategic, and sectarian significance, demonstrating persistent militant intent to probe sensitive and previously peripheral spaces. While AJK and GB did not witness regular militant attacks, and ICT recorded only a limited number of incidents, the pattern of security forces actions across these regions indicated active preemption and disruption of emerging threats.

In Azad Jammu and Kashmir, militant activity remained largely contained throughout the year. Nevertheless, a notable counterterrorism operation in May 2025 highlighted the underlying risk of militant spillover into the territory. In Rawalakot (Poonch District), security forces conducted a targeted operation against suspected Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operatives, killing four militants. The encounter also resulted in the deaths of two police personnel. Although isolated, the incident demonstrated that militant groups continue to view AJK as a potential operational space, necessitating sustained vigilance.

The Islamabad Capital Territory witnessed few incidents in numerical terms, but their gravity and symbolic impact were considerable. Early in the year, authorities arrested a TTP-linked individual in the Bhara Kahu area who was allegedly involved in filming sensitive locations and disseminating the footage online, pointing to reconnaissance and propaganda-oriented activities aimed at the federal capital. In August, law enforcement agencies successfully foiled a major TTP plot targeting a federal educational institution by arresting the operational commander and an Afghan suicide bomber prior to execution, averting a potentially mass-casualty attack. The most consequential incident occurred in November when a suicide bombing outside the District and Sessions Courts in G-11 sector resulted in 12 deaths and at least 36 injuries. The attacker detonated at the main gate after failing to penetrate the court complex, and responsibility was claimed by Jamat-ul-Ahrar. The attack underscored militants’ intent to strike at the symbolic heart of the state and highlighted the continued challenge of securing even heavily monitored urban spaces.

In Gilgit-Baltistan, the security situation in 2025 reflected a gradual uptick in challenges, including militant violence, sectarian targeting, and threats to strategic infrastructure. In July, a Federal Constabulary soldier was killed at a forest checkpoint along the Karakoram Highway, a vital strategic and economic corridor. In August, an attack on the Gilgit Scouts Camp in Diamer injured three soldiers, two of whom later succumbed to their injuries. October witnessed a more pronounced escalation in GB, marked by targeted attacks on religious and judicial figures in Gilgit. Assassination attempts on Maulana Qazi Nisar Ahmed, a prominent Sunni leader, and Judge Malik Inayatur Rehman were narrowly thwarted, with both surviving. These incidents were widely assessed as sectarian in nature, with the Al-Zainabiyoun Brigade believed to be involved. In Diamer, militants abducted two WAPDA officials working on the Diamer–Bhasha Dam project, drawing attention to the vulnerability of major development initiatives in remote regions. In response, security forces arrested eight facilitators in Gilgit and conducted a joint counterterrorism operation with KP police along the Babusar Top–Kaghan Valley corridor, aimed at securing the Mansehra–Naran–Gilgit route and disrupting militant movement.

While AJK, ICT, and GB did not experience sustained militant campaigns in 2025, the incidents recorded in these regions carried high strategic, symbolic, and sectarian weight. They reflected militant efforts to expand beyond traditional conflict zones, target sensitive state symbols, exploit sectarian fault lines, and disrupt critical infrastructure and development projects. The year also demonstrated the importance of proactive intelligence-led security measures, as timely interventions and security forces actions prevented several potential attacks from materialising. Continued coordination, surveillance, and preventive operations remain essential to ensuring that these relatively stable regions do not evolve into new fronts of militant activity.

Pakistan’s Political Trajectory: Contained Calm and Expanding Fault Lines

Pakistan’s political trajectory in 2025 unfolded as a study in contrasts: surface-level calm at the centre coexisted with deepening institutional, regional, and civil–military fractures beneath it. While the year did not witness the kind of sustained nationwide street upheaval seen in late 2024, it marked a decisive shift toward controlled politics, legal-institutional consolidation, and sharpened confrontation between the state and the country’s largest opposition party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). During the year, political contestation gradually shifted from streets to courts, prisons, legislatures, and constitutional changes, producing a climate of compressed stability rather than genuine political settlement.

The first half of the year was defined by the state’s success in neutralising PTI’s street mobilisation capacity. Following the violent climax of protests in November 2024, the federal government maintained firm control over public space. Even the January conviction of former prime minister Imran Khan failed to trigger mass protests, signalling a decisive contraction of PTI’s street power. The passage and enforcement of amendments to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), continued restrictions on social media platforms, and tighter controls on political expression shifted dissent into digital and international arenas, drawing criticism from civil society and rights groups. Islamabad appeared politically calm, but this calm was sustained through regulation rather than reconciliation.

In contrast, regional dynamics proved far more volatile. Balochistan remained a persistent pressure point, with militant violence, tight security measures including internet ban and political mobilisation reinforcing each other. The Jaffar Express hijacking and its bloody aftermath became a flashpoint, triggering protests, arrests of Baloch activists including Dr Mahrang Baloch and other leaders of Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), and renewed claims of political marginalisation. Sindh, meanwhile, witnessed sustained agitation over proposed Indus River canal projects under the Green Pakistan Initiative. Environmental, economic, and federal–provincial grievances converged, pulling even mainstream parties like the PPP into protest politics. These regional tensions suggested that while the centre achieved political control, underlying questions of resource distribution, representation, and coercion remained unresolved.

By mid-year, a series of Supreme Court rulings—most notably the validation of military trials for civilians linked to the May 9 violence and the denial of PTI-backed independents’ claim to reserved seats— impacted political environment besides altered the balance of power in parliament. The reallocation of seats handed the ruling coalition a two-thirds majority, enabling it tweeking the constitution while leaving PTI legislatively weakened. Legal pressure on PTI leaders intensified through anti-terrorism convictions, prolonged pre-trial detentions, and repeated denial of bail to Imran Khan, reinforcing the perception that judicial processes were being used as instruments of political containment.

Internally, PTI struggled to adapt. Leadership fragmentation, contradictory messaging, and tensions between pragmatists and hardliners eroded organisational coherence. While some party figures floated reconciliation or engagement with the government, Imran Khan’s rhetoric from prison remained confrontational, rejecting dialogue except with the military itself. Attempts to revive political relevance through selective alliances—such as the Tehreek-i-Tahafuz Ayeen-i-Pakistan—and periodic protest calls failed to generate sustained momentum, revealing the limits of PTI’s mobilisation capacity under sustained state pressure.

Towards the end of the year, escalation between PTI founder and the military establishment was observed besides some confrontation between the government and the judicary. The passage of the 27th Constitutional Amendment fundamentally reshaped Pakistan’s governance architecture. Judicial restructuring through the creation of a Federal Constitutional Court, the sidelining of the Supreme Court’s constitutional role, and the resignation of senior judges signalled a decisive rebalancing of power away from judicial autonomy. Parallel reforms to the military command structure—culminating in the creation of a unified Chief of Defence Forces role—formalised an already entrenched hybrid governance model. These changes consolidated executive–military authority while narrowing institutional checks and balances.

Civil–military tensions became unusually explicit during this period with Imran Khan opting for personal attacks on military leadership followed by public criticism of Imran Khan by military spokesperson. The sentencing of former ISI chief Lt Gen (retd) Faiz Hameed by a military court added new layers of political sensitivity. Meanwhile, centre–province relations deteriorated further in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where disagreements over security policy, governance, and the possibility of governor’s rule point to the disturbing PTI-establishment relations impacting politics as well as security.

By year’s end, Pakistan found itself in a paradoxical position. The state had succeeded in imposing order, weakening opposition capacity, and pushing through far-reaching constitutional and institutional reforms. Yet this consolidation came alongside deepening polarisation, eroded trust in institutions, and unresolved regional and federal tensions. PTI, though diminished, remained politically relevant through grievance, symbolism, and selective participation, ensuring that confrontation did not disappear but instead hardened into a long-term structural standoff.

Overall, 2025 did not deliver political breakdown, but neither did it produce stability rooted in consensus. Instead, it marked a transition toward managed politics—characterised by legal containment, institutional centralisation, and restricted opposition space. Whether this model proves durable or merely defers a larger reckoning will depend on the state’s ability to address underlying grievances, recalibrate civil–military boundaries, and reopen meaningful political space. Absent such adjustments, the fault lines exposed throughout this year and earlier are likely to remain defining features of Pakistan’s political landscape in the year ahead with its obvious implications for security and economic development.

State of Economy: Stabilised but Not Transformed

Pakistan’s economy in 2025 visibly moved away from the brink of crisis toward a phase of fragile stabilisation primarily through sustained engagement with international financial institutions and resulting in sharply lower inflation, improved external balances, and relatively restored market confidence. By the end of the year, this stabilisation was reinforced by a marked improvement in foreign exchange reserves that climbed to their highest level since March 2022. However, the year also exposed the depth of Pakistan’s structural weaknesses—low growth potential, weak governance, climate vulnerability, and chronic revenue constraints— indicating the persistent gap between short-term macroeconomic relief and long-term economic transformation.

At the macro level, 2025 was defined by stabilisation rather than growth. GDP expansion remained modest at 2.7 percent, well below the level required to absorb population growth or meaningfully reduce poverty and generate employment (unemployment currently stands at 7.1 percent). Agriculture underperformed due to weather shocks, floods, and pest attacks, while industry showed uneven recovery constrained by high costs, taxation, and weak demand. Services remained the main driver of growth but lacked the productivity gains needed to lift overall economic momentum. Inflation, however, declined dramatically—from nearly 40 percent in 2023 to single digits in 2025—falling as low as 0.7 percent in March before stabilising in the 5–7 percent range later in the year. This allowed the State Bank of Pakistan to cut policy rates, easing debt servicing pressures and supporting confidence.

External sector performance emerged as one of the year’s most notable improvements. Pakistan recorded its first sustained current account surplus in over a decade, supported by a surge in workers’ remittances, restrained imports, and modest export growth. Foreign exchange reserves, which had hovered around $14-15 billion by mid-year, rose steadily in the second half of 2025, reaching $21.1 billion by late December. Central bank reserves alone climbed to $15.9 billion, representing a nearly five-and-a-half-fold increase from their 2023 lows. This recovery strengthened Pakistan’s import cover—now exceeding 2.6 months—easing near-term external solvency concerns that had dominated policy debates only two years back. At the same time, the improvement reflected not only external inflows but also tighter macroeconomic management, declining forward foreign exchange liabilities, and a reduction in the external debt-to-GDP ratio from around 31 percent to 26 percent. Nevertheless, despite these gains, Pakistan’s external position remained structurally dependent on continued rollovers from friendly countries like China and Saudi Arabia, IMF support, and partner financing to meet annual external obligations estimated at roughly $20 billion.

The IMF remained the central anchor of economic management throughout the year. Pakistan secured continued support under the $7 billion Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, enabling release of multiple tranches despite missed benchmarks and the need for waivers. The Fund acknowledged Pakistan’s progress in restoring macroeconomic stability, achieving a primary surplus, rebuilding reserves, and containing inflation, but repeatedly stressed that reforms—particularly in taxation, energy, state-owned enterprises, and governance—remain incomplete and vulnerable to reversal. The publication of the IMF’s Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment marked a turning point in the reform discourse, explicitly identifying corruption, elite capture, and institutional decay as structural constraints on growth and stability.

Fiscal and investment policy debates during the year highlighted the tension between reform ambition and structural constraints. The Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) publicly acknowledged that Pakistan’s high effective corporate tax burden—estimated by officials to reach as high as 50 percent in some cases—has become a major deterrent to foreign direct investment. However, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) cautioned that any reduction in corporate taxation would need to be conditional on significant improvements in tax compliance, warning that unfunded tax cuts could create revenue losses of up to Rs 1.6 trillion. These diamterically opposing view points indicate to the main dilemma facing economic policymakers: while high taxation and regulatory costs are constraining investment, the narrow tax base and weak enforcement capacity limit the state’s space for manoeuvring.

Financial markets responded positively to stabilisation signals. Pakistan received credit rating upgrades from Fitch, S&P, and Moody’s, reflecting reduced default risk, improved foreign exchange reserve, and better fiscal discipline. The Pakistan Stock Exchange surged to record highs, due to easing of inflation, exchange rate stability, and improved investor sentiment. Consumer confidence recovered gradually, though it remained fragile. However, foreign direct investment stayed subdued overall, with several multinational firms scaling back or exiting due to regulatory uncertainty, weak contract enforcement, security concerns, and profit repatriation constraints—highlighting the limits of macroeconomic stabilisation in the absence of deeper institutional reform. Even the joint civil-miliary framework in the form of Special Investment Facilitation Council failed to achieve desired outcome suggesting that government will have to invest on traditional structures and institutions for economic turnaround. While the current focus on defence export – a sector least affected by political enviroment and overall state of economy - might provide breathing space for the government especially with regards to addressing balance of payment issues, it is not panacea to address structural economic challenges.

Against this backdrop, the successful privatisation in December of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Ltd (PIA) marked a rare and symbolically important microeconomic reform. The Rs 135 billion acquisition by a domestic business consortium ended nearly two decades of stalled privatisation efforts and was widely welcomed by policymakers and analysts as a long-overdue step toward reducing fiscal drain and improving operational efficiency. The transaction signalled renewed willingness to pursue politically sensitive reforms and was framed by the government as a confidence-building measure for both local and foreign investors. However, its broader impact will depend on effective post-privatisation restructuring, governance improvements, and the ability to attract strategic partners and capital, rather than on the transaction itself. As with other reform efforts, the PIA case indicates that privatisation alone is not a panacea without complementary regulatory, competition, and institutional reforms.

Climate shocks emerged as a defining economic risk during the year. Floods caused widespread displacement, agricultural losses, and infrastructure damage running into hundreds of billions of rupees, showcasing Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate change. While the RSF and other climate-linked financing provided some support for adaptation and disaster response, repeated shocks continued to undermine growth, food security, and fiscal planning. The economic cost of climate events increasingly intersected with poverty, inequality, and internal displacement, deepening socio-economic fragility. The worst part is that these climatic-induced challenges might remain a recurring phenomenon due to climate change and Pakistan’s vulnerabilities.

The government also signalled ambitions beyond stabilisation, particularly in digital finance, investment facilitation, and governance reforms. Initiatives linked to the SIFC, tax automation, digital regulation, and trade facilitation reflected an effort to reposition Pakistan as a more investable economy. However, these initiatives often ran ahead of institutional capacity and regulatory coherence, raising questions about sequencing, credibility, and implementation in an economy still grappling with fundamental fiscal, administrative, and governance deficits.

By the end of 2025, Pakistan’s economy stood at a critical juncture. The immediate crisis had been contained through IMF-backed stabilisation, tighter macroeconomic discipline, a notable rebuilding of foreign exchange reserves, and selective reform steps such as privatisation. Inflation was down, external buffers had strengthened, and default risks had receded. Yet growth remained weak, poverty widespread, and structural constraints deeply entrenched. High taxation, governance failures, climate vulnerability, energy inefficiencies, and a narrow tax base continued to limit Pakistan’s ability to translate stabilisation into sustainable, inclusive growth. The central challenge ahead is whether this window of relative calm can be used to deliver politically difficult but economically necessary reforms—or whether Pakistan will once again drift from stabilisation back into crisis management. In addition to these economic variables, growing security challenges and unending political polarization remain the decisive factors weighing heavily on Pakistan’s economic outlook in the year 2026 and beyond.

Extremism, Minority Persecution, and the State’s Response

Pakistan has witnessed a disturbing escalation in extremist violence and religiously charged mob attacks over the past year, exposing deep structural weaknesses in law enforcement, governance, and the protection of minority rights. A series of incidents in April marked a particularly alarming phase, as religious mobilisation increasingly translated into vigilantism, targeted killings, and attacks on both religious minorities and symbols associated with the West. Together, these episodes reveal a convergence of ideological radicalisation, opportunistic violence, and delayed or inconsistent state response, raising serious concerns about internal security, social cohesion, and Pakistan’s international standing.

The most visible manifestation of this trend emerged in Punjab, where violent attacks targeted international fast-food outlets during protests framed as solidarity with Gaza. On April 14, a 45-year-old employee, Asif Nawaz, was shot dead in Sheikhupura when attackers allegedly linked to Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan opened fire on a restaurant. A similar attack days earlier in Lahore underscored a pattern of violence aimed at Western-linked businesses under the guise of religious protest. While dozens of suspects were arrested and cases registered under terrorism laws, the persistence of such attacks—and the escape of key perpetrators—highlighted gaps in deterrence. These incidents not only endangered lives but also threatened Pakistan’s fragile investment climate at a time of acute economic vulnerability.

Alongside attacks on businesses, religious minorities—particularly Ahmadis—continued to face systematic violence. On April 19, Laeeq Ahmad Cheema, a known Ahmadi community member and witness in a previous attack case, was lynched in Karachi’s Saddar area after a mob gathered to prevent Friday prayers at an Ahmadi place of worship. Although police and Rangers secured the premises and dispersed the crowd, Cheema was attacked nearby and later died from blunt trauma. Investigations revealed that suspects involved in his killing had also been accused in a 2023 attack on the same site, reinforcing perceptions of impunity and repeat offending. Similar patterns emerged in subsequent months, with targeted killings of Ahmadis in Sargodha and Kasur, vandalism of an Ahmadi graveyard in Kotli (AJK), and sustained hate campaigns forcing minority families into fear and displacement.

These events align with broader findings in the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan report Streets of Fear: Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2024/25, which documents a sharp rise in violence against religious minorities, blasphemy-related vigilantism, forced conversions, and institutional failures. The report highlights cases where even individuals seeking police protection were killed, as well as growing hate speech targeting judges, politicians, and minorities. It also points to troubling signs of extremist influence within professional bodies, including segments of the legal community, and allegations of collusion in blasphemy-related extortion cases.

The misuse of blasphemy narratives has further intensified the climate of fear. In October 2025, a man in Gujranwala murdered his aunt over a false blasphemy allegation inspired by social media sermons. Although police acted swiftly and rejected the blasphemy claim, the case illustrated how extremist rhetoric can translate into private acts of violence, often driven by personal grievances. Such incidents rarely trigger broader investigations into ideological networks or online radicalisation, limiting the preventive impact of law enforcement responses.

Against this backdrop, the state has taken some notable institutional steps. The formation of the National Committee on Narrative Building and its subcommittee, the National Paigham-i-Aman Committee, reflects an attempt to counter extremism through coordinated messaging, interfaith dialogue, and narrative reform under the Revised National Action Plan. The inclusion of minority representatives and clerics from different sects is a positive signal, though the effectiveness of these bodies will depend on public engagement and tangible outcomes rather than declaratory statements alone. Similarly, the passage of the National Commission for Minority Rights Bill 2025 marks a long-delayed institutional milestone, providing a statutory framework to monitor violations and uphold constitutional guarantees. Yet, as past experience suggests, legislation without political will, resources, and enforcement risks becoming symbolic.

The most consequential shift has been the crackdown and subsequent proscription of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan in October, following violent protests and clashes linked to the group’s mobilisation. Large-scale arrests, financial investigations, and formal proscription under the Anti-Terrorism Act signalled a rare moment of state resolve against religious populism. Unlike earlier episodes, the move encountered limited public resistance, reflecting erosion in TLP’s legitimacy and a growing consensus that violent religious mobilisation poses a direct threat to stability. However, the state’s decision to target violent elements while preserving the party’s political structure suggests a cautious approach shaped by past reversals under pressure.

Condemnations by officials, scholars, and political parties have been plentiful, but consistent enforcement and preventive action have lagged. Extremist actors continue to exploit religious emotion, legal ambiguities, and weak policing to assert street power, particularly against minorities. Breaking this cycle requires more than episodic bans. It demands sustained prosecution of perpetrators, protection of vulnerable communities, reform of hate speech enforcement, and accountability for incitement. Without addressing the ideological and institutional roots of extremism, Pakistan risks further emboldening violent actors, deepening societal polarisation, and undermining the credibility of the state as a guarantor of security and equal citizenship.

Strikes, Violence, and Fault Lines in Azad Jammu and Kashmir

In late September and early October, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) experienced one of its most severe episodes of unrest in recent years, as protests led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) escalated into violent clashes with law enforcement. Demonstrations and strikes, enforced amid a communications blackout, paralysed the region and resulted in at least ten deaths, including three policemen, and injuries to more than a hundred people. The violence reflected deepening public frustration over governance failures, economic grievances, and the unresolved constitutional status of the territory.

The immediate trigger was the collapse of negotiations between the JAAC, the AJK government, and federal representatives over the committee’s 38-point charter of demands. While some socioeconomic issues—such as electricity and wheat subsidies, health cards, and compensation mechanisms—saw partial concessions, the dispute hardened around more political demands. Chief among these was the call to abolish reserved seats for refugees from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Authorities argued these seats carry symbolic importance for Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute, while protesters viewed them as a mechanism through which Islamabad, and by extension the military establishment, exerts decisive influence over AJK’s political outcomes and government formation.

Tensions sharply escalated on 29 September when a so-called peace rally by rival groups clashed with JAAC demonstrators in Muzaffarabad, leaving a shopkeeper dead. Two days later, violence intensified near Neelum Bridge—the focal point of protests—where the use of tear gas and live fire by police led to multiple civilian deaths. Protesters accused security forces of excessive force, while officials maintained that demonstrators had turned violent. Daily life across AJK ground to a halt: markets closed, transport was suspended, and attendance in government offices dwindled. Large funeral processions for slain protesters further galvanised public anger, with JAAC leaders vowing to continue agitation until all demands were met.

Facing mounting casualties and fears of wider instability, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif dispatched a high-level federal delegation—including Ahsan Iqbal, Rana Sanaullah, Qamar Zaman Kaira, and Raja Pervez Ashraf—to Muzaffarabad. After two rounds of talks, an agreement was reached in early October, providing compensation for victims, government jobs for bereaved families, and the registration of cases under anti-terrorism laws, alongside a 15-day implementation mechanism. Federal ministers portrayed the deal as a triumph of dialogue, arguing that attempts to destabilise AJK had been thwarted. However, the core political disagreement over refugee seats remained unresolved, highlighting deeper structural tensions over autonomy and self-governance.

These grievances resonate beyond AJK. Similar patterns of unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan and in Ladakh across the Line of Control reflect a broader political awakening, particularly among younger populations challenging entrenched power structures. In AJK, as in GB, the absence of meaningful autonomy within an unresolved Kashmir framework continues to generate periodic eruptions of protest. While the October agreement restored temporary calm, the episode underscored that without substantive reforms, such unrest is likely to recur.

Political instability resurfaced again in mid-November, when a long-anticipated no-confidence motion succeeded against Prime Minister Chaudhry Anwarul Haq. The vote—carried by a decisive majority—reflected chronic volatility and shifting loyalties rather than a clear ideological realignment. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) joined forces to oust Haq, while divisions within the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)—including abstentions and defections—proved decisive. Under AJK’s constitutional framework, the no-confidence motion simultaneously endorsed PPP’s Raja Faisal Mumtaz Rathore as the new prime minister, making him the fourth to assume office in just four years.

Upon taking office, Rathore announced an ambitious reform agenda aimed at overhauling administration rather than merely reshuffling leadership. His proposals included downsizing the bureaucracy, limiting official vehicles, enforcing biometric attendance, reviving the Public Service Commission, and initiating recruitment reforms. He also pledged regular open courts, judicial reforms in consultation with superior courts, improvements in internet connectivity, and renewed focus on hydropower agreements with the federal government. Measures to support low-paid government employees and police personnel were also announced, alongside symbolic steps such as prisoner remissions.

The formation of a large cabinet—dominated by the PPP and recent PTI defectors—soon followed, signalling efforts to consolidate power ahead of elections due in 2026. Yet, the episode once again exposed the fragility of AJK’s political system, marked by fluid alliances, frequent defections, and recurrent power struggles. While the new administration’s reformist rhetoric has raised expectations, its ability to deliver tangible governance improvements and sustain political stability in the coming months will be critical in determining whether AJK moves toward durable calm or remains trapped in a cycle of protest, confrontation, and fragile compromise.

Protest in Gilgit-Baltistan: Economic and Political Challenges

After more than two months of deadlock, traders in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) ended their 68-day sit-in at the Sost Dry Port, located closer to the Chinese border, on 27 September, following an agreement with the federal government. The protest, which had paralysed trade and travel through the Khunjerab Pass since July, was driven by demands for exemption from federal taxation, clearance of stuck consignments, and relief from regulatory restrictions that traders argued were unconstitutional given GB’s disputed constitutional status.

The breakthrough came after week-long negotiations in Islamabad between a federal committee, led by Power Minister Sardar Awais Ahmad Khan Leghari, and representatives of the GB traders’ Supreme Council. The committee included senior federal ministers, the Attorney General of Pakistan, GB Chief Minister Haji Gulbar Khan, and political leaders from the GB. At the conclusion of the talks, both sides announced a relief package designed to address long-standing grievances of the GB business community while ensuring regulatory oversight remained intact.

Under the agreement, imports routed through the Silk Route Dry Port (SRDP) at Sost will be exempt from sales tax, advance income tax, and federal excise duty, provided they are for local consumption in GB. The exemptions are capped at Rs 4 billion annually, with quotas allocated across product lines on a first-come, first-served basis. Only firms owned by indigenous residents and registered with the GB government are eligible, and all goods must be accurately declared to Customs. Any diversion of exempted items outside GB, particularly in commercial quantities, would trigger partial or complete withdrawal of concessions. The agreement will be reviewed every two years, or earlier if smuggling or policy violations are detected.

The package also addressed ancillary issues. Pending consignments at Sost Dry Port, which have been stuck for nearly two years, are expected to be cleared within days. The terminal operator has been asked to consider waiving demurrage and detention charges. Customs tribunals will expedite related cases, and a valuation official will conduct annual visits to GB. Moreover, the federal and GB governments pledged to work on broader development measures, including border area investment in Gojal and mechanisms to facilitate GB’s exports to China. The reopening of the Khunjerab Pass has restored cross-border trade and eased the movement of stranded passengers and tourists, temporarily diffusing the crisis that had disrupted commerce with China and strained local livelihoods.

The episode illustrates GB’s economic dependence on cross-border trade, lack of diversification, and unresolved constitutional position. While the relief package has brought temporary calm, it leaves open deeper questions of taxation rights, representation, and regional autonomy. Without structural reforms, the risk of renewed unrest in GB remains high, particularly as local actors weigh the concessions against long-standing grievances over governance amidst economic and environmental challenges.

Internet Shutdowns in Balochistan: Security Tool or Digital Collective Punishment?

Throughout 2025, Balochistan experienced repeated and often prolonged internet and mobile service shutdowns, affecting all 36 districts at various points during the year. Authorities justified these disruptions—primarily targeting 3G/4G mobile data—as necessary measures to address “law and order” concerns, security threats and militant activity. However, human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and UN experts, criticised the shutdowns as a form of digital collective punishment.

The shutdowns frequently coincided with significant events like Pakistan’s Independence Day, death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Bugti etc. Province-wide blackouts in August—some lasting weeks—were among the most severe, prompting intervention by the Balochistan High Court, which ruled it unconstitutional. Despite this, enforcement remained inconsistent, and partial or renewed disruptions continued through the end of the year.

The human and economic costs were substantial. In a province where mobile internet is the primary means of connectivity for over 14 million people, shutdowns disrupted education, healthcare coordination, small businesses, humanitarian work, and family communication. Students missed exams, livelihoods dependent on digital platforms temporarily affected. These impacts were magnified by Balochistan’s limited fixed broadband infrastructure, making shutdowns far more damaging than in other parts of the country.

Although the repeated internet and mobile service disruptions were intended to deny militant groups the ability to coordinate attacks yet these measures had limited operational impact on militant capabilities as militant groups operating in Balochistan demonstrated considerable resilience, adapting quickly to communication blackouts through the use of alternative technologies, including satellite phones and other non-terrestrial communication systems. The availability of such equipment not only allowed militants to maintain command and control during shutdowns but also reflected the level of external technical facilitation and financial backing accessible to these groups. Moreover, militant networks appeared to factor the likelihood of state-imposed blackouts into their operational planning, relying on pre-coordinated timelines, decentralized cells, and offline command structures to execute attacks even in the absence of real-time connectivity. As a result, while digital shutdowns significantly disrupted civilian life and lawful political activity, they failed to decisively constrain militant operations, raising questions about the effectiveness and proportionality of these measures as counterterrorism tools.

Pakistan-India Relations: Escalation, Crisis Management, and Unresolved Issues

The year 2025 marked one of the most volatile phases in recent India–Pakistan relations, defined by repeated crises, heightened military signalling, and the persistent centrality of Kashmir as the core unresolved dispute. While both countries repeatedly stepped back from the brink of full-scale war, the cumulative effect of political rhetoric, military exchanges, water disputes, and diplomatic confrontation left the bilateral relationship more fragile at the end of the year than at its outset.

The cycle of tension began early, with February bringing Kashmir back to the forefront through Kashmir Solidarity Day observances in Pakistan and renewed friction along the Line of Control (LoC). Pakistani civilian and military leaders reaffirmed support for Kashmiri self-determination while coupling calls for dialogue with explicit deterrent messaging. India, meanwhile, viewed such statements as provocative, reinforcing mutual suspicion. LoC incidents and competing allegations of cross-border sabotage underscored the erosion of confidence-building mechanisms that had previously helped contain escalation.

The most consequential turning point came after the April 22 Pahalgam attack, which rapidly escalated into a major India–Pakistan crisis. India’s attribution of responsibility to Pakistan and Pakistan-based groups, followed by sweeping diplomatic measures and military preparations, pushed relations into a dangerous phase. Pakistan’s rejection of the allegations, its call for an independent investigation, and reciprocal steps demonstrated how quickly crises now move from attribution to confrontation, with little diplomatic insulation.

May 2025 proved to be the most dangerous month of the year. India’s launch of “Operation Sindoor,” involving air and missile strikes inside Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, marked a significant escalation beyond the LoC. Pakistan’s retaliatory “Bunyanul Marsoos” operation, including large-scale conventional strikes, drone deployments, and cyber actions, brought the two nuclear-armed states perilously close to uncontrolled escalation. Civilian casualties, strikes near sensitive military installations, and unprecedented aerial engagements (in which seven Indian jets including Rafaele were downed) illustrated how future crises could spiral rapidly despite the absence of declared nuclear posturing.

De-escalation was eventually achieved through intense backchannel diplomacy with regional and international players, with the United States playing a central—if contested—role. The ceasefire announced on May 10 and subsequent military-to-military contacts prevented further escalation, but the episode exposed the fragility of crisis-management mechanisms. Competing narratives over mediation, battlefield outcomes, and political “victory” deepened mistrust rather than restoring stability.

Beyond kinetic conflict, 2025 also witnessed the expansion of confrontation into legal, economic, and humanitarian domains. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and subsequent irregularities in river flows, particularly on the Chenab, introduced water security as a destabilising factor. Pakistan framed these actions as treaty violations and “water weaponisation,” while international legal and human rights scrutiny lent weight to Islamabad’s concerns. The water dispute, already sensitive due to climate stress, added a structural, long-term dimension to bilateral tensions that extends well beyond episodic military crises.

Diplomatically, both countries pursued parallel but conflicting strategies. Pakistan sought to internationalise the crisis through sustained outreach to global capitals, multilateral forums, and the United Nations, linking Kashmir, water security, Indian support to anti-Pakistan groups and regional stability. India doubled down on bilateralism, rejecting third-party mediation while projecting firmness against what it described as cross-border terrorism. This divergence reinforced diplomatic deadlock, even as quiet engagement continued behind the scenes to prevent escalation.

Domestic political dynamics in both countries further shaped the trajectory. In India, nationalist rhetoric and security posturing remained potent tools, though electoral considerations at times encouraged calibrated restraint. In Pakistan, the crisis provided temporary domestic consolidation but also exposed vulnerabilities in air defence and the risks of prolonged confrontation with a larger neighbour. Military promotions, capability announcements, and doctrinal signalling on both sides suggested that lessons drawn from the crisis may lead to further militarisation rather than de-escalation.

By the end of 2025, the ceasefire was holding and forces had largely returned to peacetime positions, but the underlying drivers of conflict remained unaddressed. Kashmir continued to serve as the emotional and political fulcrum of the rivalry, while water disputes, sub-conventional warfare allegations, and hardened terrorism narratives compounded mistrust. Confidence-building measures remained weak, formal dialogue absent, and crisis management reliant on ad hoc external intervention rather than institutionalised mechanisms.

In short, 2025 underscored a sobering reality: India and Pakistan demonstrated an ability to step back from the edge, but not to move beyond it. The year ended not with resolution or rapprochement, but with a tense equilibrium—one in which future crises are likely to be sharper, faster, and potentially more dangerous unless sustained dialogue, restraint, and credible dispute-resolution frameworks are restored.

Pakistan–China Strategic Convergence and Enhanced Economic Relations

Pakistan–China relations in 2025 evolved into a more integrated strategic alignment, combining economic stabilization, defence cooperation, and coordinated regional diplomacy amid heightened South Asian volatility. The partnership—often described by both sides as “ironclad”—was reinforced by overlapping economic, military, and political engagements that reflected mutual threat perceptions, Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities, and China’s expanding strategic footprint along its western periphery.

Economic cooperation under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) remained the backbone of the relationship. In early February, Islamabad and Beijing agreed to advance priority infrastructure projects, including the upgrade of Pakistan’s railway network, accelerated development of Gwadar Port, and potential Chinese investment in offshore oil and gas exploration. These initiatives aligned with the transition toward CPEC 2.0, which emphasizes connectivity, industrial cooperation, and business-to-business engagement within the broader framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

This trajectory was reinforced by President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to China from 4-8 February, marked by high-level meetings with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and NPC Chairman Zhao Leji. Discussions focused on the “high-quality development” of CPEC 2.0, cooperation in renewable energy, science and technology, infrastructure, and agriculture, alongside regional and global issues of mutual concern. Several memorandums of understanding were signed covering clean energy, emerging technologies, media cooperation, and socio-economic development, signalling a broadening of the partnership beyond traditional infrastructure projects.

Strategic convergence deepened further in May following the India–Pakistan military crisis. During the period of heightened tensions, China adopted an unusually explicit diplomatic posture in support of Pakistan’s sovereignty and security, reflecting Beijing’s concerns over regional instability. Enhanced coordination was visible through high-level diplomatic contacts, including Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Beijing and a trilateral meeting involving China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Although public statements remained cautious, security, counterterrorism, and regional stability—particularly threats emanating from Pakistan’s border regions—were widely understood to be central to the agenda.

The China–Pakistan–Afghanistan trilateral framework emerged as an increasingly important diplomatic platform. Meetings in Beijing (May) and Kabul (August) emphasized economic connectivity, counterterrorism cooperation, and Afghanistan’s integration into regional infrastructure through potential CPEC extension. Pakistan’s decision to restore full diplomatic representation in Kabul signaled a recalibrated approach—encouraged by Beijing—favouring political engagement and regional coordination over coercive pressure, especially amid concerns over militant groups such as the TTP, BLA, and ETIM. This shift also reflected Islamabad’s desire to pre-empt expanding Indian influence in Afghanistan as regional actors, including Russia, move toward limited engagement with the Taliban authorities.

Defence and security cooperation expanded in parallel, particularly after the May crisis indicated Pakistan’s reliance on Chinese military platforms and integrated systems. China consolidated its position as Pakistan’s principal arms supplier, with Sino-centric platforms forming the backbone of Pakistan’s conventional deterrence. High-level military diplomacy intensified, including a July visit to China by Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir, who held extensive meetings with senior Chinese political and military leaders. These engagements focused on defence modernization, counterterrorism, joint training, and interoperability, reinforcing institutionalized military-to-military cooperation.

Visible capability enhancements followed. In August, Pakistan inducted Chinese-built Z-10ME attack helicopters, signaling deeper reliance on Chinese aviation platforms, while the launch of the fourth Hangor-class submarine in December at Wuhan pointed to the strategic depth of naval cooperation. Part of an eight-submarine programme, the Hangor-class fleet—expected to incorporate air-independent propulsion—will significantly enhance Pakistan’s sea-based deterrence and anti-access capabilities in the Indian Ocean region. According to the ISPR, all four submarines being constructed in China are currently undergoing sea trials and are in the final stages of delivery. The programme stems from an agreement with China for eight Hangor-class submarines, with four to be built in China and four in Pakistan at Karachi Shipyard under a transfer-of-technology arrangement. Equipped with advanced sensors and standoff-range weaponry, the diesel-electric submarines feature air-independent propulsion, significantly enhancing endurance and operational reach. Joint counterterrorism exercises, including Warrior-IX held in November–December at NCTC Pabbi, further strengthened operational coordination and reflected shared concerns over militant threats targeting both Pakistani and Chinese interests.

Security of Chinese nationals emerged as a persistent and sensitive issue throughout the year. With militant attacks intensifying in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif elevated the protection of Chinese citizens to a national priority. High-level meetings directed enhanced security measures, including Safe City surveillance projects, secure travel protocols, and strengthened residential security, amid reported Chinese dissatisfaction over past lapses.

China’s role as Pakistan’s economic backstop also became more pronounced. On 29 June, Beijing rolled over and refinanced approximately $3.4 billion in loans, a critical move that helped Pakistan meet IMF-mandated foreign exchange reserve targets. This financial support demonstrated China’s importance not only as an investor and defence partner but also as a stabilizing actor in Pakistan’s broader economic landscape.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid an official visit to Pakistan from August 20-22, 2025, during which he co-chaired the 6th Pakistan–China Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. The discussions focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation, addressing regional security challenges, and enhancing counter-terrorism coordination, reflecting the depth of the two countries’ all-weather strategic cooperative partnership. During the visit, Wang Yi also met President Asif Ali Zardari and held engagements with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and senior military leaders showing sustained high-level engagement amid a complex regional environment.

By late summer, diplomatic and economic engagement culminated in Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’ visit to China from 30 August – 5 September, coinciding with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. Meetings with President Xi and Premier Li reaffirmed commitment to CPEC 2.0 and the Joint Action Plan 2024–2029, alongside MoUs and joint ventures worth billions of dollars across infrastructure, agriculture, IT, media, and industrial cooperation. While ambitious, implementation remains contingent on Pakistan’s internal security environment and fiscal capacity.

While both the countries remained tight-lipped about provision of high-tech fighter jets and other defence equipment to Pakistan, a recent Pentagon report submitted to the US Congress has highlighted some of these acquisitions. As per the report, Pakistan is the only country to have received China’s J-10C multirole fighter, with 20 aircraft delivered to the Pakistan Air Force as of May 2025 against total orders of 36 and that China has supplied Pakistan with advanced unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Caihong and Wing Loong series besides remaining a key naval partner, having delivered multiple frigates. Both the countries are already jointly producing JF-17 Thunder fighter jets that Pakistan is gearing up to export to other countries. Any Chinese export to Pakistan of 5th generation fighter jets are yet not confirmed thoug its possibility cannot be ruled out given the current state of bilateral relations between the two countries.

Pakistan–Bangladesh: Enhanced Engagement, Strategic Recalibration

Continuing with the trend of late 2024, Pakistan–Bangladesh relations in 2025 underwent their most substantive recalibration in decades, marked by a sustained diplomatic thaw, revival of defence and military engagement, expanding internal security cooperation, and emerging strategic discourse on regional alignments. While historical grievances continued to frame sensitivities, developments throughout the year indicated a deliberate effort by both sides to normalise ties and re-anchor relations in pragmatic political, security, and economic interests.

The first indicators of warming ties emerged in January 2025, when a high-ranking Bangladeshi military delegation visited Pakistan, signalling renewed interest in reviving long-dormant military-to-military engagement. Discussions focused on training cooperation, exchange programmes, and intelligence coordination—areas where historical precedents existed, particularly through Pakistani military academies that had previously trained Bangladeshi officers. The visit suggested exploratory efforts to institutionalise defence dialogue and reopen channels that had remained largely inactive for decades. In January, Lieutenant General S.M. Kamrul Hassan, Principal Staff Officer of Bangladesh’s Armed Forces Division, visited Pakistan, holding discussions with Pakistan’s naval leadership on maritime security and bilateral defence cooperation. Separately, a Pakistani delegation including senior ISI officials visited Dhaka in January, to explore counterterrorism coordination and intelligence-sharing mechanisms—an engagement that, while discreet, attracted regional attention and underscored the emerging security dimension of bilateral ties.

This trajectory gained further momentum in February 2025, when Bangladesh’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mohammad Nazmul Hassan visited Pakistan from 6–8 February. During the visit, Admiral Hassan met Pakistan’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Naveed Ashraf on 7 February at Naval Headquarters, Islamabad, where both sides discussed bilateral naval cooperation, regional maritime security, and prospects for expanding professional engagement. He also called on Chief of Army Staff General Syed Asim Munir and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Sahir Shamshad Mirza in Rawalpindi, with discussions covering the evolving regional security environment and broader defence cooperation. Bangladesh’s participation in the AMAN-25 multinational naval exercise and the inaugural AMAN Dialogue further embedded Bangladesh in Pakistan-led maritime security initiatives focused on piracy, narco-trafficking, and stability in the Indian Ocean. The visit coincided with visible policy shifts in Dhaka following the August 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina, including the launch of a direct maritime link between Karachi and Chattogram and the removal of mandatory inspection requirements on Pakistani imports—measures that reinforced the broader reset in relations.

The diplomatic dimension of this reset was institutionalised on 16 April 2025, when Pakistan and Bangladesh held the Sixth Round of Foreign Secretary-Level Consultations in Dhaka, the first such engagement in 15 years. Led by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch and Bangladesh’s Md Jashim Uddin, the talks revived structured dialogue on political, economic, and sectoral cooperation. Bangladesh formally reiterated long-standing historical demands, including claims of $4.52 billion in pre-1971 assets and a public apology for the 1971 conflict, alongside the issue of repatriating over 324,000 stranded Biharis. While these issues remained unresolved, Pakistan agreed to continue dialogue—interpreted in Dhaka as a cautiously positive signal. Simultaneously, both sides explored forward-looking cooperation in trade, education, climate resilience, connectivity, and cultural exchange, including easing visas and restoring transport links. The consultations set the stage for higher-level political engagement later in the year.

Security cooperation gained renewed urgency in July 2025 amid growing evidence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) linkages in Bangladesh. Arrests on 2 July and 17 July of individuals linked to TTP-associated networks indicated the emergence of transnational militant connections involving JMB splinter groups, regional armed actors, and cross-border ideological networks. These developments warranted enhanced Pakistan–Bangladesh cooperation on counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, and monitoring of extremist financing and online radicalisation. In July, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi visited Dhaka, meeting Bangladesh’s Home Minister Jahangir Alam Chowdhury. The visit resulted in an agreement granting visa-free entry for holders of diplomatic and official passports, alongside commitments to deepen cooperation in internal security, police training, counterterrorism, narcotics control, and human trafficking. Plans were also announced for Bangladeshi participation in training programmes at Pakistan’s National Police Academy.

Political contacts continued on multilateral fora. On 28 July 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar met Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain on the sidelines of a UN conference. A Pakistan–China–Bangladesh trilateral consultation at the foreign ministry level during this period further signalled evolving regional dynamics and attracted close scrutiny from India. The diplomatic reset culminated in August 2025, when Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar paid a two-day visit to Dhaka, the first by a Pakistani foreign minister since 2012. Described as a milestone, the visit produced six agreements and MoUs covering visa facilitation, foreign service training, media cooperation, and cultural exchange. Both sides agreed to activate a Joint Working Group on trade and explore reviving the Joint Economic Commission, while Pakistan announced the Pakistan–Bangladesh Knowledge Corridor, offering 500 scholarships over five years for Bangladeshi students. FM Ishaq Dar also met key Bangladeshi political figures, including BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia and Jamaat-i-Islami emir Dr Shafiqur Rahman, signalling outreach across the political spectrum. Parallel economic diplomacy was led by Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan, who visited Dhaka to explore cooperation in textiles, agriculture, halal trade, shipbuilding, and renewable energy.

Military engagement intensified further in October 2025, when a high-level Pakistani military delegation led by Lt Gen Tabassum Habib (DG JS) paid a four-day visit. Discussions focused on intelligence sharing, joint exercises, counterterrorism cooperation, and defence training and hardware collaboration. This visit set the stage for the subsequent visit in late October by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Sahir Shamshad Mirza who met Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus and senior military leadership, reaffirming commitment to defence cooperation, counterterrorism coordination, and maritime stability. This momentum continued into November 2025, with Pakistan’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Naveed Ashraf visiting Bangladesh, marked by the port call of PNS Saif at Chattogram. Meetings with Bangladesh’s service chiefs, visits to the National Defence College and Naval Academy, and defence diplomacy events reinforced growing maritime cooperation. In the same month, Chairman Heavy Industries Taxila Lt Gen Shakir Ullah Khattak met Bangladesh Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman, exploring potential defence-industrial collaboration.

By December 2025, the bilateral reset intersected with broader regional discourse. At the Islamabad Conclave on 3 December, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar advocated new regional cooperation frameworks, citing a Pakistan–China–Bangladesh trilateral mechanism as a model. On 10 December, Bangladesh’s Foreign Adviser Md Touhid Hossain publicly stated that it was “strategically possible” for Bangladesh to join a regional grouping with Pakistan excluding India—remarks widely interpreted as reflecting Dhaka’s evolving strategic autonomy amid improved ties with Islamabad.

These developments throughout 2025 marked a qualitative shift in Pakistan–Bangladesh relations—from symbolic engagement to structured diplomatic, defence, and security cooperation. While historical issues remain unresolved and economic ties underdeveloped, the sustained tempo of visits, institutional dialogue, and security cooperation indicate a deliberate policy recalibration in both capitals. The durability of this trajectory will depend on Bangladesh’s internal political evolution particularly after scheduled February 2026 elections, regional power dynamics, and the ability of both sides to institutionalise gains beyond the exceptional momentum of 2025.

Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations: Confrontation and Conditional Engagement with Third Party Mediation

Pakistan–Afghanistan relations in 2025 remained among the most volatile and consequential bilateral relationships in the region, shaped by persistent cross-border militancy, deepening mistrust, competing regional alignments, and uneven diplomatic engagement. The year unfolded as a cycle of escalation and de-escalation, where limited diplomatic openings repeatedly collided with unresolved security grievances—most notably Pakistan’s demand for decisive Taliban action against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups operating from Afghan soil.

The year began with heightened tensions marked by border clashes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, particularly in Kurram and other sectors. Pakistan reinforced border fortifications and raised concerns internationally about the proliferation of US-origin weapons left behind after the 2021 withdrawal, which Islamabad argued were enhancing militant capabilities inside Pakistan. Pakistan publicly highlighted the growing Afghan component in militant violence, revealing that hundreds of Afghan nationals had participated in attacks inside Pakistan. The Torkham border crisis in February–March became a defining episode, as armed clashes over disputed construction displaced thousands, halted trade, and inflicted significant economic losses. Although a tribal jirga-mediated ceasefire reopened the crossing, the episode demonstrated the fragility of border management and Afghanistan’s economic dependence on Pakistan. Simultaneously, Islamabad’s decision to proceed with large-scale deportation of undocumented Afghan nationals introduced a new and emotionally charged fault line, drawing criticism from Kabul and international rights organizations.

Spring saw Pakistan reassessing its Afghanistan policy amid growing recognition that coercive pressure alone had yielded limited results. Diplomatic engagement resumed cautiously, including high-level visits and technical talks focused on security, trade, and transit. Yet these engagements remained overshadowed by Islamabad’s insistence on “verifiable and irreversible” Taliban action against militant sanctuaries—an insistence Kabul resisted, often denying responsibility or reframing the issue as Pakistan’s internal failure. US intelligence assessments identifying the TTP as a future threat reinforced Pakistan’s narrative internationally and raised hopes of renewed counterterrorism convergence with Washington.

From April to June, relations oscillated between friction and pragmatic engagement. While refugee deportations accelerated and security accusations persisted, both sides expanded economic and transit cooperation. Pakistan upgraded diplomatic representation in Kabul, promoted Gwadar as an alternative Afghan trade gateway, waived financial requirements for Afghan traders, and advanced regional connectivity projects such as the Trans-Afghan Railway. China’s role became increasingly prominent, with trilateral engagements encouraging stability, counterterrorism cooperation, and economic integration. Within this context, cautious Taliban messaging emerged discouraging unauthorized cross-border militancy, though without explicitly naming the TTP—suggesting calibrated internal adjustments rather than a strategic policy shift.

Mid-year developments hinted at tentative rapprochement. Institutional mechanisms were revived, trade incentives introduced, and a Preferential Trade Agreement and Early Harvest Programme signed to lower tariffs on key agricultural goods. Diplomatic exchanges increased, and unconfirmed reports suggested limited Taliban action against recruitment networks targeting Pakistan. Islamabad, in turn, appeared to soften certain deadlines on refugee repatriation, signaling a growing reliance on incentives rather than deadlines alone. This fragile momentum unravelled sharply from August onward. Refugee repatriation expanded to include PoR cardholders (one million Afghans returned in first 11 months of 2025; UNHCR estimates) and Pakistan accused Kabul of continued inaction as militant attacks intensified.

The crisis peaked in October with the most serious military escalation, including Pakistani airstrikes, Taliban retaliation, and heavy border fighting causing significant casualties on both sides. Although Qatar- and Türkiye-mediated ceasefires temporarily halted the violence, talks failed as Pakistan demanded written guarantees against the TTP. By November and December, relations had sunk to their lowest point of the year. Diplomatic talks collapsed, border trade largely ceased, and Pakistan increasingly used economic pressure while avoiding overt escalation. Kabul, meanwhile, sought alternative trade routes and regional partners, including India, Iran, and Central Asia. Both sides hardened their public narratives, while mediation efforts by regional actors continued quietly behind the scenes. Security assessments by the UN, SIGAR, and Western media reinforced Pakistan’s claims regarding militant sanctuaries and weapons proliferation, adding international weight to Islamabad’s position.

The year ended with a narrow but notable opening: a rare gathering of Afghan clerics in Kabul declaring cross-border militancy illegitimate, cautiously welcomed by Pakistan as a positive—though insufficient—step. Despite persistent mistrust and unresolved core disputes, this development, combined with sustained regional mediation, suggested that neither side views outright rupture as a viable option. A similar gathering of Pakistani clerics in Karachi in December, inter alia, termed the armed insurgency – whether in the name of Islam or nationalism – as illegitimate and pushed for Pakistan-Afghanistan dialogue to address ongoing tensions and urged Taliban government not to allow its territory to be used by disruptive groups against Pakistan.

External mediation unfolded in distinct phases. During the first cycle of the conflict, China took the lead in mediation between the two countries, while Türkiye and Qatar became more active during the second cycle of heightened tensions, later joined by Iran. Despite these efforts, mediation produced limited outcomes beyond the establishment of a fragile ceasefire that continues to hold. Toward the end of the year, behind-the-scenes engagement by Saudi Arabia appeared to ease tensions marginally, though it remains uncertain whether these initiatives will translate into substantive or durable progress.

Unless a credible, verifiable counterterrorism mechanism emerges, the trajectory suggests continued volatility—managed through intermittent dialogue, regional mediation, and calibrated coercion rather than durable resolution. Managing Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan will remain a serious challenge in 2026 with its direct bearing on internal security, economic development and regional connectivity.

Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Relations: Deepening Defence Integration and Strategic Interdependence

In 2025, Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia underwent a significant qualitative shift, marked by intensified defence cooperation, expanding political coordination, and sustained economic support for Islamabad. The year reflected Riyadh and Islamabad’s mutual intent to elevate a historically close partnership into a more structured and forward-looking strategic alignment, shaped by evolving regional security dynamics, uncertainty over traditional security guarantors, and Pakistan’s quest for economic stability and diplomatic relevance.

Military cooperation remained the most visible pillar of the relationship. In February, the two sides conducted the Al-Samsaam VII joint military exercise in Pakistan focusing on counterterrorism, urban warfare, intelligence-based operations, and joint command coordination. The exercise depcited a shared emphasis on operational readiness and interoperability, reinforcing Pakistan’s role as a key training and security partner for Saudi forces. Also in February, Pakistan Navy and the Royal Saudi Naval Forces conducted the bilateral maritime exercise NASEEM AL BAHR-XV in the North Arabian Sea with live weapon firings, showing high levels of combat readiness and interoperability. Warships from both sides conducted surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile firings, while executing complex maritime scenarios including anti-surface, anti-submarine, and integrated maritime security operations. The exercise reinforced bilateral naval cooperation and highlighted Pakistan Navy’s combat firepower, complementing the confidence-building focus demonstrated earlier during AMAN-25. This momentum extended into the maritime domain in July, when Pakistan’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Naveed Ashraf hosted Vice Admiral Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Ghuraybi, Chief of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces, in Islamabad. Both sides highlighted enhanced naval cooperation, joint training, and regional maritime security.

A defining moment came on 17 September, when Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in Riyadh. While the full text was not made public, the pact committed both states to collective defence and formalised long-standing military cooperation encompassing training, interoperability, intelligence sharing, and defence-industrial collaboration. Its deliberate ambiguity—particularly regarding the scope of military commitments—fuelled debate within Pakistan and the wider region, including speculation over nuclear dimensions, which Pakistani officials later sought to downplay. Nonetheless, the agreement marked one of the most consequential upgrades in Pakistan–Saudi defence ties in decades and reflected Riyadh’s broader effort to diversify security partnerships amid shifting Gulf geopolitics.

The strategic pact also placed Pakistan more visibly within Gulf security conversations. In parallel, Islamabad amplified its diplomatic profile at Arab-Islamic forums, advocating collective responses to regional crises, particularly Gaza. While this enhanced Pakistan’s relevance to Middle Eastern diplomacy and aligned it more closely with Saudi regional positions, it also raised questions domestically about potential overstretch, given Pakistan’s concurrent security challenges on its eastern and western borders.

High-level engagement continued through October, when Prime Minister Sharif and Pakistan’s army chief visited Riyadh, combining economic diplomacy with defence coordination. Meetings with the Saudi leadership focused on trade, investment, energy cooperation, human resource mobility, and regional security, with discussions reportedly touching on Pakistan’s possible participation in emerging regional security frameworks. The visit, coinciding with the Future Investment Initiative, also showed Pakistan’s interest in attracting Saudi investment at a time of fiscal strain.

Efforts to operationalise the September defence pact accelerated in November, with a series of senior military exchanges. Pakistan’s Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Aamer Raza held talks in Riyadh with his Saudi counterpart, General Fayyadh bin Hameed Al-Rowaily, focusing on interoperability, joint planning, and defence-industrial cooperation aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Reciprocal visits to Islamabad, meetings with Pakistan’s military leadership, and discussions with the prime minister highlighted strong political backing for the evolving security framework. Operational collaboration was further reinforced through the Al-Battar II joint exercise in Tabuk, involving Pakistan’s Special Services Group and Saudi units, with emphasis on counterterrorism, urban warfare, and IED disposal. Field Marshal Asim Munir visited Saudi Arabia again in December showing enhanced coordination between the two countries on defence and diplomacy.

Beyond defence, Saudi Arabia continued to play a stabilising economic role for Pakistan. In December, the State Bank of Pakistan announced the rollover of a $3 billion Saudi deposit for another year, extending a financial support arrangement that has been renewed annually since 2021. While not new, the rollover depicted Riyadh’s ongoing role as a key economic backer during Pakistan’s balance-of-payments pressures and complemented broader defence and political engagement.

Pakistan–Saudi Arabia relations in 2025 reflected a transition from traditional cooperation to deeper strategic interdependence, particularly in the defence and security domain. While the upgraded partnership enhanced Pakistan’s regional profile and offered potential economic and diplomatic dividends, it also introduced new complexities, including questions about sustainability, strategic autonomy, and the balance between external commitments and domestic security priorities. Whether the ambitious defence framework translates into long-term stability and mutual benefit will depend on careful management of regional risks and the ability of both sides to align strategic expectations with practical implementation.

Pakistan’s Strategic Partnerships with Türkiye and Azerbaijan in 2025

In 2025, Pakistan’s engagement with Türkiye and Azerbaijan reflected a combination of strategic continuity and expansion, driven by sustained political contact, deepening defence ties, and a gradual shift toward economic and energy cooperation. During India-Pakistan conflict in May, Azerbaijan and Turkey, besides China, were the two countries expressing their full and unequivocal support to Pakistan further enhancing goodwill not only between the governments but also at the public level.

Relations with Azerbaijan gathered early momentum in January, when Baku signalled interest in investing in Pakistan’s infrastructure sector, particularly motorway development. This trajectory was consolidated in February during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Baku, which produced a series of agreements and memorandums of understanding covering energy cooperation, LNG procurement, pipelines, trade, tourism, and city-to-city linkages. These understandings provided an institutional framework for moving the relationship beyond political alignment toward long-term economic collaboration.

Pakistan–Azerbaijan relations gained further strategic depth in August with the visit of Azerbaijan’s senior military leadership to Pakistan. Engagements with Pakistan’s army chief and political leadership focused on defence cooperation, regional stability, and post-conflict dynamics in the South Caucasus. These exchanges coincided with Pakistan’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia following the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace agreement, indicating Islamabad’s attempt to balance principled support for Baku with a broader regional diplomatic posture.

Momentum with Azerbaijan peaked in November during Prime Minister Sharif’s second visit to Baku in 2025, timed with Azerbaijan’s Victory Day commemorations. Talks with President Ilham Aliyev framed the relationship as a long-term strategic partnership, prioritising defence, energy, connectivity, and trade. This political convergence translated into clearer economic signalling in December, when both sides publicly discussed potential investments of up to $2 billion, particularly in energy, oil, gas, mining, and a proposed pipeline project involving SOCAR.

On the other hand, Pakistan–Türkiye relations remained anchored in a mature strategic and security partnership, reinforced by frequent high-level exchanges across the year. A major milestone came on 12–13 February, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a state visit to Pakistan. The visit featured the seventh session of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC), co-chaired by President Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and resulted in the signing of 24 cooperation agreements spanning energy, transport, pharmaceuticals, media, climate change, sustainable agriculture, and renewable energy. Both the countries are also working on enhanced intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation, while both sides articulated an ambition to elevate ties into a “strategic economic partnership. President Tayyip Erdoğan’s address to Pakistan’s parliament reaffirmed Ankara’s support on Kashmir.

This momentum carried into April, when Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif undertook an official visit to Ankara. Talks with President Tayyip Erdoğan focused on regional stability, defence collaboration, and economic integration, including implementation of the Pakistan–Türkiye Trade in Goods Agreement to reduce tariffs and improve business facilitation. While both leaders reiterated a long-term bilateral trade target of $5 billion, the emphasis remained on incremental progress rather than immediate economic transformation, with cooperation expanding into areas such as energy, mining, agriculture, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.

Defence diplomacy remained the most consistent pillar of Pakistan–Türkiye engagement. In June, Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler visited Pakistan. During this meetings with Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership, both the sides reaffirmed the “brothers-in-arms” narrative, expanded cooperation in joint training and exercises, and reinforced intelligence coordination. This defence-centric convergence was further reflected in July, when Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirzra attended the International Defence Industry Fair in Istanbul, holding trilateral discussions with Turkish and Azerbaijani counterparts on defence production, training, and regional security—showing the growing overlap between Pakistan’s bilateral and trilateral security partnerships.

Political coordination with Türkiye continued in September on the sidelines of the SCO summit, where leaders reviewed progress in bilateral cooperation and aligned positions on humanitarian and geopolitical issues, including Gaza. In October, symbolic and substantive engagement converged around Türkiye’s Republic Day, accompanied by follow-up HLSCC interactions and defence-focused discussions on aviation, drones, and technology transfer. Financial cooperation also advanced, with memorandums signed between the two countries’ central banks and renewed emphasis on an ambitious long-term trade target of $10 billion.

The closing weeks of the year further highlighted the defence-industrial dimension of Pakistan–Türkiye ties. In December, Pakistan hosted a Turkish commercial delegation to explore joint ventures across aviation, aerospace, drones, automotive engineering, and advanced materials, with an emphasis on technology transfer and local manufacturing. This was followed by the commissioning of PNS Khaibar, the second MILGEM-class corvette built in Istanbul for the Pakistan Navy demonstrating the centrality of defence production and maritime security in the bilateral relationship.

Pakistan’s relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan in 2025 reflected a clear pattern of continuity and calibrated evolution. Engagement with Türkiye remained broad-based and strategically resilient, dominated by defence cooperation, political alignment, and gradual economic outreach. Ties with Azerbaijan, meanwhile, evolved more rapidly over the year—from early political goodwill to mid-year defence cooperation and, by December, concrete economic intent—indicating a deliberate effort by both Islamabad and Baku to convert longstanding diplomatic solidarity into tangible strategic and economic outcomes. This positive trajectory of Pakistan’s relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan is likely to grow further in coming years.

Pakistan–Iran Relations: Security Convergence, Strategic Balancing, and Economic Ambitions

In 2025, Pakistan’s bilateral relations with Iran witnessed a notable intensification across security, political, and economic dimensions, driven by persistent border challenges, regional crises, and Islamabad’s broader strategy of diplomatic balancing. While structural constraints—particularly sanctions, border insecurity, and implementation gaps—continued to limit tangible outcomes, the year stood out for sustained high-level engagement and efforts to place the relationship on a more structured and strategically aligned footing.

The year opened with a strong security emphasis in January, when Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammad Hossein Baqeri visited Islamabad and held talks with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir. Discussions focused on coordinated border patrols, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, and exploratory proposals for defence industrial cooperation. This engagement reflected shared recognition that militancy along the Pakistan–Iran border—particularly in Balochistan and Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province—posed a common and escalating threat, especially following the tensions and cross-border incidents of 2024.

This fragile security environment was underscored in April, when eight Pakistani nationals were killed in Iran’s Mehrestan area, an attack claimed by the Balochistan National Army (BNA). Islamabad strongly condemned the incident and pressed Tehran for swift accountability, while Iran denounced the killings as terrorism and pledged action. The episode highlighted the persistent vulnerabilities of the border region and reinforced Pakistan’s longstanding concern that militant groups exploit porous frontiers and regional instability. Against this backdrop, Pakistani military and political leadership reiterated a zero-tolerance stance on militancy, while emphasizing the necessity of deeper operational cooperation with Iran.

Political engagement intensified after the May India–Pakistan conflict, when Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif included Tehran in a regional diplomatic tour aimed at de-escalation and regional reassurance. This outreach gained added significance following the June Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and Tehran’s subsequent response, which sharply escalated regional tensions. Pakistan adopted a carefully calibrated diplomatic posture—condemning violations of Iranian sovereignty and international law while avoiding overt alignment against the United States or escalation with Western partners. Islamabad’s nuanced messaging, including legally framed National Security Committee statements and quiet outreach to Gulf states, reflected an effort to balance principled support for Iran with broader geopolitical realities.

Within this context, Pakistan is widely believed to have played a quiet mediating role between Iran and the United States in the aftermath of the Israeli attack. While no official confirmation was issued, it is believed that Islamabad used its channels with both Tehran and Washington to encourage restraint and de-escalation. It is also believed that Pakistan conveyed to U.S. interlocutors its assessment that any attempt at regime change in Iran would risk destabilizing not only Iran but the wider Middle East and adjoining regions, including South and Central Asia. This behind-the-scenes engagement aligned with Pakistan’s broader interest in preventing regional spillover, safeguarding border stability, and preserving space for diplomatic solutions amid intensifying polarization.

Multilateral diplomacy reinforced bilateral engagement in July, when Pakistani and Iranian leaders met on the sidelines of the ECO Summit in Khankendi. Prime Minister Sharif and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reviewed bilateral cooperation, trade prospects, and regional connectivity, while parallel foreign minister–level talks addressed security, migration, and economic corridors. Similar themes surfaced during interactions on the margins of SCO-related meetings, situating Pakistan–Iran relations within wider regional frameworks emphasizing dialogue and economic integration.

A significant milestone followed in August, when President Pezeshkian paid a three-day state visit to Pakistan—his first bilateral visit abroad since assuming office. The visit marked a clear attempt to elevate ties beyond crisis management. Both sides committed to enhanced counterterrorism coordination against groups such as Jaish al-Adl and the BLA, while setting ambitious economic targets, including raising bilateral trade to $10 billion. Twelve agreements and MoUs were signed across trade, ICT, agriculture, tourism, maritime safety, and judicial cooperation. While the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline remained absent from public statements, it continued to loom as a strategic issue shaped by sanctions and arbitration concerns.

Security coordination gained renewed urgency later in August after attacks on Iranian security forces in Sistan-Baluchestan, prompting intensified communication between senior military leadership and commitments to joint patrols and intelligence sharing. Political engagement continued through September and October, including meetings on the sidelines of Islamic summits and detailed talks between interior ministries on counterterrorism, anti-narcotics, and border management. Iran also signalled willingness to assist in easing Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions, aligning with Islamabad’s broader regional diplomacy. Subsequently in mid-December, a meeting was held in Tehran in mid-December of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours plus Russia but Taliban denied to attend it.

Momentum peaked in November, marked by the visit of Ali Ardeshir Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. His extensive engagements with Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership indicated shared priorities of border security, counterterrorism, economic cooperation, and regional stability. Discussions on trade in national currencies, border markets, rail connectivity, and convening overdue economic mechanisms reflected attempts to insulate bilateral ties from sanctions-related constraints. Institutional dialogue was reinforced through the 13th Pakistan–Iran Bilateral Political Consultations, followed by another leaders’ meeting in December on the sidelines of the International Conference on Peace and Trust in Turkmenistan.

Pakistan–Iran relations in 2025 were characterised by intensified engagement, growing security convergence, and ambitious—but still constrained—economic aspirations. Political goodwill and diplomatic coordination improved markedly, and Pakistan’s reported mediating role during the Iran–Israel crisis highlighted its evolving regional profile. However, the durability of this momentum will ultimately depend on whether sustained counterterrorism cooperation and economic initiatives can be translated from high-level commitments into consistent, on-ground implementation amid continued regional volatility and external pressures.

Pakistan–US Relations: Strategic Re-Engagement

In 2025, Pakistan’s engagement with the United States entered a phase of renewed momentum, marked by military-to-military contacts, revived counterterrorism cooperation, expanding economic engagement, and cautious political recalibration. While the relationship remained shaped by structural asymmetries—particularly Washington’s continued strategic prioritisation of India and divergences over China, Iran, and Afghanistan—the year nonetheless reflected a deliberate effort by both sides to test the scope of a broader, more diversified partnership beyond the post-Afghanistan drawdown phase. President Trump’s second term in office and his focus on resolving conflicts and economic engagement created opportuntities for both the US and Pakistan to work for re-engagement.

The year’s reset began to take shape in April, when a bipartisan U.S. congressional delegation visited Islamabad, holding separate meetings with Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir. Discussions focused on regional security, counterterrorism cooperation, and defence engagement, alongside trade concerns, including newly imposed U.S. tariffs on Pakistani exports. The visit—Capitol Hill’s first to Pakistan in nearly two years—was widely viewed as an early signal of re-engagement as the Trump administration clarified its foreign policy priorities. Both sides acknowledged Pakistan’s counterterrorism sacrifices and expressed interest in restoring structured dialogue, including a dedicated counterterrorism mechanism.

Security cooperation regained centrality as the relationship evolved. Pakistan actively positioned itself as a critical counterterrorism partner, particularly against Afghanistan-based militant groups such as ISIS-K and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. This convergence was reinforced by U.S. Central Command leadership testimony before Congress describing Pakistan as a “phenomenal partner” in counterterrorism operations. The arrest of ISKP operative Sharifullah by Pakistan and his subsequent handover to U.S. authorities—publicly praised by President Donald Trump during his address in Congress—became a symbolic marker of renewed operational cooperation.

High-level military diplomacy significantly shaped the relationship. A landmark moment came with the June visit of Field Marshal Asim Munir to Washington, during which he became the first serving Pakistani army chief to meet a sitting U.S. president at the White House without civilian leadership present. Discussions with President Trump focused on regional stability following the India-Pakistan crisis, counterterrorism, and broader strategic issues. The unusual format of the engagement depicted Washington’s renewed reliance on Pakistan’s military leadership as a stabilising interlocutor in South Asia. In the meanwhile, Pakistan formally recommended President Trump for Nobel Peace prize for “diplomatic intervention and pivotal leadership” during Indo-Pakistan conflict. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s visit was followed by the July visit of Pakistan Air Force Chief Air Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, the first by a serving air chief in over a decade, which centred on interoperability, joint training, technology sharing, etc. Naval engagement included port calls, senior-level exchanges, and the Chief of Naval Staff’s visit to Washington later in the year, reinforcing maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. In late July, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar held bilateral talks with the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington. PM Shahbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir visited the US in September and met President Trump to discuss, inter alia, regional security and counter-terrorism and economic cooperation besides developments related to the Middle East.

Counterterrorism cooperation was further institutionalised in August, when Islamabad hosted the Pakistan–U.S. Counterterrorism Dialogue following Washington’s designation of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Pakistan viewed the designation as long-sought diplomatic validation of its security concerns. Outcomes included commitments to deeper intelligence sharing, training programs, and cooperation against the use of emerging technologies by militant groups.

Economic relations gained renewed traction alongside security cooperation. In July, Pakistan and the United States concluded a trade agreement aimed at reducing tariffs and expanding market access for Pakistani textiles, IT services, and agricultural exports, while opening U.S. investment in Pakistan’s minerals and energy sectors. This was followed by announcements of U.S. interest in oil exploration, critical minerals, and rare earth supply chains, including the first reported shipment of rare earth elements in October. In December, the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s approval of $1.25 billion in financing for the Reko Diq project further anchored economic cooperation, positioning minerals as a new pillar of bilateral ties.

Defence cooperation also advanced materially. In December, Washington approved a $686 million F-16 modernisation package for Pakistan, covering avionics upgrades, secure communications, training, and logistics support, extending the fleet’s operational life to 2040. The approval—after years of delays—signalled U.S. willingness to sustain Pakistan’s conventional defence capabilities within a counterterrorism and interoperability framework, even as Washington reiterated that the package would not alter the regional military balance.

Diplomatically, Pakistan’s engagement with the U.S. expanded beyond bilateral issues into regional and global contexts. Washington played a key role in May backchannel efforts to de-escalate the India-Pakistan crisis following the Pahalgam attack, reinforcing its stabilising role in South Asia. Pakistan also emerged as a participant in U.S. consultations on Gaza and broader Middle Eastern diplomacy, while speculation grew about Islamabad’s quiet facilitation of communication between Washington and Tehran, reflecting Pakistan’s growing strategic space.

By late 2025, Pakistan–U.S. relations exhibited cautious optimism but remained conditional. The relationship showed clear movement away from a narrow, Afghanistan-centric frame toward a more multifaceted engagement encompassing counterterrorism, defence modernisation, trade, energy, and critical minerals. At the same time, enduring divergences—particularly U.S. alignment with India, Pakistan’s ties with China, and sensitivities over regional militancy—continued to constrain a full strategic convergence. Nevertheless, the density of high-level contacts, institutional dialogues, and economic initiatives in 2025 suggests that both Islamabad and Washington are actively testing the foundations of a more durable, though still transactional, partnership.

Pakistan’s Engagement with Southeast Asia: Defence Diplomacy and Economic Reconnection

In 2025, Pakistan’s engagement with Southeast Asian nations reflected a deliberate effort to diversify its regional partnerships beyond traditional theatres, with a particular focus on defence cooperation, economic revitalisation, and connectivity with ASEAN-linked states. Relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam advanced along parallel but distinct tracks, combining high-level political outreach with sustained military diplomacy and sector-specific economic cooperation.

Engagement with Indonesia was broader in scope and more heavily anchored in defence and strategic cooperation. In February, Pakistan Navy Ship Aslat participated in the multinational naval exercise KOMODO-25 in Indonesia alongside 38 participating countries. This was followed by a high-level defence engagement in July, when Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin visited Pakistan and held talks with Pakistan’s military leadership and the prime minister. Discussions focused on regional security, counterterrorism, defence production, and the expansion of military-to-military cooperation, reflecting shared concerns over extremism and regional stability. Defence cooperation with Indonesia deepened further in November through the Pakistan–Indonesia Joint Exercise Shaheen Strike-II, which emphasised counterterrorism operations, interoperability, and joint operational readiness. These engagements culminated in December with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit to Pakistan, coinciding with the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations. The visit marked a strategic consolidation of ties, with agreements covering trade, health, agriculture, information technology, science, education, and defence. While bilateral trade—dominated by Pakistan’s palm oil imports—remained imbalanced, both sides committed to diversifying exports and reviewing the Indonesia–Pakistan Preferential Trade Agreement. Defence and security cooperation featured prominently, with both leaders endorsing deeper military collaboration and coordination on counterterrorism. Although unconfirmed, media reporting suggested exploratory discussions on potential Indonesian interest in Pakistani defence hardware including acquisition of JF-17 thunder fighter jets, underscoring the growing strategic dimension of the relationship.

Pakistan–Malaysia relations experienced renewed momentum in October, following Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s three-day official visit to Kuala Lumpur. Meetings with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signalled a shared intent to revitalise a relationship that both sides acknowledged had underperformed relative to its potential. The signing of six memoranda of understanding and multiple cooperation agreements—covering defence, higher education, aviation, tourism, health, and anti-corruption—reflected a pragmatic shift toward results-oriented engagement. Both leaders emphasised the importance of anchoring bilateral ties within a broader ASEAN framework, with Malaysia positioning Pakistan as a prospective economic partner amid its own efforts to diversify trade and investment linkages. Defence cooperation under the Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation (JCDC) was reaffirmed, alongside initiatives to enhance air connectivity, healthcare collaboration, disaster management, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism, pointing to a more comprehensive and forward-looking partnership.

Pakistan’s outreach, though limited at the mooment, also extended to Brunei, depicted Islamabad’s intent to broaden defence diplomacy across Southeast Asia. In November, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Sahir Shamshad Mirza undertook an official visit to Brunei Darussalam, meeting Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah and senior military leadership. Discussions focused on defence cooperation, training exchanges, and regional security, with Bruneian officials expressing interest in institutionalising regular defence dialogue. The visit indicated Pakistan’s broader strategy of positioning itself as a professional and reliable defence partner across the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Pakistan–Russia Engagement: Expanding Security Cooperation and Economic Alignment

In 2025, Pakistan’s engagement with Russia gathered sustained momentum across military, security, diplomatic, and economic domains, reflecting a gradual but deliberate diversification of Islamabad’s external partnerships amid shifting global alignments. While the relationship did not represent a strategic realignment away from Pakistan’s traditional partners, it demonstrated increasing comfort on both sides in institutionalising cooperation, particularly in maritime security, counterterrorism, energy, and regional connectivity.

Military-to-military engagement remained a visible pillar of the relationship. In February, Pakistan hosted the multinational AMAN 2025 naval exercise off the coast of Karachi, with participation from more than 60 countries, including Russia. Organised by the Pakistan Navy, AMAN 2025 focused on maritime security, counter-piracy, search and rescue, and interoperability, reinforcing Pakistan’s role as a convenor of regional and extra-regional naval cooperation in the North Arabian Sea. This multilateral engagement was complemented in March by the bilateral naval exercise Arabian Monsoon VI between the Pakistan Navy and the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean, which included harbour drills, air–sea coordination with Pakistan Air Force assets, and professional exchanges in Karachi. These activities demonstrated a shared interest in addressing common maritime security challenges despite the absence of a formal alliance framework.

In April, Pakistan and Russia held the 11th meeting of their Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism in Moscow, led by Pakistan’s Special Secretary (UN) Nabeel Munir and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin. Discussions centred on transnational terrorism, with particular emphasis on Afghanistan and the threat posed by groups such as ISIS-K. This engagement reflected growing convergence in threat perceptions and a shared concern over spillover effects from Afghan instability. Separately, the 15th round of the Pakistan–Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Stability, held in Islamabad in April, addressed arms control, non-proliferation, and emerging technologies, signalling a cautious expansion of dialogue into traditionally sensitive strategic domains.

High-level political engagement was sustained through multilateral platforms. On the sidelines of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meetings, Pakistan’s leadership engaged Russian counterparts repeatedly during the year. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at SCO-related gatherings, where both sides welcomed the positive trajectory of ties and discussed cooperation in trade, energy, defence, and connectivity. This engagement culminated in a September meeting in Beijing between Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and President Vladimir Putin, where both leaders expressed satisfaction with growing trade, Russian oil supplies to Pakistan, and the potential for deeper cooperation in energy, defence, and regional transit projects. Notably, President Putin and PM Shahbaz Sharif also met in December in Ashgabat.

Economic and institutional cooperation gained notable traction in the second half of the year. The 10th session of the Pakistan–Russia Intergovernmental Commission (IGC), held in Islamabad from 25–27 November, emerged as a central mechanism for translating political intent into practical cooperation. Co-chaired by Pakistan’s Energy Minister and Russia’s Energy Minister, the IGC reviewed progress across trade diversification, energy cooperation (including oil, gas, LNG, and refinery modernisation), pharmaceuticals, metallurgy, mining, and disaster resilience. Agreements to operationalise pilot cargo movements and explore rail connectivity indicated a shared interest in regional logistics corridors. The signing of memoranda of understanding on standardisation, competition law, and media cooperation further strengthened institutional linkages.

Educational, scientific, and people-to-people ties also featured prominently. Plans to establish Russian language centres in Islamabad and Karachi, expand scholarships, and enhance academic exchanges reflected an effort to build a longer-term societal foundation for bilateral relations. These themes were reinforced in December at the inaugural Russia–Pakistan Eurasian Forum in Moscow, where policymakers and scholars discussed counterterrorism, Eurasian multilateralism, and cooperation within the SCO framework, with Afghanistan repeatedly identified as a shared security concern.

Energy cooperation remained a key driver of engagement toward the end of the year. In mid-December, Pakistan confirmed ongoing negotiations with Russia on oil supply arrangements, refinery cooperation, and potential involvement in steel sector modernisation, reflecting Islamabad’s search for affordable and reliable energy sources amid economic pressures. While many of these initiatives remain at exploratory or pilot stages, they indicate a pragmatic alignment of economic interests shaped by Pakistan’s diversification strategy and Russia’s outreach to non-Western partners.

Pakistan–Russia relations in 2025 reflected a pattern of incremental but steady deepening, characterised by expanding security dialogue, regular military engagement, and growing economic and institutional cooperation. While the relationship remains constrained by geopolitical realities and limited trade volumes, the breadth and frequency of interactions suggest a maturing partnership driven by converging interests in regional stability, counterterrorism, and connectivity rather than ideological alignment or alliance politics.

Pakistan’s Engagement with the EU and the UK in 2025

In 2025, Pakistan’s engagement with the European Union and the United Kingdom reflected a broad-based, process-driven relationship combining development cooperation, political dialogue, trade conditionality, migration management, and security coordination. The year demonstrated both continuity and growing complexity, as structured institutional engagement deepened alongside increased scrutiny linked to governance, human rights, and mobility frameworks.

During the first half of 2025, Pakistan–EU engagement focused primarily on development cooperation and migration management. In February, the EU launched civil society funding calls worth €8.33 million in Islamabad, targeting gender equality, youth empowerment, and human rights reforms within Pakistan’s criminal justice system. These initiatives complemented ongoing cooperation in rule of law, vocational training, and social development, reinforcing the EU’s normative and capacity-building footprint. This was followed in June by the 13th EU–Pakistan Joint Commission in Brussels, which reviewed sectoral cooperation with particular emphasis on migration, including returns and readmission, and agreed to convene the next session in Islamabad later in the year.

Political and strategic engagement gained further momentum in July, when the 10th EU–Pakistan Political Dialogue was held in Brussels. Co-chaired by EU Deputy Secretary General Olof Skoog and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch, the dialogue reaffirmed commitment to the 2019 Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP) and sustained engagement under the GSP+ trade framework. Discussions covered counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, migration, and global issues, while both sides agreed to convene the 7th Strategic Dialogue later in 2025, underscoring the institutional depth of the relationship.

High-level political contacts continued in September, when Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar held a phone call with EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, reaffirming cooperation on climate action, resilience, and sustainable recovery. This period also saw expanding cooperation on migration and labour mobility. In October, Pakistan and the EU agreed to deepen collaboration under the Talent Partnership framework, focusing on legal migration pathways and skills matching. The launch of the EU’s Entry/Exit System (EES) for the Schengen area in October introduced new biometric requirements for Pakistani travellers, signalling tighter but more systematised border management.

Engagement reached its peak intensity in November, marked by Ishaq Dar’s official visit to Brussels from 19–21 November. The visit coincided with the 7th EU–Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, co-chaired by Dar and Kaja Kallas, which reviewed SEP implementation and committed both sides to deeper cooperation in trade, migration, human rights, development, and climate action under the EU’s Global Gateway initiative. GSP+ remained central, with the EU updating Pakistan on post-2027 reforms while Islamabad underscored the scheme’s importance for exports and employment. Regional discussions covered Ukraine, Gaza, Jammu and Kashmir, and Afghanistan, with the EU urging Taliban action on counter-terrorism and human rights. Parallel meetings addressed migration management and regional diplomacy, situating Pakistan–EU relations within a wider Indo-Pacific and global context.

Institutional engagement continued through the 14th EU–Pakistan Joint Commission, which assessed post-election developments, GSP+-driven trade growth, development cooperation in green energy and human capital, and progress on migration and Afghan refugee support. Follow-up mechanisms remained active into December, with a sub-group meeting on democracy, rule of law, and human rights on 1 December, and the 15th Joint Commission on 17 December in Brussels, which provided a comprehensive review of political, economic, and development cooperation.

Alongside EU engagement, Pakistan’s interaction with the United Kingdom in 2025 remained more narrowly focused but comparatively stable, centred on security and counter-terrorism cooperation. While UK–Pakistan relations lacked the dense development and trade conditionality seen with the EU, sustained defence and counter-terrorism dialogues underscored London’s role as a key bilateral security partner, complementing Pakistan’s broader engagement with Europe.

Pakistan’s engagement with the EU and the UK in 2025 reflected a dual dynamic. With the EU, relations were expansive and institutionalised, spanning development, trade, migration, climate, and security, but increasingly shaped by conditionality and regulatory scrutiny. With the UK, engagement remained more pragmatic and security-oriented. These tracks illustrated Pakistan’s effort to balance cooperation with European partners against evolving expectations on governance, mobility, and regional stability, setting the tone for a more demanding but structured partnership in coming year(s).

Pakistan–Egypt Relations: Defence, Diplomacy, and Economic Outreach

Pakistan–Egypt relations witnessed renewed momentum in 2025, marked by sustained high-level engagement across defence, political, economic, and cultural domains. These interactions reflect Islamabad’s broader defence diplomacy in the Middle East and Cairo’s interest in reinforcing ties with a longstanding partner amid regional instability, particularly linked to Gaza and wider security challenges.

In July, Pakistan’s defence outreach was underscored by the visit of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Sahir Shamshad Mirza to Egypt for the third round of Pakistan–Egypt Defence and Security Talks. Meetings with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and senior defence officials focused on expanding military cooperation, counterterrorism coordination, and joint training. Notably, General Mirza’s engagement with the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar highlighted Pakistan’s parallel use of religious and soft-power diplomacy to promote interfaith harmony and counter extremist narratives alongside conventional security cooperation.

Defence diplomacy intensified further in September when Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir held talks in Cairo with President el-Sisi, Defence Minister Abdel Mageed Ahmed Saqr, and senior military leadership. Discussions reaffirmed long-standing strategic ties, with emphasis on defence collaboration, intelligence sharing, and cooperation in maritime and industrial sectors. The exchanges also reflected shared assessments of regional stability, while continued engagement with Al-Azhar’s leadership reinforced convergence on countering extremist ideologies and promoting unity within the Muslim world.

The relationship gained additional breadth with the two-day visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to Islamabad on 29–30 November. Meetings with President Asif Ali Zardari, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Field Marshal Asim Munir signaled a shared intent to elevate bilateral engagement to a more structured and strategic level. Defence discussions at General Headquarters focused on military exchanges, training, and regional security, while parallel political talks emphasized economic cooperation and investment opportunities in Pakistan’s energy, infrastructure, agriculture, mining, and IT sectors.

Economic engagement featured prominently during the visit, with both sides acknowledging that bilateral trade—estimated at around $300 million—remains below potential. Pakistan announced plans to facilitate targeted business linkages, establish a Pakistan–Egypt Business Council, and convene a Pakistan–Egypt Business Forum in Cairo in 2026, aiming to institutionalize private-sector cooperation. Egypt, in turn, expressed readiness to expand cooperation across education and culture, including doubling scholarships for Pakistani students at Al-Azhar University, and outlined its integrated counterterrorism approach combining security, socio-economic measures, and religious moderation.

Regional developments, particularly the Gaza crisis, formed a consistent thread across engagements. Pakistan welcomed Egypt’s humanitarian and diplomatic role, while Cairo reiterated support for a two-state solution and invited Pakistan to participate in future Gaza reconstruction efforts. Overall, the sequence of defence, diplomatic, and economic interactions indicates a gradual deepening of Pakistan–Egypt relations, with both sides seeking to anchor traditional security cooperation within a broader framework of economic connectivity, institutional linkages, and coordinated regional positions.

Pakistan–Libya Defence Engagement: Strategic Outreach Amid Political Fragmentation

In 2025, Pakistan significantly expanded its defence engagement with Libya, signalling a growing willingness to project military diplomacy and defence-industrial capacity into conflict-affected regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. The centrepiece of this outreach was a high-level visit to Benghazi by Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces and Army Chief, Asim Munir, where he held talks with the commander of the eastern-based Libyan Arab Armed Forces, Khalifa Haftar, and his deputy, Saddam Khalifa Haftar. Official messaging framed the engagement as part of Pakistan’s broader military-to-military cooperation agenda, with emphasis on counterterrorism, training, and institutional capacity building, reflecting Islamabad’s attempt to leverage its operational experience and professional military training as tools of strategic influence.

The Benghazi visit followed earlier contacts, including Saddam Haftar’s visit to Pakistan in July, during which discussions reportedly explored defence-industrial cooperation and technical exchanges. Taken together, these interactions indicate a shift from symbolic engagement toward more sustained and institutionalised defence ties with Libya’s eastern authorities. For Pakistan, this outreach aligns with its broader defence diplomacy strategy—expanding partnerships, showcasing indigenous military platforms, and positioning itself as an alternative defence supplier for states facing political constraints or security challenges.

This engagement gained further significance with reports that Pakistan concluded a multi-billion-dollar defence export agreement with Libya’s eastern authorities. According to Reuters, the deal—valued at over $4 billion—was finalised following meetings in Benghazi between Pakistani military leadership and Saddam Haftar. Draft details suggest the package may include the sale of JF-17 Thunder aircraft, jointly produced by Pakistan and China, as well as Super Mushak trainer planes, alongside equipment for land, sea, and air forces. If implemented over the reported two-and-a-half-year timeline, the agreement would represent one of the largest defence export deals in Pakistan’s history, significantly expanding its footprint in the global conventional arms market.

However, the reported deal carries substantial political and legal sensitivities. Libya remains under a United Nations arms embargo imposed in 2011, requiring UN approval for weapons transfers. Pakistani officials cited by Reuters have argued that the embargo has long been eroded in practice, describing it as a “paper embargo” routinely circumvented by multiple external actors. Nonetheless, any large-scale arms transfer to the Libyan National Army is likely to attract international scrutiny, particularly given Libya’s prolonged instability and the absence of a unified national authority.

The engagement also exposes a diplomatic tension in Pakistan’s Libya policy. Islamabad formally recognises the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity led by Abdulhamid Dbeibah, yet its deepening defence ties with the unrecognised eastern authority underscore a pragmatic—if risky—approach to engagement. While this allows Pakistan to advance defence exports and military diplomacy, it also entails reputational and signalling risks amid Libya’s fragmented legitimacy, personalised power structures in the east, and competing regional alignments involving Gulf and Western actors.

For Islamabad, the Libya engagement reflects a calculated attempt to convert defence production capacity into economic and strategic gains, supporting its objective of an export-driven, more self-sustaining defence sector. At the same time, it highlights the delicate balance Pakistan must maintain between commercial ambition, diplomatic consistency, and international legal constraints. Whether this outreach yields durable strategic dividends or exposes Pakistan to greater diplomatic friction will depend on careful calibration and the evolving dynamics of Libya’s unresolved internal conflict.

Pakistan–Jordan Relations: Strategic Alignment and Defence Cooperation

Pakistan and Jordan used the two-day state visit of King Abdullah II to Islamabad (15–16 November) to reinforce a multidimensional partnership anchored in shared regional concerns, humanitarian priorities, and expanding defence cooperation. The visit highlighted political convergence on Middle East stability—particularly Gaza—while also signaling intent to broaden bilateral engagement across economic, technological, and security domains.

At the political level, discussions between King Abdullah II and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif highlighted alignment on humanitarian principles and regional stability, with both leaders adopting a firm stance against the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. The exchanges reflected coordinated positions with other Arab and Muslim countries and support for international efforts, including a U.S.-backed proposal for an international stabilization force. Broader regional security consultations included briefings on Afghanistan and India, with Jordan acknowledging Pakistan’s role in promoting stability in a complex neighbourhood.

Beyond political dialogue, the visit advanced practical cooperation across trade, investment, health, education, science and technology, and defence. The signing of memorandums of understanding in media, culture, and education aimed to institutionalize people-to-people ties, while the ceremonial welcome—including a guard of honour and Pakistan Air Force JF-17 Thunder escort—underscored the symbolic importance attached to the relationship by both sides.

Defence cooperation featured prominently. King Abdullah II’s visit to Global Industrial & Defence Solutions provided exposure to Pakistan’s indigenous defence capabilities and prospects for joint collaboration. His attendance at a joint fire and manoeuvre exercise at the Tilla Field Firing Ranges—alongside Pakistan’s leadership and Azerbaijan’s defence minister—highlighted interoperability, multi-domain operations, and emerging warfare capabilities, reinforcing military-to-military confidence.

The exchange of high national honours further reflected the depth of ties. King Abdullah II conferred the Order of the Military Merit (First Degree) on Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir, recognizing his role in strengthening defence cooperation, while Pakistan awarded the king the Nishan-i-Pakistan for his leadership, advocacy on Palestine, and sustained support for bilateral relations. Collectively, the visit signaled a maturing Pakistan–Jordan partnership—one that blends principled humanitarian positions with expanding defence and economic cooperation, and is increasingly embedded in structured, long-term engagement.

Pakistan–Bahrain Relations: Security and Economic Partnership

Pakistan–Bahrain relations have gained renewed momentum in 2025, evolving from sector-specific cooperation into a more structured and goal-oriented partnership that integrates security collaboration with ambitious economic objectives. A key early driver of this trajectory was the September engagement between Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Bahrain’s Interior Minister Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, which led to agreement on enhancing cooperation in counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, immigration, and border security. The decision to establish a Joint Working Group and finalize memoranda on extradition, mutual legal assistance, and specialized battalion training signaled a move toward institutionalizing internal security cooperation rather than relying on ad hoc coordination.

Counter-narcotics cooperation emerged as a particular priority, with Pakistan highlighting its interdiction efforts despite resource constraints and welcoming Bahrain’s decision to appoint a Drug Liaison Officer in Islamabad. The discussions also reflected recognition of the stabilizing role played by the large Pakistani expatriate community in Bahrain, which continues to underpin people-to-people ties and provide a social foundation for closer bilateral engagement. Subsequent meetings of the Bahraini interior minister with President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif broadened the focus to economic cooperation, with Islamabad emphasizing investment facilitation and signaling openness to a larger Bahraini economic footprint in Pakistan.

This security-led engagement was complemented and elevated by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s two-day visit to Manama in late November, which marked one of the most substantive political exchanges between the two countries in recent years. Discussions with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa produced an ambitious commitment to raise bilateral trade to US$1 billion within three years, nearly doubling current levels. Both sides explicitly linked this target to the prospective Pakistan–GCC Free Trade Agreement and recent visa facilitation measures, underscoring a shared view that economic partnership should anchor future relations. Pakistan also proposed enhanced maritime connectivity between its ports and Bahrain’s Khalifa bin Salman Port to support more efficient trade flows.

High-level meetings with King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa further reinforced the breadth of the relationship, spanning political, cultural, economic, and defence domains. Defence cooperation featured prominently, with both sides agreeing to expand collaboration in training, defence production, cybersecurity, and information-sharing. Regional issues, particularly Gaza, also figured in the dialogue, reflecting convergent positions on the need for stability and durable peace. The conferral of Bahrain’s highest state honour on Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif symbolized political goodwill and historical continuity in the relationship.

The sequence of engagements suggests that Pakistan–Bahrain relations are transitioning from episodic cooperation to a more institutionalized partnership with clearly articulated economic and security goals. With formal mechanisms such as joint working groups, parliamentary exchanges, and trade targets now in place, both countries appear positioned to pursue a comprehensive agenda grounded in mutual security interests, economic complementarity, and longstanding people-to-people ties.

Pakistan–UAE Relations: Economic Partnership and Mobility Management

Pakistan–UAE relations in 2025 reflected a mix of strategic alignment, deepening economic interdependence, and episodic frictions over mobility and visa access besides some concerns on Couunter-Terrorism demonstrating both the resilience and evolving complexity of the bilateral partnership. High-level political and diplomatic engagements throughout the year indicated a shared intent to consolidate ties across trade, investment, security, and people-to-people exchanges, even as administrative and regulatory challenges intermittently tested public perceptions of the relationship.

Momentum was reinforced in February through a series of senior-level engagements. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Abu Dhabi and his meeting with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan focused on expanding cooperation in trade, energy, defence, and investment. This was followed by the first official visit to Pakistan of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, during which five accords were signed covering banking, railways, mining, and infrastructure development. These agreements signaled a deliberate effort to anchor political goodwill in tangible economic and strategic outcomes.

This trajectory was further consolidated during Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed’s two-day visit to Pakistan in April, which reaffirmed the goal of building a broad-based strategic partnership. Delegation-level talks emphasized trade, investment, energy cooperation, regional security, and cultural links, against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding economic relationship. Bilateral trade surpassed $10.9 billion in FY 2023–24, bolstered by infrastructure-focused agreements exceeding $3 billion and the UAE’s $10 billion investment pledge announced in 2024. Institutional outcomes of the visit—including the establishment of a UAE–Pakistan Joint Business Council and a Joint Consular Affairs Committee—reflected an effort to formalize economic and consular cooperation while exploring new areas such as tourism, information technology, and sustainable development. Meetings with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, alongside Pakistan’s senior military leadership, underscored the strategic weight attached to the partnership.

Alongside these advances, visa and mobility issues emerged as a sensitive and recurring theme. While UAE officials, including Interior Minister Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, publicly assured support for visa facilitation during meetings with Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, contradictory signals surfaced in mid-to-late 2025. Pakistani parliamentary committees were informed that visas for Pakistani nationals had been significantly restricted, reportedly due to concerns over criminal activity and misuse of visit visas. These disclosures contrasted with parallel assurances from UAE officials and diplomats that reforms—such as online processing, e-visas, five-year visas, and expanded visa centre capacity—were being implemented to ease access for Pakistani citizens.

The handling of the visa issue illustrates a broader dynamic in Pakistan–UAE relations: strong strategic and economic convergence at the state level, occasionally offset by administrative and regulatory frictions that carry domestic political and social implications. Despite these challenges, both governments consistently framed the relationship as fraternal, strategic, and forward-looking, emphasizing the contributions of the Pakistani diaspora and the importance of continued coordination on security, technology, and public welfare.

In late December, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan paid an official visit to Pakistan and held talks with Pakistani civil and military leadership. It was MBZ’s first official visit to Pakistan after his private visit in January this year where PM Shahbaz Sharif had called on him in Rahim Yar Khan. During the latest visit, both the countries agreed to expand cooperation in trade, investment, energy, infrastructure, IT, technology, and people-to-people exchanges, while also coordinating on regional and international issues. The visit, though marked by a high-level reception and strong symbolic gestures, did not produce anything substantial on trade and investments. According to unverified reports from some journalists, Pakistan has taken up the issue of terror financing enjoyed by the Baloch militant groups through the UAE. Notably, when the UAE President was in Pakistan (during private leg of his visit), PM Shahbaz Sharif and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar called on him in Rahim Yar Khan at the time when tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia was high after Saudi strikes in Yamen and Pakistan is believed to have mediated between the two countries to normalize situation.

Pakistan–Iraq Engagement: Focus on Security and Economic Cooperation

As Pakistan and Iraq seek to broaden bilateral engagement, President Asif Ali Zardari met Iraqi President Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid in Baghdad, where both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation against extremism, terrorism, and the narcotics trade while exploring avenues to expand trade, investment, and people-to-people contacts. The meeting, held at the Baghdad Palace, included one-on-one talks and delegation-level discussions, reflecting a renewed emphasis on institutional engagement.

The two leaders reviewed the state of bilateral relations and expressed satisfaction over the positive momentum generated by recent interactions, including meetings of the Pakistan–Iraq Joint Ministerial Commission and parliamentary exchanges. President Zardari noted that existing trade volumes fall short of the relationship’s potential and highlighted opportunities in agriculture, defence production, information technology, construction, and pharmaceuticals. He also emphasised the need for direct banking channels and closer business-to-business engagement to facilitate commercial activity.

President Zardari reiterated Pakistan’s willingness to support Iraq’s reconstruction through the provision of skilled and semi-skilled manpower under an existing agreement, while also seeking improved facilities for Pakistani pilgrims and the early finalisation of a memorandum of understanding on Zaireen management. He further conveyed Pakistan’s resolve to cooperate with Iraqi authorities to curb illegal entry and overstays. President Rashid, in turn, appreciated Pakistan’s role in promoting unity within the Islamic world and its historical support for Palestine.

Separately, President Zardari met Iraq’s caretaker prime minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, where discussions focused on practical measures to deepen cooperation in priority sectors, including defence training, trade facilitation, and improved arrangements for pilgrims. Both sides agreed to sustain engagement through established institutional channels.

Pakistan–Sudan Engagement: Defence Cooperation and Maritime Connectivity

In August, Pakistan and Sudan took a significant step toward deepening defence cooperation when Lieutenant General Pilot Al-Tahir Mohamed Al-Awad Al-Amin, Commander of the Sudanese Air Force, led a high-level delegation to Pakistan. The visit included meetings with Pakistan’s defence minister, the leadership of the Pakistan Air Force, and senior military officials, alongside representatives from Sudan’s Defence Industries Organization. Media reports at the time suggested that discussions culminated in a large prospective defence package valued at over US$1.5 billion, covering trainer/light attack aircraft, multiple UAV platforms, armoured vehicles, air defence systems, and support for legacy fighter aircraft. The scale of the reported package indicated Sudan’s continued reliance on military solutions amid stalled political negotiations and ongoing regional conflict, with indications that third-party financing would be required.

This trajectory was later recalibrated but formalised on 13 October 2025, when Sudan and Pakistan signed a revised defence agreement worth approximately US$230 million. The finalized deal focused on more immediately deployable capabilities, including K-8 trainer/light attack aircraft, Shahpar-II unmanned combat aerial vehicles, MR-10 surveillance drones, and Mohafiz-IV armoured security vehicles. According to reports by regional media outlets, the agreement followed the suspension of the earlier, more expansive package—reportedly due in part to constraints on missile system transfers and sanctions-related sensitivities. Deliveries are expected via Port Sudan for heavy vehicles and Wadi Sayyidna Air Base for aerial systems, showing the operational integration of air and ground components.

Strategically, the agreement reflects Sudan’s efforts to rebuild airpower, surveillance, and mobility capabilities amid a protracted conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces that has persisted since April 2023. By prioritising UAVs, light attack aircraft, and armoured mobility, Khartoum appears to be addressing immediate intelligence, reconnaissance, and rapid-response needs, while also diversifying defence procurement away from Western suppliers constrained by embargoes. For Pakistan, the deal expands its defence export footprint in Africa, particularly in the UAV and light aircraft segments, reinforcing its position as an alternative supplier for states operating under sanctions or political restrictions.

Operationally, the agreement could enhance Sudan’s aerial intelligence and close air support capacity, while improving troop protection and mobility in contested urban and semi-urban environments. At the same time, observers note substantial risks: integrating and maintaining advanced systems amid conflict and sanctions will test Sudan’s logistical and training capacity, while additional firepower may intensify fighting and civilian harm. Questions also persist regarding transparency, financing mechanisms, and end-use compliance, all of which are likely to attract international scrutiny.

The defence dimension has been complemented by parallel economic and connectivity engagement. In October, Pakistan offered technical assistance to Sudan for the modernization of its maritime infrastructure following talks in Islamabad between Pakistan’s Maritime Affairs Minister Junaid Anwar Chaudhry and Sudan’s ambassador. Discussions covered port modernization, AI-enabled logistics, and the potential establishment of a direct shipping line linking Sudanese and Pakistani ports. Islamabad has framed this outreach as part of its broader geoeconomic strategy—leveraging port automation, smart logistics, and digital management systems developed during its own reform process—to position Sudan as a regional trade hub connecting South Asia, East Africa, and beyond.

Taken together, the defence and maritime initiatives illustrate a multidimensional expansion of Pakistan–Sudan relations, combining security cooperation with longer-term economic connectivity. While these engagements offer tangible gains for both sides—military capability for Sudan and export and strategic reach for Pakistan—they also carry humanitarian, operational, and reputational risks. Ultimately, the sustainability and impact of this partnership will depend not only on timely deliveries and technical integration, but also on whether enhanced capabilities contribute to stability or further entrench conflict in an already volatile regional environment

Pakistan’s Military Exercises in 2025: Interoperability, Counterterrorism, and Maritime Security

In 2025, Pakistan expanded defence engagements and conducted military exercises with foreign partners, using joint drills and multinational platforms to strengthen interoperability, enhance counterterrorism capabilities, and reinforce maritime security cooperation. These activities reflected Islamabad’s broader defence diplomacy strategy—leveraging operational experience, particularly in counterterrorism and maritime domains, to position itself as a constructive regional security actor while diversifying military partnerships across Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and beyond.

A central feature of Pakistan’s military diplomacy during the year was the AMAN 2025 multinational naval exercise, hosted by the Pakistan Navy in the North Arabian Sea off Karachi. With participation from more than 60 countries, including the United States, China, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, AMAN 2025 underscored Pakistan’s role as a convenor of inclusive maritime security cooperation. The exercise featured complex sea manoeuvres, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue operations, and live-fire drills, reinforcing collective approaches to counter-piracy and non-traditional maritime threats. The exercise series—“AMAN” meaning peace—has evolved into a globally recognised platform for naval interoperability amid increasingly contested maritime spaces.

Alongside multilateral engagement, Pakistan sustained an active schedule of bilateral and specialised exercises. In February, Pakistan and Turkey conducted Ataturk-XIII, a joint counterterrorism drill at Cherat, focusing on special operations, close-quarters battle, hostage rescue, and mountain warfare. During the same month, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia held Al-Samsaam VII, aimed at enhancing joint command, infantry manoeuvres, and urban counterterrorism operations—reinforcing a long-standing strategic military partnership. Pakistan also conducted Sea Guardians-III with China in the Arabian Sea, highlighting deepening naval cooperation through advanced anti-submarine, missile, and electronic warfare drills.

Maritime cooperation extended further through bilateral engagements with Russia and regional partners. In March, the Pakistan Navy and the Russia Navy conducted Arabian Monsoon VI in the Indian Ocean, integrating naval and air assets to address common maritime security threats. Pakistan also participated in the multinational KOMODO-25 exercise in Indonesia, reinforcing its contribution to collective maritime security, and engaged with United Arab Emirates through naval exercises and defence exhibitions, including IDEX and NAVDEX. Regular port visits, professional exchanges, and exercises such as Naseem Al Bahr-XV with Saudi naval forces further strengthened regional maritime coordination.

Counterterrorism cooperation remained a defining element of Pakistan’s military outreach. Pakistan conducted and hosted a wide range of special forces and CT-focused engagements, including Warrior-IX with China, Druzhba 2025 with Russia, Shaheen Strike-II with Indonesia, and Dostarym-V with Kazakhstan. These drills focused on hostage rescue, cordon-and-search operations, urban combat, and intelligence-driven missions, reflecting Pakistan’s intent to share operational experience gained from decades of counter-militancy campaigns. Pakistan also hosted CT training for foreign forces, including Iraqi troops, further underscoring its role as a regional capacity builder.

The scope of Pakistan’s military engagement extended beyond exercises to sustained training programmes and institutional cooperation. Joint drills with partners such as Oman through Exercise TAT-2025, engagements with Morocco, and specialised training with UAE forces depcted the geographic breadth of Pakistan’s military engagement. Participation in multinational exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean and hosting foreign contingents at Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Centre further reinforced Islamabad’s emphasis on interoperability and professional military exchange.

While these engagements do not signal formal alliances, they demonstrate Pakistan’s intent to diversify defence partnerships, contribute to regional stability, and enhance readiness against both conventional and non-traditional security threats. The challenge ahead will be sustaining this operational tempo and translating military engagements into longer-term strategic and economic dividends amid evolving regional and global security dynamics.